Monday, April 21
Grant Miller: Managerial Incentives in Public Service Delivery
a PSC Research Project [ARCHIVE DISPLAY]
Investigator: Joel Slemrod
We propose to study the special problems posed for taxation by family firms in four steps. First, we will construct a formal model of family firms, stressing their role in overcoming agency problems in a low-trust environment and facilitating tax evasion. Second, we will formalize the problems this business structure poses for tax enforcement and the ways that governments can effectively collect revenue in the presence of such business structures. Third, in the context of the model we will examine what would be the most effective enforcement and collection methods, which we suspect will go beyond traditional instruments such as tax audits and penalties to cover third-party reporting and remittance of revenue by government and large firms and involving the financial sector. Finally, we will outline (but not implement) an empirical project that will test the hypotheses generated by the theoretical modeling, including what data would need to be collected and how it will be analyzed.
|Funding:||International Growth Centre|
Funding Period: 08/21/2009 to 12/31/2011
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