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Grant Miller: Managerial Incentives in Public Service Delivery

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

Archived Abstract of Former PSC Researcher

Slemrod, Joel, and John D. Wilson. 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens." Journal of Public Economics, 93(11-12): 1261-1270.

We develop a taxcompetition framework in which some jurisdictions, called taxhavens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of taxhavens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become taxhavens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs.

DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.08.004 (Full Text)

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