Home > Publications . Search All . Browse All . Country . Browse PSC Pubs . PSC Report Series

PSC In The News

RSS Feed icon

Bloomberg cites MTF data in story on CDC's anti-smoking ads for e-cigarettes

Bound says notion that foreign students are displacing U.S. students "isn't right"

Prescott says online option for access to court system can help equalize justice

Highlights

U-M ranked #1 in Sociology of Population by USN&WR's "Best Graduate Schools"

PAA 2015 Annual Meeting: Preliminary program and list of UM participants

ISR addition wins LEED Gold Certification

PSC Fall 2014 Newsletter now available

Next Brown Bag

Mon, March 23
Lundberg, State Care of the Elderly & Labor Supply of Adult Children

Tax competition with parasitic tax havens

Archived Abstract of Former PSC Researcher

Slemrod, Joel, and John D. Wilson. 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens." Journal of Public Economics, 93(11-12): 1261-1270.

We develop a taxcompetition framework in which some jurisdictions, called taxhavens, are parasitic on the revenues of other countries, and these countries use resources in an attempt to limit the transfer of tax revenue from capital taxation to the havens. We demonstrate that the full or partial elimination of taxhavens would improve welfare in non-haven countries. We also demonstrate that the smaller countries choose to become taxhavens, and we show that the abolition of a sufficiently small number of the relatively large havens leaves all countries better off, including the remaining havens. We argue that these results extend to the case where there are also taxes on wage income that involve administrative and compliance costs.

DOI:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.08.004 (Full Text)

Browse | Search : All Pubs | Next