Research Report

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Report 08-638
June 2008
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Population Studies Center Research Report 08-638

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Acknowledgement. This study has been supported by two grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0433773 &SES-0522174). The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and the NSF assumes no responsibility for these opinions, findings, and conclusions. Comments by Kristine Ajrouch, Julie de Jong, Stuart Karabenick, and Robert Robinson, and the editor and anonymous reviewers for Public Opinion Quarterly are gratefully appreciated.
ABSTRACT

Investigators from such disparate fields as public opinion research and comparative history agree that foreign occupation tends to provoke nationalist awareness. Engaging this growing body of literature, we focus on the affective side of nationalism—the feeling of national pride—and argue that foreign domination by itself does not necessarily incite this feeling among all members of the population under occupation. Rather, (a) the perception of the occupation held by the public is related to national pride, and (b) this perception is anchored in communal attributes. A survey of Iraqis (N=2,700) in 2004 found that the only common factor that is linked to national pride for the Sunnis, Shi’is, and Kurds is attitude against foreign Muslim militants. In addition, for the Sunnis, it was linked to attitudes against foreign presence and in favor of the Baath party. For the Shi’is, national pride was inversely related to their attitudes toward American moral values. For the Kurds, national pride is linked to attitudes toward the political issues over which the Sunnis and Shi’is have consensus—attitudes against foreign presence and disbanding the former Iraqi army, and a rejection of American moral values. Implications for the study of national pride are discussed.
Analyzing historical documents, events and the pronouncements of political and intellectual elites, scholarly studies of nationalism in Islamic countries have established a connection between foreign domination and national oppositional responses. Yet these studies provide little understanding of how nationalist awareness is aroused among ordinary individuals. On the other hand, while public opinion research literature focuses on such aspects of nationalism as national pride and national identity in Western countries, there is little theory in this literature that explains how nationalist awareness is related to foreign occupation in an Islamic context. Drawing on both scholarly traditions, the present study examines the linkages between various features of foreign occupation and national pride among different segments of Iraqi society—the Sunnis, Shi'is, and Kurds.

FOREIGN DOMINATION AND NATIONALIST AWARENESS

Nationalism is one of the most important organizing principles of modern politics. To be viewed as legitimate, both power holders and aspiring power contenders must demonstrate not only their unity with the citizens in terms of language, religion, territorial affiliation, and national origin, but also allegiance to these nationalist principles. Historians and theorists of nationalism, however, have debated its social origins. Earlier theorists, known as perennialists (e.g., Fishman 1980; Connor 1994) or primordialists (.e.g., Kieman cited in Editorial Board 1967; Kohn 1967; van den Berghe 1978, 1979; Pearson 1993), variously considered nations as perennial and historical in character, saw little difference between ethnicity and nationality, and believed that nationalism is a natural outcome of the evolution of ethnicity, tribe, and other manifestations of early group formation.1 Recently, however, historians have cast doubt on whether a common language, religion, and territory necessarily produce nationalism, which binds a political community to the wider public. They have pointed to prominent historical cases of pre-modern political order where the ruling elite and the conquered masses were not culturally compatible. These historians argue that nation and nationality are cultural artifacts; they were invented in recent history, when a conjunction of events and processes (e.g., the development of capitalism, industrialization, commercialization, and the rise of the modern state that necessitated the imposition of a uniform set of national norms on peripheral communities of the multiethnic empires) interacted to produce the new political module (Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983, Hobsbawm 1990; O’Leary 1997; Kidd 1999). In this new approach, the nation is perceived, in Anderson’s (1983: 15) often cited assertion, as “an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.” As a third alternative, Smith (1988: 3) argues that both the primordial, natural-unit, and trans-historical conception of the nation, on the one hand, and the view that it is a wholly modern phenomenon tied to an industrial society on the other, are inadequate. Taking a middle-of-the-road position, he proposes that the modern nation is not invented but rather reconstructed out of the cultural values, norms, and identities that were inherited from pre-modern eras.

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However, if the *same people-same politics* nexus is historically debatable and there are disagreements over the historical origins of the modern nation, researchers commonly agree that in modern times one way that nationalism emerges is where the culture of a people and that of its ruling elite and institutions are incongruent. This premise may be particularly true under the conditions of foreign occupation. Lacking the necessary linguistic, religious, and nationality credentials, an occupying power is not only perceived as having no right to rule, but is likely to become the target of nationalist agitation from the indigenous people.

The history of the Islamic countries that experienced European domination in the contemporary period provides ample evidence in support of this thesis. That is, foreign domination begets a nationalist response from the indigenous population, that the form and intensity of this response is moderated by the nature of this domination (e.g., whether it is cultural, political, and economic, and whether it involves the occupation of the country), and that the variation in this response among different indigenous groups is a function of the way foreign domination affects the balance of power among these groups. For example, the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 contributed to the rise of territorial nationalism among Egyptians in the first quarter of the twentieth century. During the same general period, on the other hand, Syria, which was under Ottoman domination, experienced liberal Arabism (in contrast to territorial nationalism) in response to the pan-Islamic despotism of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1908) and the subsequent Turkish nationalism of the Committee of Union and Progress (formed in 1907). The imposition of the French mandate on Syria (1920-45) and British mandate on Iraq (1920-32), and the colonial partitioning of the Arab lands into arbitrary states supported the perception that the Arab people were commonly mistreated by the colonial powers. This perception in turn contributed to the rise of pan Arab nationalism. In this new nationalist discourse, Syrian and Iraqi political ideologues departed from the liberal views of such Arabists as al-Kawakibi to support the glorification of the Arab people and the subordination of the idea of individual freedom to the idea of self-sacrifice for the cause of national liberation (Haim 1962; Cleveland 1971; Wendell 1972; Zeine 1973; Dawn 1973, 1988; Hourani 1983; Khoury 1983, 1987; Khalidi et al 1991; Chartouni-Dubarry 1993; Gershoni and Jankowski 1995; Marsot Tripp 2000; Dawisha 2003; Moaddel 2005).

Escaping foreign occupation in the modern period, Iran, in contrast, experienced a cultural trend from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth that emphasized anti-monarchical constitutionalism and anti-clerical secularism rather than anti-foreign nationalism. In the twentieth century, however, in response to the British control of the Iranian oil industry, the country experienced the rise of anti-British economic nationalism (Abrahamian 1982; Afary 1996; Moaddel 2005).

These cases also show that nationalism is a multifaceted phenomenon, involving a conception of national identity, attitudes toward one’s nation and foreigners, nationalist organizations, and the emergence of a mass movement for national emancipation (Hroch 1985). However, the success of a national liberation movement ultimately depends on the extent of popular support and the
commitment of ordinary individuals to the nationalist cause. The affective dimension of nationalism—the sense of belonging to a national community; the feeling of pride in its people, territory, history, and achievements; and the love of the country and hate of the outsider—may thus contribute to the core emotional factor that motivates its champions. As the revolutionary icon of twentieth-century Latin America Che Guevara put it, “at the risk of seeming ridiculous, let me say that the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine revolutionary lacking this quality.”

FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND NATIONAL PRIDE

The feeling of national pride is linked to other social processes as well. On the national aggregate level, researchers have found that national pride is directly related to the importance people accord to religion (Inglehart 1997: 83; Tilley, Heath, and Exley 2005: 4), but inversely related to the level of economic development (Inglehart 1997) and democracy (Smith 2006). A country’s historical experience may also affect the feeling of national pride among its citizens. National successes, for example, breed national pride. These may range from victory in a war or national-liberation movement (Rose 1985) to achievements in various fields, including science, technology, sports, arts, and literature. A defeat in a war or a collective feeling of guilt for starting a war, on the other hand, reduces national pride (McCrone and Surridge 1998; Smith and Jarkko 1998; Smith and Kim 2006).

National pride is thus a consequence of multiple social and historical processes—constructed from fragments of history, significant and traumatic events, and past and current national achievements. Researchers, however, commonly agree that a key dimension of these processes involves external threat and foreign intervention. Nationalist awareness and pride are particularly provoked under direct foreign domination when the indigenous people feel that they were being, in Gellner’s words, “bossed and knocked about by others with whom they cannot or are not allowed to identify” (cited in O’Leary 1997: 196; see also Hobsbawm 1990; Mueller 1973; Centlivres and Centlivres-

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2The participants in the fifth Past and Present Conference were unanimous about the role of foreign threat, perceived or real, in bringing about nationalist awareness. For R. F. Leslie, “all politically conscious elements within a community subject to external control will desire liberation” (cited in editorial board 1963: 67). For A. Mazrui: “nationalism could involve… rejection of foreign rule, or the attempt to rule by others; but it could also merely involve rivalry, for example the attempt to "catch up" with the West” (p. 68). For R. Guha also, it was essentially a negative response to foreign economic or political control (p. 69). Dore, on the other hand, while recognizing that the sudden appearance of foreigners had sparked samurai nationalism in Japan, argued that nationalism could not be explained solely in terms of external constraint, as a section of the samurai elite deliberately fostered national consciousness, via war and the educational system, in the absence of external threat (ibid.). Jewish nationalism, for Y. Bauer, was “the response of Jews in the West to their failure to assimilate there and to their sense of being ‘outsiders’” (ibid). Finally, according to T. Hodgkin, Pan-African nationalist ideology is a response to colonial domination (p. 71).
The key question is thus not whether foreign occupation affects national pride. It is, rather, how and what features of that occupation are linked to national pride. This specification is necessary in order to test rigorously the relationship between foreign occupation and national pride in such a segmented context as that of Iraq, where diverse sects and ethnic groups are vying for political power.

Foreign occupation may shape national pride via two broad routes. One includes attitudes toward the foreign other, and the other is attitudes toward the former ruling institutions which were overthrown by the foreign power. These relationships are such that stronger anti-foreign attitudes and a stronger loyalty to the former ruling institutions are tied to a higher feeling of national pride. These effects may also be moderated by ethnicity and sectarian divisions. In parallel to Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) view on ethnicity and civil war, we argue that these moderations are not the results of ethnic or religious characteristics per se, but rather, the outcomes of the economic, political, and cultural implications that foreign occupation has for different segments of the occupied country. For the members of the group who are adversely affected by foreign occupation, national pride may be tied to anti-foreign attitudes. For another group, national pride may be linked to attitudes toward the former dominant institutions that were undermined or dissolved by the occupying power. For yet a third group, their assessment of the morality of the occupying country may be a key point of difference that enhances the feeling of otherness vis-à-vis the occupying power, contributing to nationalist awareness and pride. Such may be the case even though the group as a whole has benefited economically and politically from foreign occupation.

To be sure, there have been cases in which the occupying force is greeted as a liberator (e.g., the liberation of countries that had been occupied by the Nazis during the Second World War). There have also been other cases where the presence of the occupying power was justified in terms of ensuring the security of the public and protecting the subjugated nation from chaos (e.g., the expansion of the East India Company in the Indian territory in the eighteenth century was promoted by the relative security that existed in the areas that were under its control [Bayly 1983, Hasan 1992]), providing the only viable opportunity for education the indigenous people (e.g., as the prominent Muslim reformer Muhammad Abduh had thought of British rule in Egypt [Ahmed 1960: 51]), eliminating a dictator (e.g., the Allied invasion of Iran in 1941 that ended the autocratic rule of Reza Shah [Moaddel 1993]), bringing democracy and freedom to the conquered nation (e.g., the Japanese Soka Gakkai religious movement’s praise of Japan’s American-written postwar Constitution for its advocacy of peace and religious freedom [Métraux 2006]); and saving the nation from Communist aggression (e.g., the South Koreans aged 50 and over who view “the U.S. as a savior that stopped the communist takeover and recognize the sacrifice of 54,000 American lives in the Korean War” [Lee 2004: 17]). On the other hand, it could be argued that indigenous acquiescence has been temporary, as nationalist movements eventually kicked the British out of Egypt and India, Iranian nationalists rose in opposition to British control of the country’s oil industry, and the South Korean elders’ compliance gave way to the youth’s anger at American presence in their country, subscribing “to a new form of nationalism that echoes their national pride” (Lee 2004: 24).
HYPOTHESES

The U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003 has created a new environment in which to evaluate the connection between foreign occupation and nationalist awareness. There are two key components to nationalist awareness. One is national identity—the extent to which Iraqis define themselves in national-territorial terms rather than in terms of religion or ethnicity. The other is national pride—the extent to which they express high pride in being Iraqis. While both components are incited by foreign occupation, national pride may be aroused more rapidly than national identity, because it is emotional and attitudinal. National identity, on the other hand, is cognitive, involving the individuals’ selection among competing conceptions of identity—being an Iraqi, Arab, Kurd, or Muslim. Because it often entails a shift in their ideological commitment from, say, Arab or Islamic nationalism to Iraqi nationalism, it would take a relatively longer period for national identity to be aroused and widely supported by the indigenous people. In the concluding section of this paper, we shall briefly discuss the rise of national identity among Iraqis between 2004 and 2007. Here, we focus on national pride and employ the theoretical propositions advanced in this paper to explain its predictors among different segments of the Iraqi population. We consider two sets of attitudes: attitudes toward the presence of foreign forces in the country and the overall moral character of the invading power; and attitudes toward the ruling institutions overthrown by the foreign power.

The US-led coalition forces justified their invasion and occupation of Iraq initially on the grounds that they were there to overthrow a brutal dictator, clear the country from weapons of mass destruction, bring democracy to Iraq, and promote economic development and security. If most Iraqis had believed this rationale, they probably would have greeted the invading forces enthusiastically. In such a case, the aims of foreign occupation and the Iraqis’ national priorities would be harmonious, and, as a result, foreign presence unrelated to national pride. On the other hand, if they were suspicious of U.S. intentions and felt that they were being dictated to by an arrogant superpower, then they would have unfavorable attitudes toward the presence of foreign troops in their land. These attitudes in turn would have increased their national pride.

Beyond believing in or consenting to the invasion, the indigenous people’s conception of the moral values of the invading forces may also play an important role in shaping their national pride, as nationalism includes a moral dimension. This morality defines what is right in national politics and specifies a set of normative expectations from the members of the national community. For example, “it demands that the members of a nation be loyal both to the nation and to one another” (McKim and McMahan 1997: 5). For a society like Iraq, where national politics and the politics of religion are closely intertwined, there may be a close affinity between religious and national moralities— with both shaping opinions about the morality of the invading power, particularly when that power belongs to a

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different culture. The assessment of the morality and honor of the occupying power by the indigenous people may in turn shape their national pride.\(^5\)

In addition, attitudes toward the former ruling institutions may also contribute to national pride. The Coalition Forces disbanded the Iraqi army and dissolved the Baath party—both were the major instruments of power under Saddam Hussein. The move against the Baath party also included de-Baathification, which entailed banning party officials from employment in the new Iraqi government. Those who disliked the former regime and believed that both the Baath party and the army were its apparatus of control were naturally happy that they were gone. On the other hand, those who were favorably predisposed toward these institutions might have perceived that, in addition to putting a large number of people out of work, the country’s major political institution and defensive forces were dismantled in order to solidify foreign domination. This perception may in turn provoke national pride.

Finally, the occupation unintentionally created a favorable condition for the influx of Muslim militants from other countries to Iraq—designated as terrorists by the Iraqi provisional government and the Coalition Forces and called “foreign fighters” by others. In the name of fighting the “crusaders,” the “infidels,” and defending the land of Islam, these militants launched violent attacks on foreign military forces, workers, and Iraqis whom they believed were collaborating with the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Had Iraqis agreed with their violent tactics and demonstrations of radical Islamism, they would naturally have served as appreciating hosts. On the other hand, if these groups were perceived as intrusive foreigners whose tactics were counter to national interests, then their presence may provoke national pride.

**Predictions**

To summarize, based on theoretical considerations and previous empirical findings, we predict that national pride would be higher for respondents who:

- \(H_1\): Have stronger negative attitudes toward the foreign presence.
- \(H_2\): Attribute lower morality to the people from the occupying country.
- \(H_3\): Believe that de-Baathification was harmful.
- \(H_4\): Were against disbanding the former Iraqi army.
- \(H_5\): Display stronger attitudes against foreign Muslim militants.

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\(^5\)There are historical precedents for considering the issue of morality in the scholarly study of nationalism. For example, a factor that contributed to the British success in legitimizing their presence in Egypt in the last quarter of the nineteenth century was their relative popularity in the Islamic world. The British, said Wilfred Blunt (1967: 9), “were popular everywhere in Mohammedan lands, being looked upon as free from the political designs of the other Frank nations. . . . England. . . . appeared in the light of a bountiful and friendly providence very rich and quite disinterested, a redresser of wrongs and friend of the oppressed.” Iranians also held similar attitudes toward Americans in the first half of the twentieth century (Moaddel 1993).
METHOD

Sample and Survey Procedure

Data presented here is from a values survey carried out in Iraq in December 2004. The study used an in-person household survey sampling mode to interview a nationally representative sample of 2,700 Iraqi adults (ages 18 and over). The interviews, which required about 50 minutes on average to complete, were conducted in respondents’ residences. Importantly, they were conducted by indigenous Iraqi personnel with considerable experience in their communities. With a response rate of 86.1%, the survey produced 2,325 complete face-to-face interviews from all regions of the country. Of this number, 67% respondents were from urban areas, 48% were male, and 13% had a university education. About 0.5% defined themselves as members of the upper class, 13.3% the upper middle class, 34.6% the lower middle class, 35.7% the working class, and 15.9% the lower class. The sample included 20% Sunnis, 55% Shi’is, 16% Kurds, 6% Muslims (consisting of those who wished not to be identified as either Shi’is or Sunnis), with the remaining 1.2% being members of religious minorities.

Dependent Variable: National Pride

Scholars have employed different methods to measure national pride in surveys, asking respondents how close they feel to their nation, how proud of it they are, what aspects they are proud of, and how they compare their nation to others (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003: 174). For example, McCrone and Surridge (1998: 9) used a scale of pride in national achievements and institutions among Germans, Britons, Swedes, and Spanish. The 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) also included a seven-item battery of questions, which were similar to the questions used by McCrone and Surridge’s (1998) scale of national pride (cited in Tilley, Heath, and Exley 2005). However, the most widely used measure of national pride is a single-item question that asks respondents how proud they are to be citizens of their country. Very similar versions of this question were included in the World Values Surveys, Eurobarometer surveys, and the ISSP.

The single-item measure of national pride is considered very general and useful for cross-national comparison. In addition, it correlates highly with other and more complex measures of national pride. For example, Tilley, Heath, and Exley (2005: 5-9) found that the correlation coefficient between this measure and the seven-item battery included in the 2003 ISSP was .58, highly

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6 This survey was carried out by the Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Society Study, an Iraqi research firm. This survey revised the questionnaire used in other Islamic countries in order to address issues related to current social conditions in Iraq. However, key batteries from the original questionnaire were kept to allow for comparison with other Islamic countries as well as with more than eighty nations covered by the World Values Survey.

7 This response rate is calculated using the formulae (RR1 for minimum response rate) suggested by the American Association for Public Opinion Research (2006: 32). Of the nationally representative sample of 2,700 Iraqi respondents that were contacted, 148 refused to participate in the study and 227 were partial interviews, non-contacts, and unknown.
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This is reassuring, suggesting that our single-item measure is a good substitute for an underlying national pride dimension in individuals’ attitudes (Tilley, Heath, and Exely 2005: 5-6, note 7). De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003: 175) also argued that, while some scholars treat national pride as a multidimensional construct, “there is little empirical evidence that statements of national pride come in distinctly different breeds.” They showed that the single-item measure has convergence validity as it correlated highly with both patriotism and nationalism indicators.

Finally, Elkins and Sides (2006: 8) argued that many patriotism and nationalism survey items that refer to particular aspects of the nation-state (e.g., its government, history, and achievements) are inadequately specific. Based on inspection of various cases, they concluded that the single item measure of national pride has also face validity. For them, as an example, the dramatic increase in national pride among South African blacks from being notably lower than whites in 1981 to surpassing them in 1995, which likely reflected their political integration, was an evidence of the measure’s face validity.

For the purpose of the current study, this single-item measure of national pride focusing on the country as a whole seems to be more appropriate than other measures. Because our objective is to understand how foreign occupation promotes collective Iraqi national awareness and provokes pride in being Iraqi, other pride-enhancing factors such as national achievements in sports, science, literature and the arts may have little to do with foreign occupation.

Respondents in our study were asked:

How proud are you to be an Iraqi? (1) very proud, (2) proud, (3) not much proud, or (4) not proud at all

To make our results more intuitively clear, this variable’s coding was reversed so that high values indicated high levels of national pride.

Table 1 shows that 77.6% of respondents indicated that they were very proud to be Iraqis. National pride, however, varied by ethnicity, as Kurds were much less likely than all other groups to be very proud to be Iraqis.

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8The 7 items that make up this scale are five point “agree strongly” to “disagree strongly” statements as follows: i) I would rather be a citizen of Britain than another other country in the world, ii) There are some things about Britain today that make me feel ashamed, iii) the world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the British, iv) Generally speaking, Britain is a better country than most other countries, v) people should always support their country, even if the country is in the wrong, vi) when my country does well in international sports, it makes me feel proud to be British, vii) I am often less proud of Britain than I would like to be.
Table 1: How proud are you to be Iraqi?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shi‘i</th>
<th>Kurd</th>
<th>Muslim</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very proud</td>
<td>80.2%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>84.6%</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quite proud</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very proud</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>.6%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all proud</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>.1%</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2284</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PREDICTORS

Foreign Presence

To measure this variable, Iraqis were asked about their attitudes toward the presence of the Coalition Forces in their country, the necessity of these forces for maintaining security, and the implications of American domination for the future of Iraq:

1. Do you (1) strongly support, (2) somewhat support, (3) somewhat oppose, or (4) strongly oppose the presence of the Coalition Forces in Iraq?
2. Please tell us if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) disagree strongly with the statement that the presence of the U.S. troops in large cities is good for ensuring security for Iraqis.
3. To what extent, if any, do you think American domination of Iraq in the foreseeable future will be an obstacle to the formation of an independent prosperous Iraq? (1) none at all, (2) not very much, (3) quite a lot, or (4) a great deal?

For greater parsimony, these three correlated measures (.48 < r < .59) were reduced to a single indicator (Foreign Presence), using principal component factor analysis technique.9

American Moral Values

To measure the morality of the invading power, we have used a ten-point scale in order to tap into the Iraqis' assessment of the moral values of Americans:

Where would you place the U.S. on a scale of morality, where “1” means that society is culturally decadent and people have a very low level of morality, and where “10” means that people in that society have a high level of morality?

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9The eigenvalue is 1.98 and Cronbach’s reliability alpha is 0.90.
Attitudes toward the Ruling Institutions of the Former Regime

To measure attitudes toward these institutions, we consider the degree to which Iraqis believed that de-Baathification and disbanding the former Iraqi army were beneficial or harmful to Iraq. Two questions measure their attitudes toward these policies:

After the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of the Iraqi government, a number of changes have occurred in Iraq. Below are some of these changes. Please tell us if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) disagree strongly with these changes:

1. **De-Baathification**: De-Baathification damaged the political conditions of the country.
2. **Disbanding the army**: Disbanding the former Iraqi armed forces was beneficial for Iraq.

We reverse the coding for the de-Baathification variable so that larger values represent a stronger opposition to the policy.

Foreign Muslim Militants

The breakdown of law and order after the invasion provided a favorable opportunity for anti-American Muslim militants to infiltrate Iraqi communities. The influx of these militants is another form of foreign intervention that may be linked to national pride. One question measures Iraqis’ attitudes toward these militants:

**Foreign Muslim militants**: To what extent, if any, do you think the presence of foreign fighters in Iraq will be an obstacle to the formation of an independent and prosperous Iraq? (1) a great deal, (2) quite a lot, (3) not very much, or (4) none at all

The coding on this variable is reversed so that higher values represent greater concern with the foreign terrorist groups.

Control Variables

In order to more fully assess the effectiveness of these variables in predicting national pride, we statistically control several attitudinal, perceptual, and demographic factors that may correlate with the dependent variable. First, attachment to the idea of one’s country as a unified nation may correlate with national pride. This attachment is measured by (a) adherence to national identity, that is; describing self as “Iraqi, above all” rather than “Arab or Muslim, above all,” (b) the perception that Iraq would be a better place if people were to see one another as Iraqis rather than members of different ethnic or religious groups, and (c) the belief that ethnic or religious differences are artificial and contrary to the essence of the Iraqi society. True, these measures may also be linked to attitudes against foreign occupation. They may in turn affect national pride. The effects of these factors are controlled, however, in order to assess the direct relationship between foreign occupation and national pride. Three questions measure these variables:
1. **National identity**: Which of the following best describes you: (1) I am a Muslim, above all; (2) an Iraqi, above all; (3) an Arab, above all, or (4) a Kurd, above all?

2. **Iraqi versus ethnic identity**: Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that Iraq will be a better society if people treat one another as Iraqis rather than the Shi'is, Kurds, or Sunnis?

3. **Anti-sectarian attitudes**: Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that dividing Iraqi people into Sunnis, Shi'is, and Kurds is artificial and contrary to the reality of the Iraqi society?

National identity is treated as a dummy variable (1=Iraqi above all, 0=otherwise), and the coding for the other two variables is reversed so that higher values indicate stronger attitudes in favor of Iraqi identity in contrast with ethnic identity and stronger anti-sectarian attitudes.

Religion may also be linked to national pride. In the absence of effective political parties and national leaders to articulate public demands in post-Saddam Iraq, religious institutions have become the medium through which knowledge about the country and its future is generated and disseminated among Iraqis. Consequently, religious authorities have emerged as the de facto spokespeople of their community. These authorities in Iraq, however, have diverse orientations, depending on their sect and ethnicity. Some, mostly of Shi'i background, might be interested in promoting political Islam as an alternative to what is perceived as a foreign-imposed political model. Others might opt to promote adherence to Islamic orthodoxy and traditional culture, which might be the case among the Sunnis. Furthermore, since mosques constitute the major site in which religious authorities disseminate their ideas about the status of religion and nation to their audiences, mosque attendance may also be a key factor in shaping individual political attitudes.

While the literature on nationalism suggests a linkage between national pride and emphasis on religion, there is little to nothing in this literature that indicates the aspects of religion which are linked to national pride in Islamic countries. We thus include in our analytical model all the religion-related variables mentioned above as controls: attitudes toward religious authorities, support for an Islamic government, adherence to Islamic orthodoxy, and mosque attendance.

Four questions tap attitudes toward religious authorities:

Generally speaking, do you think—(1) yes and (2) no—that the religious authorities in this country are giving adequate answers to

1. the moral problems and needs of the individual?
2. the problem of family life?
3. people’s spiritual needs?
4. the social problems facing your country today?
These items are highly inter-correlated (.62<r<.73). Here again, the coding of these items is reversed so that higher values indicate positive attitudes toward religious authorities, and using factor analysis technique, these four indicators are reduced into one variable, religious authorities.10

One question measures attitudes toward Islamic government (Islamic government):

Would you say it is a (1) very good, (2) fairly good, (3) fairly bad or (4) very bad to have an Islamic government, where religious authorities have absolute power?

In measuring Islamic orthodoxy, we follow Davis and Robinson (2006), who measured this concept in terms of support for the Shari’a.

I would like to know your views about a good government. Which of these traits is (1) very important, (2) important, (3) somewhat important, (4) least important, or (5) not important for a good government to have?

It should implement only the laws of the Shari’a.

Coding on Islamic government and the Shari’a is reversed so that higher values indicate stronger support for Islamic government and religious orthodoxy, respectively. Finally mosque attendance is measured in terms of frequency of participating in mosque services:

**Mosque attendance:** About how often do you go to a mosque these days: (1) more than once a week, (2) once a week, (3) once a month, (4) only on special holidays, (5) once a year, (6) less often, and (7) never, or practically never.

The coding on mosque attendance is reversed so that low values indicate low mosque attendance.

National pride may also be affected by perceptions of insecurity and out-group intolerance. Inglehart (1997) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) have argued that existential security—the feeling that survival can be taken for granted—is conducive to interpersonal trust, tolerance of outsiders, and openness to social change. Conversely, they argue, existential insecurity is conducive to (1) xenophobia and (2) strong in-group solidarity. The fact that insecurity is linked with intolerance of out-groups has been demonstrated repeatedly in history, when demagogues have manipulated mass fears to build strong in-group feelings and the rejection of out-groups. Evidence from the 2004 national survey of the Iraqi public shows higher levels of intolerance of foreigners than any other of the more than 80 societies previously covered in the World Values Surveys (Inglehart, Moaddel, and Tessler 2006).

Tolerance is measured in such a variety of ways as one’s attitudes toward members of other religious groups, Communists, immigrants, and homosexuals, with respect to whether members of these groups should be allowed to hold office, and as tolerance of least-liked groups for individual respondents (Gibson 1992; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, Pierson 1981). Here, we measure tolerance in terms of Iraqis’ willingness to have Christians as neighbor.

---

10 The eigenvalue is 2.99 and Cronbach’s reliability alpha is 0.89.
Tolerance: On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors? (1) Do not like to have Christians as neighbors, (2) Like to have Christians as neighbors.

We use self-report or perceived insecurity as a measure of insecurity:

Perceived insecurity: Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that in Iraq life these days is unpredictable and dangerous?

Finally, national pride is believed to vary with demographics, including age, gender, education, social class, and place of residence (Rose 1985; McCrone and Surridge 1998; Davis and Sliver 2004; Tilley, Heath, and Exley 2005; Elkins and Sides 2006). A series of dummy variables are created for places of residence (1=urban, 0=rural), education (1=university, 0=below university), gender (1=male, 0=female), and age (1=65 and more, 0=below 65). A ten-category income scale (1=low income, 10=high income) is used as an indicator of class.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Variations in the Predictors of National Pride by Group

Predictors of national pride vary considerably between the three ethnic groups. Among the Sunnis, 90% expressed that American domination of their country would be a great deal of obstacle to Iraq’s independence and prosperity, 88% strongly opposed the presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq, 74% strongly disagreed that the presence of the U.S. troops in large cities is good for ensuring security, and 69% gave the lowest mark to American moral values. These values for the Shi’is were lower, with 87%, 64%, 54%, and 48% expressing similar concerns about the above issues, respectively. The Kurds, on the other hand, diverged significantly from these attitudes. Only a minority among them were strongly against foreign presence, as shown by such respective figures as 31%, 14%, 13%, and 17% with regards to the four issues detailed above. Based on these figures, we argue that the Sunnis and Shi’is disapproved of the foreign presence, while the Kurds thought otherwise.

In terms of attitudes toward the former ruling institutions, there are variations across the Sunnis, Shi’is, and Kurds as well. On de-Baathification, the attitudes of the Sunnis sharply differed from the Shi’is’ and Kurds’, as 50% of the Sunnis strongly agreed that the measure damaged the political conditions of the country, compared to 18% of the Shi’is and 22% of the Kurds. On disbanding the former Iraqi army, the three groups diverged, but this time, the difference is between the Sunnis and Shi’is, on the one hand, and the Kurds, on the other. Only 7% of the Sunnis and 11% of the Shi’is supported the measure, compared to 52% of the Kurds. The only issue that unified all was over the presence of foreign Muslim militants in their country, as 80% of the Sunnis, 93% of the Shi’is, and 77% of the Kurds considered the presence of these militants as a great obstacle to the formation of an independent and prosperous Iraq. To show these variations more precisely, the means and standard deviations of national pride and its predictors are presented in Table 2.
Table 2: The mean and standard deviation for the dependent and independent variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Pride: How proud are you to be Iraqi: (4) very proud, (3) proud, (2) not very proud, (4) not proud at all?</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shi'i</th>
<th>Kurd</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>499</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>3.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Predictors of National Pride

I. Foreign Presence

1. To what extent, if any, do you think American domination of Iraq in the foreseeable future will be an obstacle for the formation of an independent prosperous Iraq: (4) a great deal, (3) quite a lot, (2) not very much, (1) none at all? 465 3.88 0.42 1185 3.80 0.57 350 2.57 1.16 2000 3.60 0.83

2. Do you (1) strongly support, (2) somewhat support, (3) somewhat oppose or (4) strongly oppose the presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq? 489 3.80 0.60 1240 3.39 0.92 359 1.98 1.01 2088 3.24 1.06

3. Please tell us if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) disagree strongly with the statement that the presence of the U.S. troops in large cities is good for ensuring security for Iraqis. 470 3.62 0.75 1198 3.19 1.03 323 1.99 1.04 1991 3.10 1.10

II. American moral values: Where would you place the U.S. on a scale of morality, where “1” means that people have a very low level of morality, and where “10” means that people in that society have a high level of morality? 366 1.93 1.99 909 2.71 2.54 252 6.14 3.60 1527 3.09 2.98

III. Foreign Muslim militants: To what extent, if any, do you think the presence of foreign fighters would be an obstacle for the formation of an independent prosperous Iraq?: (4) a great deal, (3) quite a lot, (2) not very much, (1) none at all? 455 3.72 0.63 1189 3.91 0.35 357 3.60 0.84 2001 3.81 0.55

IV. DeBaathification: Please tell us if you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) disagree strongly that De-Baathification damaged the political conditions of the country. 428 3.27 0.87 1115 2.24 1.09 319 2.19 1.20 1862 2.47 1.15

V. Disbanding the former Iraqi army: Please tell us if you (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) disagree strongly that disbanding the former Iraqi armed forces was beneficial for Iraq. 469 3.37 0.84 1169 3.13 0.97 315 1.86 1.07 1953 2.98 1.08

Valid N (list-wise) 312 784 196 1292
Predictors of National Pride

We have used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to estimate the effect of attitudes toward foreign presence, American moral values, de-Baathification, disbanding the former Iraqi army, and foreign Muslim militants on national pride. Four regression models are estimated. The first model estimates the effects of the independent variables on national pride for the entire national sample. The other three models estimate these effects for each of the three major ethnic groups separately (Table 3). The comparison of the regression estimates across the four models is intended to demonstrate that (i) an analysis of national pride on the national aggregate level without consideration of the social divisions along ethnicity and sect could be misleading, and (ii) foreign occupation may have different effects on different segments of Iraqi society in provoking national pride.

The Total column in Table 3 shows the results of the regression estimates for the national sample. Assuming that there is no ethnic or sectarian division in the country, these estimates show that each of the predictor variables is significantly related to national pride. That is, national pride is positively linked to attitudes against foreign presence, de-Baathification, disbanding the former Iraqi army, and foreign Muslim militants, while it is negatively related to attitudes toward American moral values.

OLS regression estimates for each of the three groups separately show quite different results, however. Only one factor—concerns about the presence of foreign Muslim militants—is consistently linked to national pride across these groups. In addition, among the Shi‘is, only attitudes toward American moral values are negatively associated with the dependent variable. Among the Sunnis, on the other hand, attitudes against foreign presence and de-Baathification are positively linked to national pride. Among the Kurds, attitudes against foreign presence are positively associated with national pride and attitudes toward American moral values are negatively associated with national pride. Attitudes against disbanding the former Iraqi army are positively linked to feelings of national pride.

The varying correlates of national pride among the three communities are instructive and make it possible to identify some of the factors conditioning the connection between foreign occupation and national pride. Generally, our findings indicated that foreign occupation by itself does not necessarily provoke national pride among all groups within a society. Rather, the foreign occupation-national pride nexus is moderated by communal attributes (interests and values). For the Sunnis, attitudes toward foreign presence and de-Baathification are connected to national pride because these factors had undermined their communal interests. For the Shi‘is, in contrast, neither attitudes against foreign presence, de-Baathification, nor disbanding the former Iraqi army was significantly linked to national pride. This is understandable because the occupation freed the Shi‘is from the despotism of the former regime and paved the way for their political ascendance. Yet, for them, national pride is linked to their perception of American moral values. We speculate that this linkage is due to the fact that their politics is shaped by religion. A much higher percentage of the Shi‘is support an Iranian style Islamic government than either the Sunnis or Kurds (Moaddel 2007).
and those who are more in favor of such a government tend to have a higher feeling of national pride (Table 3). Given that favorable attitudes toward political Islam are often associated with a view of the U.S. as a morally decadent society, the perceived difference in moral values with Americans may be the key cultural demarcation that incites the feeling of otherness and national pride among the Shi'is. For the Sunnis, on the other hand, having little interests in an Islamic government and being much more secular than the Shi'is, their perception of American moral values does not become a signifier of nationalist awareness.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictor and Control Variables</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shi'i</th>
<th>Kurd</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>σₑ</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>σₑ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Predictors: Attitudes toward Foreign Presence, American moral values, De-Baathification, Disbanding Iraqi army, and Foreign Muslim militants</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign presence</td>
<td>.235***</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American moral values</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.014*</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-Baathification</td>
<td>.088*</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disbanding Iraqi army</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Muslim militants</td>
<td>.142***</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.133**</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td>.154*</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.032</td>
</tr>
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<td>Iraqi versus ethnic identity</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.025</td>
<td>.029</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-Sectarianism</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious authorities</td>
<td>.056†</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>-.009</td>
<td>.021</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mosque attendance</td>
<td>.026†</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic government</td>
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<td>.032</td>
<td>.034*</td>
<td>.016</td>
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<td>Islamic orthodoxy</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>-.011</td>
<td>.011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tolerance of Christians</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>-.066*</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
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<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>-.014</td>
<td>.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>.149**</td>
<td>.059</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.254**</td>
<td>.085</td>
<td>-.044</td>
<td>.033</td>
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<td>Household income</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>.008</td>
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<td>Age-65 and above</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.130</td>
<td>.138</td>
<td>.085</td>
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<td>R/Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>.291/.222</td>
<td>.068/.037</td>
<td>.575/.508</td>
<td>.408/.396</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>4.218***</td>
<td>2.195**</td>
<td>8.489***</td>
<td>35.774***</td>
</tr>
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<td>DF: Regression/Residual</td>
<td>19/195</td>
<td>19/576</td>
<td>19/119</td>
<td>19/987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†p<.1 *p< .05 **p < .01 ***p < .005
Considering the differences in the size of explained variance across the three groups, the low value of $R^2 (.068)$ for the Shi’is can be partially attributed to the weak relationships between attitudes toward the foreign occupation and toward the changes wrought by the occupation, on the one hand, and national pride, on the other. For the Sunnis, in contrast, the much higher value of $R^2 (.291)$ appears to be due to stronger relationships. The key question, however, is how to account for the high value of $R^2 (.575)$ for the Kurds who, like the Shi’is, also benefited from the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the occupation of Iraq.\footnote{Some of these differences may be due to the varying effects of the control variables. Nonetheless, estimating the model using only the five predictors, there is still a large difference between $R^2 (.014)$ for the Shi’is, on the one hand, and $R^2$ for the Sunnis (.15) and $R^2$ (.299) for the Kurds (.299) (not shown). Another factor accounting for the differences in explained variance is that national pride among the Kurds has the highest and among the Shi’is lowest variability.}

This difference is better understood when we assess how foreign occupation might have affected the identity of the Kurds. Generally, the Kurds have expressed a strong ethnic identity, as 65% of the Kurdish respondents are self-described as “Kurds above all” rather than Iraqis or Muslims above all (Moaddel 2007). Their attitudes toward foreign presence were more positive than non-Kurds, and they gave relatively high marks to American moral values. In fact, the relationship between adherence to Kurdish identity (measured as a dummy with “Kurds above all” = 1, and 0=otherwise) and attitudes in favor of foreign presence is positive and fairly strong ($r = .48$ in the Kurdish subsample, not shown). These attitudes may reflect their collective fortune following the invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein that brought them considerable political autonomy and economic prosperity.

Nonetheless, the ensued feeling of empowerment does not seem to have resulted in the Kurds drifting away from Iraq and toward seeking independence. On the contrary, the feeling of empowerment seems to have further integrated the Kurds in the emerging Iraqi nation-state. The process of integration was reinforced in the following years and is reflected in a significant increase in the feeling of national pride among the Kurds, as shown by subsequent surveys (see Table 5). The Kurds’ expression of pride to be Iraqis may in turn involve a weakening of their Kurdish identity and a shift in their political attitudes toward solidarity with Iraq as one unified nation—that is, the stronger the feeling of national pride, the weaker Kurdish identity. This shift naturally entails a stronger solidarity with non-Kurdish Iraqis—Sunnis and Shi’is alike. The signifiers that might have provoked national pride among the Kurds thus revolve on those political issues over which both the Sunnis and Shi’is have a high degree of consensus. The Kurd’s solidarity in political attitudes with the rest of the nation means taking a position that conforms to this consensus. That is, the stronger Kurdish conformity with both the Shi’is and Sunnis over these issues, the higher is their national pride. We speculate that for the Iraqi Kurds, national pride is linked to attitudes against foreign presence, disbanding the former Iraqi army, and American moral values because these issues elicit a high level of consensus among the Sunnis and Shi’is—the Arab majority. On the other hand, there is no significant...
linkage between national pride and de-Baathification among the Kurds, because the Sunnis and Shi’is widely differ on the issue of de-Baathification. In short, foreign occupation not only provided a favorable condition for the Kurds’ political integration but inadvertently the very signifiers in relation to which national pride among the Kurds is provoked. This fact may account for high correlations between national pride and its predictors among the Kurds, hence the high explained variance.  

Overall, it seems that foreign occupation per se does not necessarily stimulate feelings of national pride among all groups in society. Instead, the threat that the occupation posed to the interest of a given ethnic group, perceived morality differences with the occupying power, and the desire to conform to the majority views on major political issues appear to be decisive factors, which in different ways contributed to national pride among the Sunnis, Shi’is, and Kurds, respectively. Where a threat is universally felt, as with attitudes toward the presence of foreign Muslim militants, it is invariably linked to national pride across all the three groups.

Generally, the factors linking foreign occupation to national pride are not static; they change according to changes in social conditions, power relations, and political attitudes. Winners and losers wrought by foreign domination often experience shifts in the balance of power. The contending groups constantly search for new resources, assess the strength of their rivals and enemies, and adapt new strategies for the realization of their goals. As a result, there may be a shift in their security concerns, changes in ethnic identity and evaluation of honor, and reassessment of interests, particularly under the conditions of inter-ethnic rivalries and conflict (Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2006). There may also be a shift in the attitudes of the public from the occupying country, as the human and financial costs of the occupation begin to escalate. These factors operating through time thus shape not only nationalist awareness (in contradistinction to ethnic or religious awareness) but also the state of the occupying power in reaction to which this awareness is provoked. The nature of historical conjuncture characterized by inter-group interaction, competition, and conflict, changing patterns of domination and its differential effects on various groups, and the outbreak of significant national and international events will eventually decide whether nationalism is able to transcend communal differences and develop into a generalized movement of the indigenous public against foreign dictations, or whether it will remain confined to a disgruntled minority whose language of nationalism has failed to rally the public to its cause.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER SUPPORT

The foregoing analysis was based on cross-sectional data collected at one point in time—December 2004, which pertained to the relatively early days of the U.S.-led occupation of the country as nationalistic feelings began to develop. Although some of our hypotheses regarding the linkages between foreign occupation and national pride were supported and variations in these linkages across

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12Among the Kurds, the correlation coefficients between national pride and its predictors are fairly high—0.451 with attitudes against foreign presence, -0.350 with American moral values, 0.226 with de-Baathification, 0.388 with disbanding Iraqi army, and 0.399 with foreign Muslim militants.
the three major groups were consistent with the theoretical propositions advanced in this paper, we must acknowledge that with cross-sectional data, the direction of causality cannot be determined empirically. We also acknowledge that with the data it may not be possible to rule out causality in the opposite direction from what we proposed—that is, people who have stronger feelings of national pride are more likely to display stronger attitudes against the presence of foreign forces. Finally, it is possible that causality flows in both directions and that national pride and the attitudes against foreign presence are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, if our analysis reveals statistically significant relationships, we can only conclude that the data are consistent with our hypotheses. The goal of this study was to determine whether the hypothesized relationships exist and to offer theoretically informed insights about the political dynamics that seem likely to account for variations in the feelings of national pride among different Iraqi groups.

However, to further validate our argument that foreign occupation contributes to nationalist awareness, we consider the emotional and cognitive measures of nationalist awareness—national pride and national identity, respectively—and assess how these measures have changed, analyzing the data from several subsequent surveys that were carried out in Iraq in April 2006, October 2006, March 2007, and July 2007. If our analysis is correct, then there must be an increase in both measures between December 2004 and July 2007.

Table 4 shows the change in national pride among the three Iraqi groups during this period. As this table shows, the percent who reported that they were very proud to be Iraqis for the entire country increased from 78% in December 2004 to 83% in April 2006, and then slightly decreased to 82% in October 2006, 82% in March 2007, and 81% in July 2007. Among the Sunnis, feelings of national pride increased from 80% to 84% between December 2004 and July 2007; remained static among the Shi'is, varying between 85% and 90% with no apparent pattern between December 2004 and July 2007; and rose significantly for the Kurds in this period. Although in 2004 only 35% of the Kurds said that they were very proud to be Iraqis, in the subsequent surveys, this value increased to 52% in April 2006, 77% in October 2006, 61% in March 2007, and 62% in July 2007 (Table 4).

The trend in national pride among the Kurds and Sunnis is both significant and in the expected direction, but shows no significant change among the Shi'is. However, considering the changes in the national identity indicator, we may provide an additional empirical basis to suggest a significant connection between foreign occupation and nationalist awareness.

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13All these surveys were conducted by IIACSS, the survey research firm that conducted the 2004 Iraqi values survey.
14The increase in the feeling of national pride among Iraqi Kurds may also reflect the increase in their level of economic prosperity and feeling of empowerment following the overthrow of the former dictator, a finding that is consistent with a similar increase in national pride among blacks in South Africa between 1981 and 1995 after the dismantlement of Apartheid in the country (Elkins and Sides 2006).
15Using the test of significance for difference of sample proportions between the December 2004 and July 2007 samples, the increase in national pride is significant among the Kurds (p<.001) and Sunnis (p<.05).
The indicator of national identity is based on the respondents’ choice of adherence to alternative definitions of identity—they were asked to choose between being Iraqis, Muslims, Arabs, or Kurds above all. In December 2004, 23% of all respondents defined themselves as Iraqis above all in contrast to Muslims, Arabs, Kurds, or other, above all. For the total population, this value consistently increased in each subsequent survey, with 59% identifying as being Iraqi above all by July 2007. While percentages self-identifying as Iraqi above all consistently increased for the Sunnis (from 21% to 57%
between December 2004 and July 2007) and the Shi’is (from 32% to 71% between December 2004 and July 2007), for Kurds there were some fluctuations (9% in October 2004, 4.6% in April 2006, 20% in March 2007, and 17% in July 2007). Nonetheless, the trend among the Kurds has also been toward an increase in the percentage of those who adhered to Iraqi national identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of the Surveys</th>
<th>Sect not specified</th>
<th>Sect not specified</th>
<th>Sect not specified</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004 December</td>
<td>Above all, I am an Iraqi</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am a Muslim</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am an Arab</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am a Kurd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>1264</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 April</td>
<td>Above all, I am an Iraqi</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am a Muslim</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am an Arab</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am a Kurd</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>1376</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 March</td>
<td>Above all, I am an Iraqi</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Above all, I am a Muslim</td>
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<td>Above all, I am a Kurd</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2030</td>
<td>4044</td>
<td>1194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 July</td>
<td>Above all, I am an Iraqi</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am a Muslim</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am an Arab</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Above all, I am a Kurd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DK</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4132</td>
<td>1199</td>
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Thus, while there has been an increase in the feeling of national pride among the Kurds and Sunnis in the 2004-2007 period, the percentage increase in the number of Iraqis who adhered to national identity in this period has been even more impressive. Considering that in the post-invasion period, Iraqis have increasingly described self as “Iraqis, above all” rather than Muslims, Arabs, or Kurds above all may lend credence to our argument that the presence of the American-led Coalition Forces represented by people whose language, culture, and even physical appearance are so conspicuously different from the Iraqi public has unavoidably roused nationalist awareness among Iraqis so strong that it trumped other forms of identity. Consistent with our argument also, nationalist awareness varies among different sections of Iraqi society.
REFERENCES


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