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Developmental Idealism and Migration: Theorizing their Relationship and an Empirical Example from Nepal
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Abstract

This paper brings together both theoretically and empirically two strands of social science research: migration and developmental idealism. The paper is motivated by the fact that there are extensive bodies of research about migration and about developmental idealism, but almost no discussion in the literature about how they might be interconnected. We present theoretical arguments concerning the influence of migration in distributing developmental idealism around the world and in developmental idealism being a force influencing the migration decisions of people. We also provide an empirical investigation of how variation in developmental idealism may have been an influence on migration and choice of migration destinations in Nepal. Thus, we extend the developmental idealism literature to include migration and the migration literature to include developmental idealism.
Developmental Idealism and Migration: Theorizing their Relationship and an Empirical Example from Nepal

Introduction

This paper is designed to bring together both theoretically and empirically two strands of social science research: migration and developmental idealism. Although there are extensive bodies of research about migration and about developmental idealism, there is almost no discussion in the literature about how they might be interconnected. To be sure, Melegh (2012) has suggested that developmental idealism may play a role in decisions about migration, and Thornton et al. (2015) have called for research on the interconnections between migration and developmental idealism, but general theoretical discussions and empirical research on the topic are still lacking. In this paper we present theoretical arguments concerning the influence of migration in distributing developmental idealism around the world and in developmental idealism being a force influencing the decisions of people to migrate and where to migrate. We also provide an empirical investigation of how variation in developmental idealism may have been an influence on migration and choice of migration destinations in Nepal. Thus, in this paper, we both extend the developmental idealism literature to include migration and extend the migration literature to include developmental idealism.

As discussed by Thornton and colleagues (Thornton 2005; Thornton et al. 2015), developmental idealism (hereafter DI) is a cultural system or model that—like other cultural systems—contains important worldviews and numerous scripts about how the world works and how people should live in the world. As such, DI includes numerous values about what makes up the good life. It also contains numerous beliefs about how the good life is obtained, with the
things perceived to bring the good life also valued in their own right. These scripts of values and beliefs thus provide motivations for goals to attain and mechanisms for attaining those goals.

At its core, DI culture contains the belief that societies follow a developmental trajectory from lower to higher levels of development. DI culture also posits that life in developed—or modern—societies is better than life elsewhere—and developed societies are often seen as models for other people to follow. This DI culture emerged in northwestern Europe, with the clear suggestion that populations in these societies—and their overseas transplantations—are at the highest levels of development, have the best lifestyles, and are models to emulate.

Research on the interconnections of migration and DI is important because the DI literature (Thornton 2005; Thornton et al 2015) has argued that this DI culture has been widely disseminated through many mechanisms around the world where it has been a powerful force influencing many dimensions of social, economic, and demographic life. In fact, the DI literature has asserted that this global dissemination of DI worldviews, beliefs, and values has not only been among elite national and international actors but has extended to the grassroots and the everyday lives of individual people. In addition, the DI literature has asserted that the spread of DI culture has not only influenced social and economic institutions at the societal level, but the decisions that individuals in everyday life make about such things as their modes of production, school enrollment, and family and demographic behavior. Thus, it is important to understand both how DI has been disseminated around the world as well as how it has influenced social and economic institutions and the lives of individuals in everyday life.

This paper contributes to this important research agenda about the dissemination and influence of DI by providing theoretical arguments suggesting that migration is likely to be an important global disseminator of DI. We build off of previous work about the influence of
migration in distributing people, resources, and ideas to make theoretical arguments about how migration can be an important global disseminator of DI (Berry et al. 2006; Compernolle and Axinn 2019; Córdova and Hiskey 2019; Duquette-Rury et al. 2018; Krawatzek and Müller-Funk 2019; Lacroix et al. 2016; Leavitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Portes et al. 1980; Vari-Lavoisier 2016). We also build off of previous work about the importance of DI in influencing a range of demographic and familial processes to show how endorsement of DI culture could be an important force affecting both the decision to migrate and the choice of migration destinations (Carling 2002; Carling and Schewel 2018; De Jong 2000; De Jong and Fawcett 1981; De Jong et al. 1996; Deane 1990; Fischer and Malmberg 2001; Hughes et al. 2020; Irwin et al. 2004; Ryo 2013; Schewel 2019; Thornton et al. 2019a; 2019c).

Our research is also important because we not only provide discussion of the dual directions of the theoretical relationship between migration and DI but also undertake the first empirical testing of one aspect of the relationship between DI and migration. Although we believe that our theoretical arguments call for empirical research concerning both the influence of migration on the dissemination of DI and the influence of DI on migration, our empirical work focuses exclusively on the influence of DI on migration. This decision to focus empirically only on the influence of DI on migration was dictated by the fact that we have valuable data for this purpose from Nepal, but do not have appropriate data in Nepal to examine the influence of migration on the dissemination of DI. In addition to having useful data from Nepal for studying the influence of DI on migration, Nepal, like some other South Asian countries, has widespread dissemination of DI, and substantial domestic and international migration.

Our empirical work uses the Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS), a panel study of a sample of respondents from south-central Nepal that extends from 2008 through 2012. The data
are appropriate for our research because they contain detailed histories of respondents’ movement out of Chitwan and their migration destinations, which are very diverse—ranging from internally within Nepal and to international destinations, including India, the Persian Gulf, Japan, Australia, and Western Europe. Most importantly, the CVFS also includes one of the broadest sets of survey measures of DI values and beliefs currently available (Allendorf and Thornton 2015). Our empirical analyses, therefore, offer an important starting point in understanding the effects of DI on migration and the choice of migrant destinations. The CVFS also includes extensive information about socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, and we control for these in our empirical research to minimize the influence of misspecification bias.

We now turn to a fuller discussion of the conceptual and theoretical ideas motivating our research. Because we are introducing DI to the migration literature, it is necessary to provide significant information about several elements of DI and its international spread and influence on various institutions and behaviors. We begin with a discussion of the central elements of DI as a culture containing an array of worldviews, values, and beliefs for understanding the world and how to live in it. We then discuss the international spread of DI from its origins in Europe and theorize about how migration could be a factor in that dissemination. We follow this with a discussion of how DI influences several institutions and behaviors, with particular emphasis on theoretical propositions about how DI could influence decisions about migration. We then discuss Nepal as a study site, our data and methods, and end with results and conclusions.

However, before embarking on a discussion of DI culture, it is important to be clear that we are not endorsing its worldviews, beliefs, and values as being correct, good, or in need of being emulated. In fact, we recognize that serious challenges have been made to DI culture as a model for interpreting the world and for acting in the world. Our goal instead is to describe it
without evaluation—as we would any other culture—with the goal of understanding its worldviews, beliefs, and values and how it has been disseminated and been influential in producing tension, conflict, and changes in individual behavior. In addition, in our discussion of DI culture, we must use the language of DI to discuss its worldviews, values, and beliefs—language that uses such concepts as developed and modernity. We do so without any implication that we ourselves apply such language to describe nations, people, ideas, and behavior patterns.

**The Elements of Developmental Idealism Culture**

The origins of the DI cultural system or model lie in ancient Greece, Rome, and early Christian theologians where writers posited societal development as a process of birth, childhood, adulthood, decline, and death, with the pace of change varying across societies (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1969; Pagden 1982; Thornton 2005). In the 17th century, this model of growth and decline was reformulated when “the metaphor of genesis and decay was stripped….of its centuries-old property of decay leaving only genesis and growth” (Nisbet 1969:109). This optimistic view arguing for continual growth and development became the dominant developmental model from the mid-18th century (Thornton 2005). This developmental model posited social change as relatively uniform development that varied in velocity across different societies, with the result being a cross-sectional continuum or hierarchy from less to more developed (Mandelbaum 1971; Nisbet 1969; Thornton 2005). Among prominent scholars of the time, northwest Europe and its overseas populations were viewed as the most developed while other societies were perceived lower down on the developmental continuum. An expansion in global economic inequality during the 19th and 20th centuries likely reinforced this perception, while southwest and central Europe, Japan, and other east Asian countries gradually became seen as highly developed as they grew wealthier.
Thornton and colleagues (2015:281-282) also indicated that “the identification of northwest Europe and its overseas populations with modernity” led to a belief that other societies should copy them to become like them. Thornton and colleagues went on to identify a wide range of societal and familial attributes that DI identifies with modernity and northwest Europe. At the societal level this includes economic growth, free markets, education, good health, technological and industrial innovation, urbanization, and democratic institutions. At the individual and familial level this includes the nuclear family, relatively older age of first marriage, family planning, gender equality, individual human rights, and self-expression. Alongside these attributes, DI culture posits other social values as helpful for and indicators of development: “pluralistic norms and laws, an emphasis on the individual as compared to the family and community, universalism, freedom, equality, human rights, secularism…and scientific-rational decision making” (Thornton et al. 2015:285).

DI specifies both values and beliefs concerning these various dimensions of personal and societal life it labels as modern. DI culture gives priority and preference to the general attributes of modern society, modern family systems, modern political systems, and modern economies over other societal, family, political, and economic systems. The central general belief within DI culture is that many attributes of modernity are interconnected within a web of cause and effect relationships (Lai and Thornton 2015).

It is important to note that while we discuss worldviews, values, and beliefs as different concepts, they are often intertwined into a zeitgeist of interrelated ideational factors. For example, things that are believed to produce the good life may themselves become values (Lai and Thornton 2015). In addition, things that are valued may be incorporated into beliefs about how the good life is produced. Cultural elements can also take on a life of their own and be
almost automatically accepted by individuals (Johnson-Hanks et al 2011). It is also possible that DI can become so prevalent and strong that in some cases it can be viewed as a secular religion—a religion that competes with other religious systems such as Hinduism and Islam. DI can also be like religion in that it can become an identity that people adopt (Liechty 2003; Osella and Osella 2006; 2008). That is, commitment to DI can extend beyond worldviews, beliefs, and values in that modernity can become an identity in that people see themselves as “modern” and “cosmopolitan” in contrast to being “less developed” or “local” people. And, this “modern” identity can be held in conjunction with other identities such as mother and teacher.

We do not mean to suggest that all of the elements of DI fit together into a neat package of tightly interconnected beliefs and values. Rather, we follow Allendorf and Thornton (2015) in suggesting that DI comes in different varieties—sometimes with some scripts or elements closely interconnected with other scripts—and sometimes the various elements are loosely related or even unrelated. In this way the specifics of DI can be different across history, geography, communities, and individuals, while maintaining general similarities.

We noted earlier that DI originated in northwest Europe and generally identifies modernity with that region. However, northwest European societies have changed significantly over the past several centuries, which has induced evolution and variation in the specific elements of DI at different times and places. Some forms of DI are likely to focus on the attributes observed in northwest Europe in the 19th century and other forms focus on 20th or 21st century societies believed to be developed, which includes southwest and central Europe, European diaspora populations in Australia, Canada, and the United States, as well as wealthy countries in east Asia. Changes in these societies that are particularly relevant here are the increases in divorce and sex, cohabitation, and childbearing outside marriage, as well as the
acceptance of homosexuality. In fact, these elements of some 20th and 21st century societies are often disliked and rejected as elements of DI and seen as “western” rather than “modern”. For example, several scholars show a growing divergence in policies and attitudes cross-nationally with respect to homosexuality (Ferguson 2019; Hadler and Symons 2018; Roberts 2018). Others show how divorce is not an explicitly promoted value within DI, but a spill-over effect from norms of individuality, human rights, and gender equality (Wang and Schofer 2018). Other studies document how sex, cohabitation, and childbearing outside of marriage continue to be labeled as “western” rather than “modern” in many societies (Allendorf and Pandian 2016; Pigg 2001). This distinction between the original and new formulations of DI will be relevant when we later turn to our empirical indicators of DI.

**Migration as a Mechanism for the International Spread of Developmental Idealism**

Although migration has not been previously identified as a mechanism for the spread of DI, many mechanisms have been identified as disseminators of DI culture (Thornton et al. 2015). Among the most important global mechanisms identified for the dissemination of DI from northwest Europe and its overseas diasporas are international actors such as the United Nations, Christian missionaries, transnational corporations and businesses, and numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations. Other dissemination mechanisms are colonization, international conflicts, and tourism. Also of great importance are the mass media and mass education, foreign aid programs, and numerous social movements, including those for gender equality, civil rights, and democracy. Different mechanisms have factored more prominently across some societies than others: “this variation can be attributed to cultural and structural differences in the places where DI is being disseminated, differences in the intentions of
purveyors of DI…and differences in the effectiveness of particular mechanisms in cross-national and within-country dissemination” (Thornton et al. 2015:290).

The DI literature has documented how the culture of DI has spread widely among both national and international elites. Such spread has been shown in such widespread organizations as the United Nations, the international family planning program, the governments of Kenya and the United States, and the Chinese Communist Party (Thornton 2005; Thornton and Xie 2016; Watkins and Hodgson 2019). The extensive literature generally defined as world polity, world society, or world culture literature has also documented widespread dissemination of many things widely considered as indicative of societal development in the laws, policies, and programs adopted by national governments (Krücken and Drori 2009; Meyer et al. 1997).

Among the many changes documented in this literature are the expansion of schools and the increased enrollment of children, increased support for human rights, the adoption of programs encouraging gender equality and discouraging female circumcision, and removing laws regulating sexual behavior (Baker and Letendre 2005; Berkovitch 1999; Boyle 2002; Chabbott 2003; Cole 2005; Frank et al. 2010; Meyer et al. 2010).

There is also a substantial literature showing that many DI worldviews, values, and beliefs have spread to the grassroots in many places around the world. Ethnographic data from Nepal, Sub-Saharan Africa, India, Vietnam, China, New Guinea, and the Middle East have revealed ordinary people using the conceptual framework of DI and expressing many DI’s beliefs and values (Ahearn 2001; Caldwell et al. 1988; Dahl and Rabo 1992; Ferguson 1999; Hoang 2014; Jayakody 2019; Osella and Osella 2006; Pigg 1992; Wang 1999; Yount et al. 2010). Similarly, recent survey research and investigation of internet searches have documented widespread knowledge of development scripts (the causes and consequences of development) and of shared
beliefs in a similar hierarchical order of nations by their level of development (Binstock et al. 2013; Binstock and Thornton 2007; Dorius 2016; Dorius and Swindle 2019; Melegh et al. 2013, 2016; Thornton et al. 2012a; Xie et al. 2012). Recent survey research has also documented widespread beliefs among many ordinary people around the world that development is closely connected to many aspects of family life such as nuclear households, low fertility, gender equality, mature ages at marriage, and self-choice marriages, as well as political freedoms, including democracy and respect for human rights (Abbasi-Shavazi et al. 2012; Allendorf 2013; Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Binstock and Thornton 2007; Gjonça and Thornton 2019; Kavas and Thornton 2020; Lai and Thornton 2015; Thornton et al. 2012c; 2014; 2017).

There are many reasons to believe that migration is an important disseminator of DI. We theorize that migration disseminates DI both for migrants and for their relatives and friends who stay behind. This likely occurs because internal migration often takes people from rural to urban areas where there is more access to international information flows from such things as the mass media, schools, and international agencies. Similarly, international migration takes people across borders and often into contact with the worldviews, values, and beliefs of DI. This is likely to be particularly true when the migrations are to destinations where DI is especially common and the standard of living is high.

Our theoretical framework joins a body of literature about how the migration process affects migrants’ beliefs, values, and aspirations. Classical theories of assimilation and acculturation address the extent to which the identities and attitudes of migrants change or remain intact due to their migration experience (e.g. Berry et al. 2006; Portes et al. 1980). These theories show that migrants, informed by their experience in a new host country, change their own attitudes and behavior and shape political and economic activities in their home country.
(Compernolle and Axinn 2019; Córdova and Hiskey 2019; Duquette-Rury et al. 2018; Krawatzek and Müller-Funk 2019; Lacroix et al. 2016; Leavitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Vari-Lavoisier 2016). Building on these findings, we theorize how migrants to certain destinations saturated with DI culture serve to spread DI culture when communicating with friends and family back home or themselves returning home.

Migrants’ exposure to DI culture comes from interaction with inhabitants at the destination. Personal friendships and work acquaintances are likely to be especially powerful influences, in particular those who become involved in a long-term intimate relationship with a person native to the destination. Also important is the nature of a migrant’s work environment: migrants that work and live predominantly alongside other migrants may be less exposed to DI culture relative to those migrating for enrollment in higher education, for example. However, a strong ethnic enclave may also more effectively transmit DI culture by translating it such that it is more understandable and by offering an example of how to combine DI culture with the cultural ideals of one’s home community (see Portes and Bach 1985:20-26). Beyond these factors, the discrimination migrants face in the new destination negatively affects whether and how much they acculturate to their new destination.

Having traveled to a new destination and exposed to DI culture, migrants can then share it with their non-migrating relatives and friends in their home country. This can happen via communication technologies, visits home, or return migration. Such interpersonal contacts are likely to be especially powerful forms of DI dissemination back in migrants’ home countries.

Scholars conceptualize such flows of ideational models from a migrant’s destination back to their home country as social and cultural remittances (Levitt 1998; Levitt and Jaworsky 2007; Rapoport et al. 2019; Suksomboon 2008). Many show how different ideals flow across the world.
via migrants back to their home countries, such as entrepreneurship and demands for political representation (Krawatzek and Müller-Funk 2019; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Vari-Lavoisier 2016). The flow of these cultural remittances has important effects on home countries, changing social institutions and political regimes (Córdova and Hiskey 2019; Duquette-Rury et al. 2018; Lacroix et al. 2016).

We contend that when migrants move to a place where DI culture is more pervasive and institutionalized than in their origin, the cultural remittances they transmit to people back in their home communities are often rooted in DI culture. In fact, several of the studies of cultural remittances focus on the flow of specific ideals that fit within the spectrum of DI culture. For example, Duquette-Rury et al. (2018) find that people in Mexico with greater social network ties to migrants in the United States harbor greater suspicion of domestic political corruption, a growing concern within DI culture (Thornton et al. 2017). Most telling, Rapoport et al. (2019) use cross-national data to study people’s attitudes about a wide variety of social issues, including gender equality and personal freedom that constitute important elements of DI culture. They observe that as migration increases, the attitudes of people in migrant-sending countries converge toward the attitudes of people in migrant-receiving countries, even when return migrants are excluded. They do not find evidence that cultural convergence happens in the other direction as a result of rising immigration. These findings suggest that migrants are broadly disseminating DI culture to friends and family back home.

Stepping back, this theorization of how migration can spread DI, leads to a few general expectations. First, sending countries will become more like receiving countries. More specifically, greater out-migration to a country that people believe to be especially developed will lead to ideational and behavioral changes among people in the sending country that match
the receiving country. Following this line of logic for a specific example, we would expect that family size preferences and fertility will decrease in a society with relatively higher fertility preferences and rates as more of its inhabitants move to societies widely believed to be very developed. We theorize that such factors will have an independent influence on people, net of known socioeconomic, demographic, and other cultural factors.

**The Influence of Developmental Idealism on Migration**

We now turn our attention from how migration disseminates DI to the influence of DI on migration. Although the DI literature has not previously theorized about the influence of the spread of DI on migration, it has argued both theoretically and empirically that DI has influenced many dimensions of life around the world. DI has been introduced into populations from the outside through some combination of insiders reaching out for DI and through outsiders introducing DI into the country, sometimes coercively. Among the consequences of these exchanges are substantial “clashes of cultures” that have produced substantial social tension, resistance, and sometimes violence (Kavas 2015; Kavas and Thornton 2013; Thornton 2005; Thornton et al. 2015).

The DI literature has also argued that the spread of DI culture has influenced many institutions and behaviors around the world, suggesting that it may also influence migration. Research at the international level has indicated that DI has been a central factor in the spread of family planning programs, campaigns to increase age at marriage, efforts to eliminate polygamy, and the movement for gender equality (Thornton 2005; Thornton et al. 2015). There is also evidence that DI has brought substantial changes at national and regional levels. Watkins and Hodgson (2019) have described how the introduction of the DI-motivated international family planning program into Kenya was initially met with substantial resistance, but eventually led to
significant change. Kavas and Thornton (2013) and Yount and Rashad (2008) have argued that DI was important in changing family and demographic behavior in several Middle Eastern countries, including Egypt, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey. In addition, Kavas (2015) and Kavas and Thornton (2013) have argued that the introduction and strong governmental endorsement of DI in Turkey facilitated the secularization of the country, the adoption of the Gregorian calendar and Latin alphabet, and the spread of western European clothing styles. Also, Thornton and Philipov (2009) have provided arguments about how DI may have facilitated the large declines in family formation—both marriage and childbearing—in central and eastern Europe during the 1990s. DI has also been credited with bringing changes in family and demographic behavior in several Asian contexts, including China, India, Malaysia, and Nepal (Allendorf 2013; Allendorf and Pandian 2016; Cammack and Heaton 2011; Thornton 2005; Thornton and Xie 2016).

Research using panel studies of individuals has also shown effects of DI on family and demographic behavior. DI has been shown to increase people choosing their own spouses, contracting intercaste marriages, and entering marriages at older ages (Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Allendorf et al. 2019). In the case of these marriage behaviors, it was the parts of DI directly related to marriage, rather than more distant elements of DI, that influenced the marriage behaviors themselves. This is consistent with Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2009) theory of reasoned action and planned behavior, which indicates that behavior is more closely affected by ideational elements that are conceptually closest to the behavior in question.

We advance the literature on the influences of DI by theorizing how DI beliefs and values can have effects on decisions about migration. We build on previous migration research that has extended the dominant model of socioeconomic factors predicting migration to include a range of ideational factors as relevant in migration decisions. Particularly relevant here is the work of
De Jong and colleagues who used a value-expectancy approach to document the influence of expectations and norms on the decision to migrate in multiple Asian settings (De Jong 2000; De Jong and Fawcett 1981; De Jong, et al. 1996). Carling and Schewel (2018) outlined how aspirations to migrate combine with migration opportunities to influence who migrates versus who stays (also Carling 2002; Schewel 2019). In addition, Ryo (2013) has shown that various norms, values, and beliefs influence migration to the United States from Mexico, and others have documented the importance of material aspirations, fatalistic beliefs, and attitudes toward family obligations on migration from Nepal (Hughes et al. 2020; Thornton et al 2019a; 2019c). There is also a body of research showing that psychological satisfaction with the local community is related to out-migration decisions (Bach and Smith 1977; Deane 1990; Fischer and Malmberg 2001; Irwin et al. 2004; Speare 1974; Speare et al. 1975; 1982; Uhlenberg 1973). In this paper we extend the literature on ideational factors involved in migration to include DI.

The DI research literature to date has focused almost exclusively on the institutional and behavioral adjustments that people make within their home communities, without considering the possibility that the reaction to the acceptance of DI could be the decision to migrate away from the home community, either internally within one’s own country or internationally. The same considerations that would lead some people to adopt the values and beliefs of DI within their home communities, and to incorporate DI-valued institutions and behavior such as attending schools, marrying at later ages, or adopting more egalitarian family patterns, would lead people to want to migrate to places that were more imbued with DI than their home communities.

This phenomenon has operated at the aggregate or national level. In some cases—for example, China—governments and communities have recruited and sent people to places seen as
more developed—such as western Europe and North America—for higher education, including knowledge of modernity and how to achieve it (Cartier 1996; Gassler 1968; Schwartz 1964; Spence 1999; Wang 1999). This phenomenon also probably operates at the individual level, as people who adopt DI beliefs might be more motivated than others to want to migrate to places characterized by the attributes of development. For example, a desire for the greater income and resources associated with places seen as more developed could motivate people to migrate, as an extensive body of research has shown that migration is strongly motivated by desires to increase resources, to attain a higher level of economic well-being, and to decrease financial risks (Donato 1993; Liang and White 1997; Massey et al. 1994; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Reed et al. 2010; Sjaastad 1962; Stark and Taylor 1991; Todaro and Maruszko 1987; Thornton et al. 2019c; VanWey 2005). DI beliefs and values and a desire for such things as greater educational opportunities for self and children and for the greater personal freedom and autonomy in the places identified as more developed than one’s home community could also lead to migration.

Similarly, a commitment to modernity and DI culture could encourage people to migrate to communities where their values and beliefs are generally shared by those around them. For example, people who value such things as democracy, gender equality, autonomy in spouse choice, and sexual freedom may be motivated to migrate away from their home societies to places where such behaviors are perceived to be more accepted and common, or at least not forcibly repressed (Carrillo 2018). This could occur because people want to adopt such behaviors themselves or because they want to live in settings where such ideas and opportunities are more accepted and widespread.

We mentioned earlier that for some people commitment to DI culture can become so extensive that they identify themselves as modern. Research on self-identity shows that how
people identify themselves have substantial implications for a wide array of personal perspectives, well-being, relationships, and behaviors (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Stets and Burke 2000; Hitlin 2003; Rise, Sheeran, and Hukkelberg 2010; Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 2010). This suggests that people who identify with modernity and accept DI beliefs and values may also come to have less commitment to their societies’ common institutions, behaviors, and practices that they see as contrary to DI culture.

Following this line of thought, lower commitment to their home society may in turn lead to less satisfaction and more desire to leave, especially to a place they view as being more modern. This could be places identified as particularly modern such as America, Australia, and Europe, or it could be other places such as Japan, or to places within one’s own country that are seen to be more developed than their home communities. Osella and Osella (2006; 2007; 2008) have argued that such views and perceptions about the level and type of modernity existing in one’s home society and in other places have affected migration from South Asia. Similarly, Krivonos and Näre (2019) have reported that migrants from the former Soviet Union to Finland often use comparisons between the relative modernity of Finland and their home countries to explain their decisions to migrate. Koikkalainen and colleagues (2019, p. 7) have made this point more broadly, suggesting that Western countries are often seen by potential migrants as “democratic, modern and affluent” and thus offer good possibilities as migrant destinations. This line of reasoning is consistent with an extensive body of research showing that satisfaction with one’s local community leads to lower rates of out-migration (Bach and Smith 1977; Deane 1990; Fischer and Malmberg 2001; Irwin et al. 2004; Speare 1974; Speare et al. 1975; 1982; Uhlenberg 1973).
These considerations suggest that commitment to DI values and beliefs increase not only the likelihood of migration but also the choice of migration destinations. This is likely true because potential migration destinations are not alike in terms of their implementation of DI. Some destinations have societies that are supportive of DI while others may be less supportive. We believe that these aspects of potential destinations play into those societies attracting or not attracting people with strong commitment to DI. This perspective is consistent with previous research showing that people at the grassroots have views about many elements of life in other places around the world and that such views affect their choices about where to migrate (Bjarnason and Thorlindsson 2006; De Jong 2000; De Jong et al. 1983; De Jong et al. 1996; South and Crowder 1997; Stinner and Van Loon 1992; Thissen et al. 2010; van Dalen and Henkens 2013).

We suggested earlier that many people around the world have perceptual hierarchies of societal development levels, with a range of perceived development from low to high. This likely translates to a hierarchy of destination spots for many potential migrants. More specifically, the places identified as being particularly modern would be seen as especially attractive and the places seen as being the least modern would be seen as the least desirable destinations—with this modernity hierarchy having implications for destination choices. Our general expectation is that those with strong commitment to DI will be more likely to choose places that are compatible with DI and less likely to choose places that are incompatible with DI.

**Nepal as a Study Setting**

Drawing upon our theorizing about the intersections of DI and migration, we now apply our framework to the case of Nepal. Our aim of outlining this case is to provide an empirical application of our theory. In our empirical analysis, we focus exclusively on the influence of DI
on migration and do not examine empirically the influence of migration on the dissemination of DI.

In turning our attention to Nepal, we follow Massey et al. (1993) in arguing that understanding the study setting is important in the translation of general arguments and expectations into concrete empirical research. This leads us to a discussion about the culture of Nepal, the historical introduction of DI into Nepali society, and domestic and international migration.

Nepal is located on the South-Asian subcontinent, is mountainous, and has historically had many of the elements that DI has associated with the lack of development: a rural low-income agricultural economy, limited formal education, and high mortality. Many of the attributes of the family that DI has labeled as traditional have historically been part of Nepali culture and social structure. Among these are multi-generation families, considerable control of parents over children, early and arranged marriages, high fertility, and gender inequality. The country has also historically had a rigid caste system that strictly limited inter-caste relationships, including marriage.

Although Nepal was largely kept in isolation from the outside world before 1950, there were some international interchanges (Adhikari 1998). These included the long-term practice of Nepali men serving in the British and Indian armies. The country became much more open and integrated into the global community beginning in the 1950s, and is now a major destination for international tourists.

**Developmental Idealism in Nepal**

Of importance for our paper is that over the last several decades development has been an important part of the Nepali national agenda (Bista 1991). This national emphasis on
development can be seen by the fact that in 1956 the country started drafting and implementing five-year development plans and began to attract numerous international organizations dedicated to helping the country’s development efforts. Implementation of several rural development programs during the 1970s and 1980s (such as the Karnali-Bheri Integrated Rural Development Program, the Rapti Integrated Rural Development Program, and the Koshi-Hill Area Rural Development Program) also helped disseminate the ideas of development in Nepal. Moreover, in 1972, the country itself was geographically divided into development regions. The penetration of this development language and efforts to the grassroots is also evident in the fact that local government units were labeled as development committees such as Village Development Committees, District Development Committees, and Regional Development Committees. Various government ministries and departments also use names that contain the word development such as the Ministry of Local Development, the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, and the Department of Agriculture Development. A few banks and programs are also named with developmental language, such as the Agriculture Development Bank and Small Farmer Development Programs.

International, national, and local organizations have formulated policies and programs to implement DI goals; these include substantial increases in schools, transportation facilities, health services, and employment centers (Axinn and Yabiku 2001). Associated with these programs have been extensive increases in educational attainment, non-family employment, utilization of health clinics, the use of family planning services, increased age at marriage, reduced fertility rates, and consumption of mass media (Axinn and Barber 2001; Axinn and Yabiku 2001; Barber and Axinn 2004; Beutel and Axinn 2002; ICF International and PDMDP
In addition, Nepal has had initiatives to decrease caste, gender, and income inequalities (NESAC 1998; Government of Nepal 2014).

It is also important to note that the language of development has permeated to the grassroots in Nepal and has considerable influence on the ways people conceptualize and understand everyday life. The Nepali word for development is bikas (or vikas) and comes from the Sanskrit language, the meaning of which is commonly equated with expansion or improvement. The word bikas became more popular after 1951 when the country was opened to the outside world after the end of 104 years of Rana rule (Shrestha 1997).

The word bikas and its opposite, abikasi, are now firmly set in the minds of Nepalis, providing meaning and social distinctions at many levels—including the individual, the geographical, and even the biological. At the individual level, the name bikas connotes someone who is big, tall, or distinguished. There is a clear status divide between those who are seen as bikasi and those who are not. According to Shrestha (1997: 45), any individual “…who had acquired some knowledge of so-called modern science and technology identified themselves as bikasis (developed), supposedly with a ‘modern’ outlook, and the rest as abikasis or pakhe (uncivilized or backward).” People who work for the government or international agencies such as CARE Nepal and USAID are called bikasi people. Nepalis also label individuals as bikasi or abikasi based on their dress and outlooks; any individual who seems educated or wears pants and shirts (Nepali dress in rural areas is different and often varies by caste and ethnicity) is labeled as bikasi. This distinction between the bikasi and abikasi both defines and contributes to the social distance between the wealthy, educated, and powerful and the poor (Shrestha 1997).

The bikasi/abikasi classification scheme is also applied at the area or geographic level. Bikas is generally associated with urban areas or cities like Kathmandu and Pokhara or
externally to wealthy countries, as well as with roads and bridges, airplanes, schools, health services, large buildings, cinema halls, and so on (Pigg 1992; Shrestha 1997). Based on the availability of such infrastructure or amenities, people label places as having much bikas (dherai bikas), little bikas (thorai bikas), and no bikas (abikasi) (Pigg 1992). For example, most Nepalis live in villages and most of these villages have little such infrastructure and therefore, are labeled as abikasi villages. People in general believe that “bikas comes to local areas from elsewhere; it is not produced locally” (Pigg 1992:499). It is set in the minds of most people that bikas is administered from Kathmandu (the capital city) and comes mostly from outside of Nepal.

The concept of bikas is also so powerful and pervasive that some people now name their children “Bikash.” Bikash is listed on Nepali baby name websites, and substantial numbers of well-known, respected, and popular people in Nepal have the name Bikash.¹ It is also applied to many other things such as animals and crops: new breeds of animals and plants are often referred to as bikasi if they are not produced locally or are produced using seeds brought from outside or from seeds known to be improved through science (Pigg 1992:499). Also, chemical fertilizers are commonly known as bikasi fertilizer (Shrestha 2008:462-465).

Given the central nature of the concept and meaning of bikas in Nepali society, it is not surprising that many Nepalis understand the DI worldview of global developmental hierarchies, with countries arrayed from high to low development, with Nepal seen as being very low in the hierarchy (Thornton et al. 2008; 2012a; 2012c; 2019b). Furthermore, many Nepalis endorse the DI propositions that development and well-being are positively associated with such family

attributes as gender equality, the independence of children, marriage at mature ages, self-choice marriages, and low fertility (Thornton et al. 2008; 2012a; 2012c; 2019b).

Despite Nepalis’ endorsement of these propositions, there is continual resistance to aspects of DI related to premarital sexual behavior. Data from the nationally-representative Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys show that less than one percent of never married women ages 15-24 report ever having had sex (ICF 2020). Reports of premarital sex among never married men ages 15-24 are substantially higher and have increased from 17 percent in 2006 to 25 percent in 2016. It is likely that women underreport and men greatly inflate their premarital sexual behavior, as cross-national comparisons demonstrate this is a consistent pattern in most societal contexts. Regardless, these reported levels of premarital sex for Nepali women and men are among the very lowest in the world for women and towards the bottom for men as well. In-depth interviews by Menger et al. (2015) and Regmi et al. (2011) outline strong social norms discouraging sexual relationships before marriage, though these are increasingly less common among youth in Nepal’s most urban areas. Efforts to promote sex education in schools in Nepal often face substantial resistance among teachers, students, and parents (Pokharel et al. 2006). Overall, national survey data and qualitative studies indicate that Nepalis may be less likely to associate these newer aspects of DI promoting sexual freedom with their general understanding of bikas.

Migration in Nepal

Although there have long been opportunities for domestic and international migration in Nepal—such as service in the British and Indian armies (Gurung 1983; Rathaur 2001; Seddon et al. 2002; Thieme and Wyss 2005)—most domestic and international migration was difficult and infrequent prior to the middle of the 20th century. Population migration prior to 1950s was also
directed eastwards along the hill corridor (Gurung 1998). Beginning in the 1950s, Nepal experienced substantial domestic migration—a trend that accelerated across the rest of the 20th century. This migration was primarily directed from the north to the south. This was made possible, at least in part, by the eradication of malaria in the southern plains, improvements in transportation, and new development projects. New economic opportunities in Kathmandu also made migration from rural areas to the capital city much easier and more common.

The 1950s also brought increases in both the ease and frequency of migration outside the country, with the initial increase being concentrated on nearby India, with its open border. In the 1980s, the Nepali government instituted steps to increase international migration to other countries such as those in the Persian Gulf, as it licensed private agencies to recruit and send Nepali workers abroad (Government of Nepal 2016). The results were very large external migration streams to many places (Kern and Müller-Böker 2015; Kollmair et al. 2006; Thieme and Wyss 2005). For example, in 2011, there were about 2 million international migrants living in approximately 130 countries, with the prevalence of migration being particularly high for men and the young (Central Bureau of Statistics 2011; Government of Nepal 2014; Sharma and Gurung 2009). In 2017, this number has been estimated to be around four million (Adhikary and Teijlingen, 2019).

An important feature of international Nepali migration is that it is frequently temporary. Migration to nearby India is often seasonal or for just a couple years (Sharma and Thapa 2013). Migration to such destinations as Malaysia, South Korea, and the Persian Gulf are usually undertaken with fixed contracts arranged by brokers and lasting for approximately two to four years, with no possibility for permanent residence. Migrants to Europe, Australia, and North
America may have longer stays and permanent settlement in those countries is sometimes possible.

**Data and Methods**

**The Chitwan Valley Family Study**

We use the 2008-2012 Chitwan Valley Family Study (CVFS) as the primary data source for our empirical analysis. The original baseline data for this study was designed as a general purpose study useful for studying multiple things rather than a narrow study focused primarily on migration. The CVFS sampled all individuals living in the Chitwan Valley who were ages 12-59 in 2008. Our baseline survey for the sample of people ages 15-29 was conducted in 2008, and the comparable baseline for those 12-14 years of age in 2008 was conducted later—when those people turned age 15. The response rate was 97 percent for the baseline interview.

Baseline respondents residing continuously any place in Nepal were re-interviewed three times each year through 2012; 93 percent of these people were interviewed in all waves. Respondents who moved away from Nepal subsequent to the baseline interview were also re-interviewed in the thrice-yearly follow-ups that occurred before the international move. If the international migration occurred by June 2011, the migrants were re-interviewed after the move; the completion rate for these interviews was 95 percent. Baseline respondents who experienced either a domestic or international migration out of Chitwan by June 2011 provided information about the timing and destination of their moves.

The 2008-2012 CVFS also conducted thrice-yearly interviews with a household member to obtain information about all members of the original 2008 households—covering the 2008 through 2012 period. These household-level interviews collected information at the monthly level on births, deaths, marriages, school attendance, and residential location. This information
provided for each person in the household a continuous history of domestic and international
moves, covering an average of 49 months for our sample. The number of months covered for
each individual depended on the exact timing of the interviews. Because refusal rates were very
low and very few households were lost to follow-up, these household-level reports were obtained
for 98 percent of the original sample. We have migration timing and destinations for 97% of the
original sample.  

Defining Migration

The risk set of people for migration in our analyses are baseline respondents aged 15-59
at the baseline survey who were also interviewed in the first follow-up after the baseline. We
focus our analyses on the first migration following this follow-up in order to limit the effects of
reciprocal influences of migration on DI values and beliefs. Our definition of a migrant is anyone
who left their homes in Chitwan and lived outside the valley for six months or more following
the first follow-up interview after the baseline interview. We did not count people as migrants if
they left Chitwan for a period of less than six months. We also conducted sensitivity analyses
using one, three, and twelve months as the minimum time outside Chitwan to define migration.
Our results using these different specifications of migration are very similar, leading us to report
only the six-month specification results.

We defined our dependent variable of first migration away from Chitwan in two ways.
Our first way is any first migration, with no destination differentiation. Our Hypothesis One
indicates that we expect DI to be positively related to this dependent variable. Our second
categorization approach defined the dependent variable as the first migration, with four

\[\text{\footnotesize 2 When this information is available from the migrants themselves, we use that information, but use the migration information from the household-level interviews when it is not. This is a reasonable approach, especially given that the match between individual and household-level reports of migration is 98\%.} \]
categories of destinations: inside Nepal, the Persian Gulf, India, and the relatively Wealthy Western and Asian (WWA) countries across Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America.

The WWA countries are generally recognized as countries that Nepalis view as the most developed or modern (Thornton et al. 2012a). Our Hypothesis Two suggests that the effects of DI will be greatest for this destination. Australia, Japan, Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States were the seven primary destinations composing the WWA category. Migrants to these seven countries accounted for 86 percent of the migrants categorized as moving to WWA destinations. The other 14 percent of migrants categorized as going to WWA destinations were divided quite evenly among 11 countries: Belgium, Belize, Canada, China, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Maldives, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. These WWA countries come from a wide range of cultures, religions, and geographical locations, but all are classified as high or upper middle income countries by the World Bank, justifying grouping them together in our analysis.

We note that each of the other three destination categories are generally recognized by Nepalis as more modern or developed than the Chitwan Valley. This leads us to expect that DI would have positive effects on migration to each of these destinations. However, we do not have hypotheses about the relative effects of DI on migration to these three groups of countries. We do not make distinctions between India and places outside Chitwan in Nepal because many Chitwan migrants go to the capital city of Kathmandu, which is similar in many ways to India in terms of what it offers migrants. The Persian Gulf offers a bit of contradiction on development levels as its levels of income, education, and health—the three key components of the Human Development Index—are generally higher than those in Nepal and India, yet the Persian Gulf countries are often seen as having attributes generally associated with less development—such as
gender inequality and non-democratic governments. Moreover, the Persian Gulf countries are seen as a separate destination by Nepalis because of their fixed-term migration contracts and system (Thornton et al. 2019a).

Six main countries comprised our Persian Gulf destination category: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. We also included in the Persian Gulf category several destinations in the general Persian Gulf region: Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon. These four countries comprised only 7 percent of the people categorized as Persian Gulf migrants.

Developmental Idealism Measures

The 2008-2012 CVFS was a general purpose data collection project that included a focus of measuring DI beliefs and values related to marriage and childbearing. The data represent one of the most expansive sets of DI beliefs and values available (Allendorf and Thornton 2015). Still, the questions are not specifically related to DI beliefs and values about migration. This means that our use of DI measures that focus on family matters will likely underestimate the effects of DI on migration because as Fishbein and Eisen (2009) indicate, predictors covering the same content as the dependent variable are the most powerful predictors of that dependent variable. Nevertheless, we believe that our broad array of DI measures focused on family matters will provide a beginning examination of the overall influence of DI on migration.

Table 1 provides detailed information about the questions asked in the survey about DI. The first two sets of questions asked respondents to tell us their beliefs about the relationships between development and family change. The first set began with the following introduction: “Some people think that Nepal will become richer in the future. Let’s talk about what things that would increase and what things would decrease if Nepal became richer.” This introduction was followed with a series of questions of the following general type: “X. If Nepal becomes richer,
over time would that increase or decrease X?” The second set of questions reversed the order of causation and was introduced with the following introduction: “We have been talking about what might happen to families if Nepal became richer. Now we are going to talk about something different: what might happen to Nepal if some things about the Nepali family changed. For each of the following things, please tell me whether you think it would help make Nepal richer or help make Nepal poorer.” This introduction was followed with a series of questions of the following type: “What if fewer/more of X happened—would that help make Nepal richer or help make Nepal poorer?”

Our third and fourth sets of questions shifted the focus from DI beliefs to DI values or preferences about various kinds of family structures, either in the present or in the future. Our third set focused on the present, with the following introduction: “Now I would like you to compare different family situations. For each of the following comparisons, please tell me which situation would be better for most people in Nepal today.” This introduction was followed with a series of questions, as follows: “Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: X or not X?” Our final set focused on the future by asking respondents to “please think about the next twenty years in Nepal” and to say whether they believed that each of several family things would increase or decrease in the next twenty years. After answering whether each family thing would increase or decrease, respondents were asked the following question: “Suppose X increases in Nepal during the next twenty years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing or won’t it matter?” In our analyses we focus on the value dimension concerning whether a certain family change was viewed as a good or bad thing because moral evaluations are especially predictive of subsequent individual action (Miles 2015).
As indicated in Table 1, for each of the four DI dimensions, we asked about a series of family attributes, with exact question wording varying across the four DI dimensions: parents choosing who their children marry; divorce, unmarried men and women living together like married couples; premarital sex; people putting individual needs before family needs; married children living with their parents or in-laws; people marrying a person of a different caste; young widows getting remarried; child spacing (except for the third dimension); number of children (except for the second dimension); gender equality (except for the second dimension); and children taking care of older parents (except for the second dimension).

Note that DI questions belonging to Sets 1, 3, and 4 of Table 1 are divided into two sections within their respective sets. Questions appearing above the patterned line were asked of all respondents at the baseline. Questions appearing beneath the patterned line were asked at the first follow-up following the baseline. This timing difference was necessary because the baseline interview contained so many questions that we had to include some items in the first follow-up rather than the baseline survey. Consequently, since some of the DI questions were initially asked in the first follow-up, we limited our analyses to people interviewed at both the baseline and the first follow-up and began the analysis of migration in the first month after the first follow-up survey.

We noted earlier that some family attributes were identified as modern as early as the 19th century while other family attributes were not so identified until the 20th or 21st centuries—and are still controversial in many places. Divorce and sex, cohabitation, and childbearing outside marriage were included in the latter category. We utilize this distinction in our empirical analyses, as we separately analyze the effects of the “original” DI and “new” DI items (see Tables 2-4).
However, nearly all the family attributes asked about are associated with the original DI traditional-modern continuum and include: parents choosing who their children marry; people putting individual needs before family needs; married children living with their parents or in-laws; child spacing; number of children; gender equality; and children taking care of older parents. Also identified as original DI are the attributes of widow remarriage and intercaste marriage, which have historically been disapproved in Nepali culture and have long been seen as attributes of modernity. We include three new DI items: divorce, premarital sex, and nonmarital cohabitation because they have recently become quite common in Europe, North America, and Australia and are frequently labeled as modern.

In order to reduce the data to manageable proportions for our analyses, we constructed a series of eight scales: 4 scales for the original DI items; and 4 scales for the new DI items. For the original DI items, we did a series of factor analyses—separately for each of the four DI dimensions discussed above (development causing family change beliefs; family change causing development beliefs; DI present values; and DI future values). From these series of factor analyses, we decided that a one-factor scale for each of the four dimensions of original DI would provide a parsimonious summary of the item interrelations. Table 2 provides the factor loadings for each of these four one-factor scales for the four original DI dimensions. For each of the four scales, the factor loadings are all positive and in many cases quite substantial. The loadings range from .16 to .78 for the original development causing family change beliefs scale, from .28 to .75 for the original family change causing development beliefs scale, from .09 to .62 for the original DI present values scale, and from .10 to .65 for the original DI future values scale.

Although we originally had three family aspects in our four new DI scales—divorce, premarital sex, and unmarried cohabitation—we dropped the divorce item from all scales
because factor analyses revealed that it loaded negatively for one of our dimensions. This had the unfortunate effect of leaving only two items (unmarried cohabitation and premarital sex) in our four new DI scales, making it impossible to estimate factor loadings for these new DI scales through ordinary factor analysis. However, we can estimate factor loadings if we assume that the loadings for unmarried cohabitation and premarital sex are the same, in which case the loadings equal the square roots of the correlations between the two items. With this procedure, the loading for the new development causing family change beliefs scale is .85, .77 for the new family change causing development beliefs scale, .63 for the new DI present values scale, and .81 for the new DI future values scale.

For each of the eight DI scales, we summed the raw dichotomous scores to provide an overall measure. Then, to standardize the scales to have the same metric, we calculated a standardized scale for each individual by subtracting the scale mean from the individual’s score, and dividing this value by the variable’s standard deviation.

Model Specification.

We used our eight measures of DI at the time of the baseline and first follow-up surveys to predict subsequent migration to minimize the possibility of our results being produced by reverse causation. We also controlled many factors that have been shown to influence migration (Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2009; Curran et al. 2005; Donato 1993; Garip 2016; Harris and Todaro 1970; Massey 1990; Massey et al. 2010; Massey and España 1987; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Pedraza 1991; Shrestha et al. 1993; Stark and Bloom 1985; Stark and Taylor 1991; VanWey 2005; Williams 2009). Table 3 shows the distributions of the predictor variables used. (Table 3 about here)
We included several individual-level demographic controls: gender, age (time-varying age categories); caste-ethnicity (advantaged castes [Bhramin-Chhetri and Newar] compared to disadvantaged castes [Dalit, Hill Janajati, and Terai Janajati]); a time-varying measure of whether the person had ever been married; time-varying levels of school attainment (grades 1-5, 6-8, 9-10, and 11 plus years, compared to no schooling); and types of non-family work, if any, prior to the baseline (no non-family work, only wage work, or salary work). At the household-level, we control the number of household residents. At the community level, we included neighborhood proximity in miles to Narayanghat, the main market center of Chitwan.

We controlled household resources by constructing a composite variable consisting of land ownership, housing quality, livestock ownership, and income. For each measure, we logged the indicator to correct for skewness, calculated a z-score for each logged variable, and then added the z-scores. We also controlled the relative household resources of the respondent’s household by comparing the resources of the respondent’s household with the resources of the households in their neighborhood. We categorized people on relative household resources into thirds: the lower, middle, and upper thirds of relative household wealth. These controls for socioeconomic variables indicate that the effects we observe for DI are unlikely to be a result of socioeconomic variables causing both DI and migration.

Our 2008 baseline data collection did not collect household resource information, requiring reliance on a 2006 household survey of the same households that did. As a result, the household resources and relative household resource variables are not available for ten percent of the initial 2008 sample that were living in households not surveyed in 2006. This ten percent was excluded from our analyses.

We include in our models several measures of the extent to which respondents and household and community members have been exposed to prior migration. We controlled for
these variables because we know that previous migration to a destination facilitates migration to that destination. The same also holds true for the migration experience of family and neighborhood members.

Our control variable for individual migration experience originates from histories of the respondent’s own migration experience from age 15 until one month prior to the baseline interview. We coded this as: no prior migration experience; domestic migration experience only; and international migration experience.

Our control variable for the respondent’s exposure to migrations (in or out) at the household level is created using information about other household members between the ages of 15-59 at the baseline interview; it is coded as the logged cumulative percentage of household members who had migrated in and/or out of the household. In-and-out migrations are not double-counted in these calculations; someone who has both moved in and out of the respondent’s household is counted as only one household member migration. Finally, we control for logged cumulative percentage of the respondent’s neighborhood members migrating, adhering to the same principles used to create the household-level migration variable. The household and neighborhood variables are time varying and lagged one month.

The sample size for our main analyses is 4291 respondents. This represents the number of people meeting the following four criteria: interviewed in the original 2008 baseline survey; interviewed in the first follow-up survey; experienced no migration between the baseline and follow-up survey, and had resource information from the 2006 survey.

Our sample includes multiple individuals from the same household and the same neighborhood, raising the possibility that this clustering of respondents would increase the estimated standard errors over those that would be observed in a non-clustered sample. For this
reason, we estimated effects using the GLIMMIX procedure in SAS that takes clustering into account.

Results

Table 4 presents the main results of our empirical analyses. Column 1 of Table 4 lists the empirical coefficients of the effects of the DI variables on migration to any location occurring after the first follow-up interview (Analysis 1)—without respect to location. Columns 2 through 5 list the empirical estimates of the effects of the DI variables on destination-specific migration (Analysis 2). We show the results as relative odds ratios.

Table 4 shows estimates of the effects of the eight different DI predictor variables we discussed earlier on the two migration variables. The first four rows of Table 4 report the estimated effects of the DI scales that we discussed earlier as “original” DI dimensions while the second four rows of the table report the estimated effects of the DI scales that we discussed earlier as “new” DI dimensions. Within the “original” DI scales, we report the estimated effects of beliefs; row 1 concerns beliefs about development causing family change (D → FC), and row 2 concerns beliefs about family change causing development (FC → D). We also report the effects of the two original DI values scales—row 3 having to do with original DI values about the present, (DI Present), and row 4 having to do with evaluations of future family change (DI Future). We report similar effects of four scales dealing with “new” DI; row 5 indicates the effects of the “new” DI scale of beliefs about development causing family change, row 6 the effects of the “new” DI scale of beliefs about family change causing development, row 7 the effects of new DI values about the present, and row 8 lists effects of new DI values about the future.
Each of the eight equations summarized in Table 4 includes all of the control variables discussed earlier in the paper, but for parsimony their effects are not shown in the table. The appendix provides the estimates for each of the control variables, along with the estimates for the new DI Present Values scale. The estimated effects of the control variables for the other 7 DI scales are very similar to those reported in the appendix for the new DI Present Values scale.

Beginning with the estimated effects of the original DI scales found in the top half of Table 4, we find little evidence of effects of these original DI scales (rows 1-4). We do observe in row 1 that the estimated coefficient for the original development causes family change scale is positive, as hypothesized for any migration, but is statistically significant at only the .10 level (with a one-tail test). And, for this original development causes family change scale, the coefficient for the wealthy destinations is, contrary to our hypothesis, smaller than the coefficients for the other destinations (row 1). In addition, none of the coefficients for our other original DI scales are both statistically significant and in the hypothesized direction (rows 2-4).

Turning now to the results for the new DI scales about beliefs, we find little evidence for new DI beliefs affecting migration (bottom half of Table 4, rows 5-6). The only new DI Beliefs scale that is in the hypothesized direction and statistically significant is the estimated effect of family change causing development (FC → D) on migration to India (row 6). However, contrary to our hypothesis, the estimated effect of the new DI beliefs about family change causing development on migration to the wealthy western and Asian places (WWA) is substantially smaller than the effect of the same scale on migration to India.

Turning to the results for the new DI value scales, we see that all of the estimates on any migration are modest and in the opposite direction as hypothesized (column 1 of rows 7-8). However, when we look at the results for both new DI values scales in Analysis 2 (columns 2-5)
we see the estimates are consistent with our hypothesis concerning the effects of DI on destination-specific migration. That is, with one small exception, the coefficients for each of the two new DI values scales for all destinations except WWA are less than one while the coefficients for each of the two new DI values scales for the WWA destination are substantially greater than one. More specifically, the estimated coefficient for the new DI present values scale on WWA migration is 1.20 and statistically significant (row 7) while the estimated coefficient for the new future values scale on WWA migration is 1.13, although not statistically significant (row 8).

In considering the magnitudes of the effects of the new DI present values scales, note that since the predictor variables are standardized, the coefficients of 1.13 and 1.20 indicate that a one standard deviation difference in the predictor variable is associated with a 13 and 20 percent difference in the odds of migrating to a WWA destination. If we extrapolate this effect over four standard deviations—from -2 to 2 standard deviations from the mean—these effects translate respectively into differences of 63 and 107 percent.

**Summary and Conclusions**

The major contribution of this paper has been bringing together, both theoretically and empirically, the migration and DI literatures. As we observed in the introduction, there are extensive bodies of research about both topics, but there has been almost no discussion about how migration and DI may be interconnected. We argued in this paper that there are excellent theoretical reasons to expect that migration and DI are interrelated in multiple and important ways. Migration can be a mechanism for disseminating DI around the world, and DI can be a factor influencing the decision to migrate and the choice of migration destinations.
We theorized that the movement of people across geographical boundaries could serve as an important mechanism for spreading DI. In the case of Nepal, we expect that substantial migration by Nepalis to places they believe to be developed has led to influential cultural remittances back home, even net of direct efforts by international organizations and other mechanisms to introduce and diffuse DI culture across Nepali society. Because of data limitations, we were not able to test this theoretical relationship empirically, but suggest that this identification of migration as a dissemination mechanism for DI is an important contribution of this paper. We also advocate for the addition of this mechanism to the research agendas of both the DI and migration literatures.

We also theorized about the potential for DI to influence migration decisions and the choices of migration destinations—arguing that just as DI can affect culture, social structure, and behavior in the home community, it can affect decisions about migration. That is, the same considerations that encourage the adoption of DI within home communities would lead people to want to migrate to places that were more imbued with DI than their home communities. We hypothesized that higher levels of DI would lead to greater propensity to migrate and especially to migrate to places perceived as more modern or developed. We provided an example of how this hypothesis could be evaluated by using panel data from Nepal.

The results of our empirical examples are mixed in their support of our hypotheses about the influence of DI on migration decisions. We found little evidence for our hypotheses that endorsement of the beliefs and values formulated in the original specifications of DI increase migration rates and the decision to migrate to more developed or modern places. Similarly, we found little support to our hypotheses that the new DI beliefs concerning the family and development influence migration decisions. At the same time, our empirical analyses suggest
that new DI values influence decisions about where to migrate. This is shown in Table 4 where we saw that both new DI present values and new DI future values were positively related to migration to wealthy western and Asian places.

This, of course, raises the question: why it is that only the new DI value items relate to migration destinations in the predicted direction of influencing people to migrate to wealthy western and Asian places. Although we have no way of evaluating this with our empirical data, we speculate that this may be related to the fact that the original DI attributes have been associated with DI for centuries and have been very widely disseminated and accepted in Nepal. It is possible that these original dimensions are so widely disseminated and accepted that the measured variance in them may have little influence on migration behavior. The new DI attributes focusing on unmarried sex and cohabitation, on the other hand, are very new and have been introduced into Nepal only recently, so that measured variance in them may be more relevant for behavior.

The new DI cultural values related to living together and sexual relationships before marriage may also be especially differentiating among Nepalis because they are controversial. It is possible that many Nepalis see these matters as being totally unrelated to development but associated with unwanted Western exports. Nepalis who endorse premarital sex and unmarried cohabitation may thus be an especially different set of people who feel constrained or alienated from others in Nepali society and desirous of being among people who are more like them. This may make them particularly likely to migrate away from Nepal and to destinations where such values are not condemned and sometimes even celebrated.

In this vein, it is useful to note that between 40 and 50 percent of the respondents endorsed the DI responses to the items contained in the original DI value scales while only about ten
percent endorsed the items contained in the new DI value scales (Table 3). This clearly indicates that respondents are much less supportive of the new DI values than the old ones.

We also note that our lack of consistent findings supporting our hypothesized effects may be related to the available empirical measures to evaluate the influence of DI on migration. We noted earlier that theory suggests that behavior is most affected by ideational factors more closely related to the behavior in question. Yet, we have no measures of how Nepalis evaluate DI as it relates to migration, but only measures relating DI to family attributes. That values supportive of cohabitation and unmarried sex promoted in newer versions of DI, despite not being about migration, positively predict migration to WWA destinations suggests that DI values and beliefs regarding migration may produce findings more powerful and consistent with our theoretical hypotheses. Additional research using a new battery of predictor variables focused on DI relative to migration will be needed to test these ideas.

We also note that we have not measured the optimism of respondents for development in Nepal. It is possible that many people with high DI beliefs and values may choose not to migrate because they are optimistic about development coming quickly to Nepal. For them, the high costs of migration may keep them from migrating because they believe that they will soon experience high levels of development within Nepal.

Finally, we note that a major contribution of this paper is in joining together the DI and migration literatures. As we noted earlier, DI has previously been studied systematically in conjunction with a number of factors, including family, political, and human rights factors, but never, to our knowledge, to migration. This is an important omission because there are many reasons to believe that migration serves as a dissemination mechanism of DI and that DI is a factor in migration decisions. We recommend that future research investigate this DI-migration
nexus both theoretically and empirically, both in Nepal and elsewhere. We also recommend that such research focus attention on the different dimensions of DI—old versus new, beliefs versus values—and consider the importance of optimism for development in home communities.
References


Table 1. Nepal Developmental Idealism Survey Questions (Translated from Nepali)

Set 1: Development Causes Family Change
Some people think that Nepal will become richer in the future. Let’s talk about what things would increase and what things would decrease if Nepal became richer.

- Parents choosing who their children marry. If Nepal becomes richer, over time would that increase or decrease parents choosing who their children marry?
- Marriages ending in divorce?
- Unmarried men and women living together like married couples?
- Premarital sex?
- People putting individual needs before family needs?
- Married children living with their parents or in-laws?
- People marrying a person of a different caste?
- Young widows getting remarried?
- The length of time between getting married and having a child?

How about equality between women and men? If Nepal became richer, over time, would that increase or decrease equality between women and men?

Set 2: Family Change Causes Development
We have been talking about what might happen to families if Nepal became richer. Now we are going to talk about something different: what might happen to Nepal if some things about the Nepali family changed. For each of the following things, please tell me whether you think it would help make Nepal richer or help make Nepal poorer.

- What if fewer parents chose who their children married—would that help make Nepal richer or help make Nepal poorer?
- If there were more marriages ending in divorce?
- If more unmarried men and women lived together like married couples?
- If there was more premarital sex?
- If more people put individual needs before family needs?
- If fewer married children lived with their parents or in-laws?
- If more people married a person of a different caste?
- If more young widows got remarried?
- If the length of time between getting married and having a child increased?

Set 3: Which Family Attributes are Better
Now I would like you to compare different family situations. For each of the following comparisons, please tell me which situation would be better for most people in Nepal today.

- First, overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: married children living with their parents or in-laws, or married children living separately?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: young people choosing their own spouses, or parents choosing their spouses for them?
- A society in which it is acceptable for an unmarried man and woman to live together like a married couple, or a society where it is not acceptable for an unmarried man and woman to live together like a married couple?
- Waiting until marriage to have sex, or having sex before marriage?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: for a husband and wife who do not get along, to divorce or have an unhappy marriage?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: to put individual needs first or to put family needs first?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: marrying within one’s own caste, or marrying someone of another caste?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most young widows in Nepal today: to remarry or not to remarry?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: to get married or not to get married?
- Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: a society in which there is equality between women and men or...
a society in which there is not equality between women and men?

• Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: having one child or having three children?
• Overall, which do you think is better for most people in Nepal today: adult children taking care of their parents and in-laws or parents and in-laws taking care of themselves?

Set 4: Evaluations of Future Change

Now please think about the next 20 years in Nepal.

• Suppose unmarried men and women living together like married couples increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose marriages ending in divorce increase in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose married couples who live with their parents or in-laws decrease in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose people putting individual needs before family needs increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing or won’t it matter?
• Suppose premarital sex increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose parents choosing who their children marry decreases in Nepal in the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing or won’t it matter?
• Suppose married couples who live with their parents or in-laws decrease in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing or won’t it matter?
• Suppose people marrying someone from a different caste increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose young widows getting remarried increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose the length of time between getting married and having a child increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?

****
• Suppose adult children taking care of their parents and in-laws decreases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing or won’t it matter?

****
• Suppose on average the number of children a woman gives birth to decreases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
• Suppose the status of women increases in Nepal during the next 20 years. Overall, will that be a good thing, bad thing, or won’t it matter?
Table 2. Individual Item Factor Loadings of the Original DI Dimensions for Respondents in Chitwan at the Baseline Interview who are at Risk for Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>D→FC Beliefs</th>
<th>FC→D Beliefs</th>
<th>DI Present Values</th>
<th>DI Future Values</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marriages arranged by parents</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual needs before family</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married children living with parents</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-caste marriage</td>
<td>.78</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.62</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow remarriage</td>
<td>.70</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time from marriage to first birth</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td></td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality between women and men</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td></td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children born</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caring for elderly parents and in-laws</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td></td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalue</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. Percent Distributions or Means and Standard Deviations for Respondents in Chitwan at the Baseline Interview who are at Risk for Migration (N=4241)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st Migration Destination</th>
<th>% Distribution or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No move</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within Nepal</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium barrier destination</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High barrier destination</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent DI Predictor Variable</th>
<th>% Distribution or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original DI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D→FC Beliefs</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F→D Beliefs</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI Present Values</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI Future Values</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New DI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D→FC Beliefs</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F→D Beliefs</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI Present Values</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DI Future Values</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent Demographic Characteristics</th>
<th>% Distribution or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender: Female</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age: 15-19 month of baseline (time varying)</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste status:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to a disadvantaged caste (Dalit, Hill Janajati, Terai Janajati)</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belongs to an advantaged caste (Brahmin-Chhetri, Newar)</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Family Characteristics</th>
<th>% Distribution or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Respondent: Ever married (time varying)</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number household members (time varying)</td>
<td>3.3 (Mean) 1.4 (Std. Dev.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent never worked</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent wage work only</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent any salary work</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic Characteristics</th>
<th>% Distribution or Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance to Narayanghat (miles)</td>
<td>8.6 (Mean) 3.9 (Std. Dev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent no school attainment (time varying)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 1-5 years of school</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 6-8 years of school</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent 9-10 years of school</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent 11+ years of school</strong></td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household resources</strong></td>
<td>.45 (Mean) 2.5 (Std. Dev)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Relative household resources</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower third</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle third</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper third</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Migration Specific Capital**

| Respondent has no migrations from age 15 to baseline interview | 63.2 |
| Respondent has domestic migration only                     | 23.1 |
| Respondent has any international migrations                 | 13.6 |

| Logged % of household members migrating (time varying)$^a$ | 3.3 (Mean) 1.1 (Std. Dev.) |
| Logged % of neighborhood members migrating (time varying)$^a$ | 3.7 (Mean) 0.3 (Std. Dev.) |

$^a$ Frequency or mean in Table 1 calculated from the value of the variable at respondent’s 1st follow-up interview month.

$^b$ There were a few contradictory reports of age for some young people in that they were recorded as ages 14 or 15 in different reports. We categorized them here as age 15.

Note: All of the DI predictor variables used in the analyses were standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. The values in this table represent a different metric. They were calculated by adding together the DI responses for each of the items included in the scale and dividing this sum by the number of items in the scale. Thus, they indicate the average percentage of respondents giving the DI answer to the items in the scale.
Table 4. Predicting First Migrations of Six Months or Longer from Standardized Original and New DI Scales and Control Variables\(^a\)—Odds Ratio Estimates, Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Models (Z-scores in Parenthesis)\(^b\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Analysis 1 Any Migration</th>
<th>Within Nepal</th>
<th>Analysis 2</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Persian Gulf</th>
<th>WWA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Original DI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1) D→FC Beliefs</td>
<td>1.07+ (.150)</td>
<td>1.09+ (1.39)</td>
<td>1.04 (.33)</td>
<td>1.08 (.73)</td>
<td>1.02 (.14)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) FC→D Beliefs</td>
<td>0.97 (.72)</td>
<td>0.95 (.91)</td>
<td>1.05 (.41)</td>
<td>0.91 (.92)</td>
<td>1.03 (.27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) DI Present Values</td>
<td>0.92 (1.70)</td>
<td>1.00 (.04)</td>
<td>0.80 (1.86)</td>
<td>0.87 (1.24)</td>
<td>0.82 (1.42)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) DI Future Values</td>
<td>0.92 (1.92)</td>
<td>0.94 (1.07)</td>
<td>0.89 (1.01)</td>
<td>0.92 (.82)</td>
<td>0.84 (1.37)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New DI</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5) D→FC Beliefs</td>
<td>0.99 (.16)</td>
<td>0.96 (.78)</td>
<td>1.01 (.08)</td>
<td>0.98 (.16)</td>
<td>1.13 (.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6) FC→D Beliefs</td>
<td>0.98 (.34)</td>
<td>0.94 (.93)</td>
<td>1.19*(1.67)</td>
<td>0.90 (.95)</td>
<td>1.03 (.23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7) DI Present Values</td>
<td>0.95 (1.18)</td>
<td>0.88 (1.91)</td>
<td>0.89 (1.02)</td>
<td>0.94 (.74)</td>
<td>1.20*(2.02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8) DI Future Values</td>
<td>0.98 (.34)</td>
<td>0.98 (.31)</td>
<td>1.03 (.20)</td>
<td>0.98 (.16)</td>
<td>1.13 (.85)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Control variables not shown.

\(^b\) Significance: +.10, *.05, **.01, ***.001 (one-tailed). Statistically significant estimates in opposite direction hypothesized are unmarked.

Note: For Analyses 1 and 2, the reference category is “No migration.”
### Appendix A. Predicting First Migrations of Six Months or Longer from New DI Present Values Scale and Control Variables—Odds Ratio Estimates, Logistic and Multinomial Logistic Models (Z-scores in Parenthesis)\(^a\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analysis 1</th>
<th>Analysis 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>New DI Present Values Scale</strong></td>
<td><strong>Any Migration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New DI Present Values Scale</td>
<td>0.95 (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resident gender (female=1)</strong></td>
<td>0.46** (7.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resident age: 15-19 (time varying)</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>1.87*** (4.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-29</td>
<td>0.92 (.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-34</td>
<td>0.62 (2.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-39</td>
<td>0.43*** (3.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40+</td>
<td>0.14*** (8.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Caste status: Advantage</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantaged</td>
<td>0.97 (.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resident ever married (time varying)</strong></td>
<td>0.74* (2.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total # of household members (time varying)</strong></td>
<td>0.88*** (3.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent: Never worked</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage work only</td>
<td>1.07 (.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any salary work</td>
<td>1.12 (.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Distance to Narayanghat (miles)</strong></td>
<td>1.02+ (1.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent: No school (time varying)</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 years of school</td>
<td>1.78** (2.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-8 years of school</td>
<td>1.75* (2.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9-10 years of school</td>
<td>2.15*** (3.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11+ years of school</td>
<td>2.43*** (3.81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Household resources</strong></td>
<td>0.99 (.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative household resources: Lower third</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle third</td>
<td>1.00 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper third</td>
<td>1.01 (.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Respondent’s migration history from age 15 to baseline interview</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No migration</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic migration only</td>
<td>1.46** (2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any international migration</td>
<td>2.64*** (6.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged % household member migration (time varying)</td>
<td>1.05 (1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logged % neighborhood member migration (time varying)</td>
<td>1.31+ (1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of person periods</strong></td>
<td>164566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Significance: +.10, *.05, **.01, ***.001 (one-tailed for New DI Present Value Scale, two-tailed for controls). Statistically significant one-tailed estimates in opposite direction hypothesized are unmarked.

Note: For Analyses 1 and 2, the reference category is “No migration.”
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