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Persico, N., J.R. Pueblita, and Daniel Silverman. 2011. "Factions and Political Competition." Journal of Political Economy, 119(2): 242-288.
This paper presents a new model of political competition in which candidates belong to factions. Before elections, factions compete to direct local public goods to their local constituencies. The model of factional competition delivers a rich set of implications relating the internal organization of the party to the allocation of resources. In doing so, the model provides a unified explanation of two prominent features of public resource allocations: the persistence of (possibly inefficient) policies and the tendency of public spending to favor incumbent party strongholds over swing constituencies.
DOI:10.1086/660298 (Full Text)
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