The Arab Spring and Egyptian Revolution Makers:

Predictors of Participation

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ABSTRACT

This paper juxtaposes two clusters of theories; political conflict, resource mobilization, organizational, and political opportunity theories, on the one hand, and mass society, structural-functional, and relative deprivation theories, on the other. It assesses their explanatory power in predicting participation in revolutionary movements. It uses survey data from a nationally representative sample of 3,143 Egyptian adults who rated their participation in the revolutionary movement against President Mubarak from 1, no participation, to 10, utmost participation. The analysis of the data identified three sets of variables that are linked to participation: attitudes against the government and attitudes in favor of alternative sociopolitical orders, individual efficacy, dysphoric emotions, and immorality; such mediums of communicative power as the Internet, mobiles, and opposition newspapers; and demographics, including being male, residing in the urban area, and living impressionable years under President Mubarak. The socioeconomic status having an inverted-U relationship with participation suggests that the revolution was led by members of the middle class. The data, however, provides support for contradictory hypotheses drawn from both clusters of theories. The analysis thus suggests rethinking about predictors of participation. This entails departing from the conception that presumes the participants as monolithic individuals rather than manifold and heterogeneous, a new look at the relationship between immorality and participation, and a refocus on the monolithic state as the unifying element in the revolutionary process.

INTRODUCTION

On December 17, 2010, street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, in protest of the mistreatment he received from the municipal agents. His death, days later, turned into a national tragedy, which was thought to have caused by the government, and unleashed such uproars that President Zein al-Abedin Ben Ali was forced to flee the country. Like a wildfire, popular protests then spread from one Arab country to another until the entire region was engulfed, ushering in a new era in the history of the region and known as the Arab Spring. On January 14, 2011, protests broke out in Jordan's capital and other major cities. On January 16, a 32-year-old Yemeni mother of three posted a message on Facebook calling people to celebrate the Tunisian uprising, an initiative followed by a chain of upheavals that several months later forced President Ali Abdullah Saleh to step down. On January 25, a computer-savvy Egyptian used Facebook to organize a rally to protest against police brutality, the state of emergency laws, lack of freedom, and corruption in high places, an action that led to the overthrow of President Hosni Mubarak. On February 14, an anti-government rally was organized in Bahrain. On the following day, thousands of Libyans protested after the government arrested human-rights attorney Fathi Terbii in Benghazi, Libya, leading to armed rebellion against Colonel Gadhafi, who was eventually captured and killed. And on March 13, Syrian security forces opened fire on people who had gathered in Deraa's main mosque in southern Syria to deliberate about how to respond to the arrests of a few students who wrote anti-regime slogans on their school walls. Demonstrations with varying levels of intensity also erupted in Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.

These events raise questions about the dominant sociological theories of rebellion and revolutionary movements, including **p**olitical conflict, **r**esource mobilization, **o**rganizational, and **p**olitical opportunity structure (PROP, hereafter) theories. While in every case discontented individuals appeared to have overcome fear, defied the repressive regimes, and poured into the public space in large number, it is not quite clear as to how these individuals organized themselves into collective action, planned rallies, designed visual rhetoric, produced slogans that they chanted harmoniously, and mobilized emotional energies. More pressing, however, are the socioeconomic and cultural factors that predict participation. Are these participants predominantly self-empowered, cognitively liberated, linked in organized networks, and morally outraged as PROP theories tend to predict? Or, alternatively, are they predominantly fatalistic,

insecure, and powerless as forecasted by **m**ass-society, **s**tructural-functional, and **r**elative-deprivation (MSR, hereafter) theories? What were the facilitators of and inhibitors to their participation? What is the relationship between socioeconomic status and participation? How did the discontented individuals manage to connect to one another and form the critical mass that tipped the balance of forces vis-à-vis the government to their favor? To what extent are participations linked to liberal values, religiosity, morality, organization, sources of information, and attitudes toward outsiders?

An analysis of the series of events that contributed to the making of the Arab Spring is useful for empirical interrogations of the dominant theories of revolutions and rebellions. In the case of Egypt, however, nationally representative sample data are available that provide insights into the socioeconomic and cultural profiles of the revolutionary actors. By analyzing data from a full-scale national values survey carried out in the country in the summer of 2011, this paper will (1) assess alternative hypotheses derived from PROP and MSR theories, (2) reveal limitations in both clusters of theories, (3) suggest additional predictors of participation, (4) offer an alternative conceptualization of revolutionary actors, and thus (5) contribute to the social-scientific understanding of revolutionary participation.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT: PROFILE OF REVOLUTION MAKERS

People who play leading roles in a revolutionary movement are conceptualized as "professional revolutionists" (Arendt 1963: 262-263),[1] "power contenders" (Tilly 1978), or "state builders" (Skocpol 1979). These concepts, however, are too restrictive to be applicable to the ordinary people involved in a revolutionary movement. As an alternative, the individual participants are conceptualized as *revolution makers*. This concept is used as a heuristic device to apply to the category of diverse individuals who are committed in varying degrees to a revolutionary overthrow of the ruling regime. These individuals seek out resources, networks, and organizations; make use of the available opportunities; and invent new strategies of political actions that render the state's repressive technologies ineffective, catching the repressive forces by surprise. While PROP and MSR theories are juxtaposed to assess their explanatory power in

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[1]According to Arendt (1963: 262-263), "the French Revolution also gave rise to a new figure of professional revolutionist, who spent his life "not in revolutionary agitation, for which there existed but few opportunities, but in study and thought, in theory and debate... [His] essentially theoretical way of life was spent in the famous libraries of London and Paris, or in the coffee house of Vienna and Zurich, or in the relatively comfortable and undisturbed jails of the various *anciens regimes.*"

predicting the profiles of revolution makers, a multidisciplinary perspective is adopted in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the range of sociological and psychological factors that are linked to revolutionary participations.

Revolution Makers: Attitudes, Efficacy, and Morality

Attitudes

Among the "whole series of fallacies" Tilly (1975: 487) attributes to MSR theories of revolution is the premise "that rebellion is an individual act intimately dependent on a certain attitude—a rebellious attitude—toward some or all authorities." Yet Tilly's (1978: 200) alternative explanation of the proximate causes of revolutionary situations under the rubric of "commitment to [exclusive alternative]… claims by a significant segment of the subject population" is consistent with the MSR premise he criticizes. This is true because commitments to an alternative political order may reflect strong attitudes, which in turn prompt participations in a revolutionary movement against the ruling regime. The difference between the proponents of MSR theories and Tilly is that while the former focus on attitudes against the government, Tilly stresses favorable attitudes toward the alternative polity.

Individual attitudes matter in revolutionary mobilizations. To take part in a revolutionary movement necessitates not only commitments in time and resources but also acceptance of certain risks, including arrest, injury, or even death. Thus, it would be hard to conceive of individuals making such commitments without having strong attitudes against the government, on the one hand, and being passionate about a vision of the alternative sociopolitical order they consider as desirable, on the other. The two sets of attitudes are thus important in predicting people's participation in a revolutionary movement.

Anti-government attitudes may reflect low trust in government, dissatisfaction with its performance, and the perception that the government is not functioning for their benefit. When people have high trust in their government, consider public officials trustworthy and civil, they tend to support government policies and are less likely to engage in collective political protest. They may participate in a political upheaval when this trust is shattered, political cynicism increases, and the belief in the prevalence of corruption in high places is widely shared (Gamson

1968; see Levi and Stoker 2000 for a review; Freitag and Bulhmann 2009; You 2012). The empirical evidence on the linkage between mistrust and system-changing or unconventional political behavior, however, have been inconclusive (Citrin 1977, Muller et al. 1982, Sigelman and Feldman 1983). Other research findings, on the other hand, have supported the connection between mistrust, efficacy, and protest participation (Paige 1971, Craig and Maggiotto 1981, Sears and McConahay 1973, Shingles 1981, Lee 1992). None of these studies, however, assesses these linkages in a successful case of a revolutionary movement similar to Egypt.

Ideology is said to play a significant role in shaping revolutionary action (Tilly 1978, Furet 1981, Skocpol 1982, Sewell 1985, Swidler 1986, Moaddel 1992). One mechanismic explanation (Bunge 1997) of this process is that ideology shapes attitudes and attitudes in turn shape revolutionary action. Because more than one ideology may be present in a revolutionary situation, different if not conflicting attitudes may predict participation. Even in cases where a single ideology predominates, the role of ideology is far from being monolithic, as it means different things to different individuals (Furet 1981, Moaddel 1992). In the contemporary Middle East, however, people's political actions may be driven by commitment to such diverse, if not opposing, ideological orientations as those toward liberal values of social individualism, gender equality, and secular politics or belief in a virtuous religious order and an Islamic government. It is not simply the belief in the liberal values of freedom and equality that motivates people to act. Nor are one's religiosity or conviction in the sanctity of religious beliefs. Rather, individuals with stronger liberal or religious fundamentalist attitudes tend to participate more often in a revolutionary movement than those with weaker attitudes. Their revolutionary action is thus a function of the extent to which they have developed attitudes and passion toward, or "an intense ideological identification" (McAdam 1986: 64) with whatever their desirable alternative order may be—whether it is a puritanical religious order or a libertarian view on politics, gender, and individual choice. In fact, "men [and women]," says Chateaubriand, "don't allow themselves to be killed for their interests; they allow themselves to be killed for their passions" (cited in Connor 1994: 206).

These two sets of attitudes—one against the government and the other in favor of alternative political orders—are thus proposed to predict participation in the revolutionary movement.

Individual Efficacy versus Dysphoric Emotions

MSR and PROP theories offer contrasting hypotheses on the kind of individuals that are more likely to be predisposed toward revolutionary action. MSR theories consider such predispositions in terms of dysphoric emotions—i.e., the feelings of isolation, powerlessness, anomie, guilt, and shame that are produced by the breakdown of social order as a result of rapid social change or the frustrations produced by a gap between achievement and expectation. These subjective states in turn render individuals receptive to the extremist messages of revolutionary movements (Arendt 1958; Johnson 1964, 1966; Davies 1969; Gurr 1970). Another interpretation may be deduced from Durkheim's concept of fatalism. For him, fatalism, like anomie, is related to the problem of how to balance social regulations. While anomie is a result of societal normlessness and deregulation, fatalism is a type of mental pathology produced by "excessive regulations," such that, as Durkheim noted, "futures [are] pitilessly blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive discipline" (cited in Dohrenwend 1959:467; Lukes 1967; Lockwood 1992; Besnard 1993; Acevedo 2005; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008). While Durkheim links fatalism to suicide, it may also predispose the individual to participate in a revolutionary movement.

PROP theories, on the other hand, portray an opposite conception of the individual predisposition. Revolution makers are portrayed as well-integrated members of their communities, self-empowered, capable of displaying considerable enthusiasm and energy, and cognitively liberated. In fact, favorable structural conditions and political opportunities are only translated into action when dissatisfied individuals consider themselves powerful enough to alter their lot in life (Piven and Cloward 1977, McAdam 1982, Nepstad 1997). Inefficacious individuals, according to Schwartz (1973: 12-13), do not believe themselves to be entitled to more power and are happy with the way things are. It is the feeling of being empowered enough—politically efficacious—to demand a more responsive government that prompts individuals to participate in protest movements (see also Gamson 1968; Citrin 1974; Miller et al. 1980; Craig and Maggiotto 1981; Sigelman and Feldman 1983; Pierce and Converse 1989).

Moral Values

Although morality has been either an explicit or implicit component of various theories of revolution, its linkages with participation has scarcely been tested empirically. How and why could moral commitments be a motivating factor to participate in a revolutionary movement? To what extent are revolution makers committed to or driven by the same moral ideals of non-violence, honesty, truth, and social justice that they accuse the ruling regime of violating? Are the more active participants driven by a stronger attachment to morality than the less active or non-participants? Revolution makers may be in consensus in considering as immoral such behaviors as the regime's violence against peaceful demonstrators, political favoritism and economic corruption, and deception of the public through the spread of misinformation. Does the feeling of moral outrage at these behaviors activate people with a stronger sense of morality to participate in protests against the regime?

The literature on revolution offers opposing interpretations of the relation of morality to revolutionary action. In Marxism, morality has been an integral component of its theory of revolution. Marxists have been explicit about the moral superiority of workers and their allies in socialist revolutionary movements. As a universal class, the working class's struggle against the particularistic interests of the bourgeoisie serves the broader humanity because it creates the conditions for the ultimate elimination of class exploitation and the formation of a just social order. In PROP theories, on the other hand, while morality is not as central, allusions are often made to such expressions as "moral outrage," "moral shock," "social injustice and corruption in high places," "the spread of misinformation and deception by the ruling regime," and "violation of human rights" as a factor motivating participation in collective protests (Gamson 1992, Japer 1999, Collins 2001, Nepstad and Smith 2001, Goodwin et al. 2001). Nepstad and Smith (2001: 173) suggest that "moral outrage is a logical reaction to the torture, disappearances, and assassinations of innocent civilians and to the lies disseminated by a government to cover its role as an accomplice to these atrocities." Focusing on such popularly labeled progressive movements as those for racial equality, nuclear disarmament and peace, poor people, and gender equality, these theorists tend to presume stronger moral commitments of the individual participants in such movements than non-participants.

MSR theorists do not explicitly address the role of morality in revolutionary developments, but since, for them, revolutions flow from societal breakdown, anomie, or

individual frustrations caused by unmet expectations, they barely consider moral outrage as a motivating factor for the participants. On the contrary, their theoretical framework predicts just an opposite relationship between morality and participation. Among MSR theorists, however, Arendt (1963) addresses the immorality of professional revolutionists by pointing to a series of social, psychological, and historical mechanisms in order to explain the retreat from the ideal of freedom and civic liberty and the rise of violence in the French Revolution and the subsequent revolutions that it inspired.

For Arendt, the French revolutionaries failed to draw a correct lesson from the American Revolution. They were affected little by "the thoughtful and erudite political theories of the Founding Fathers" (Arendt 1963: 17). Rather, "'the lovely equality,' in Jefferson's words, 'which the poor enjoy with the rich' [in America] revolutionized the spirit of men… to such an extent that… it appeared to revolutionary men more important to change the fabric of society, as it had been changed in America prior to its Revolution, than to change the structure of political realm" (p. 17). This shift to the social was also dictated by France's dire economic conditions, which in turn gave rise to a range of emotions that was first noted by Rousseau's discovery of compassion. This sensibility, however, was flawed not just because of Rousseau's "fantastic irresponsibility and unreliability" (p. 85), but because it was not realized "out of suffering with others" and was thus insensitive to reality. Understood as an emotion or a sentiment, delight of intimacy, and pity, compassion turned into a political tool in Robespierre's glorification of the poor and praising of suffering as the spring of virtue—all constituting the subjective underpinning for his "surprising faithlessness that foreshadowed the greater perfidy which was to play such a monstrous role in the revolutionary tradition" (p. 85, see also pp. 83-86). As Arendt (p. 295, note 30) further elaborates, "the more bloodthirsty the speaker [in revolutionary France] the more likely that he will insist on *ces tendres affections de l'âme*—on the tenderness of his soul." In addition, the experience of the French Revolution itself became a historical factor that perpetuated violence in the revolutionary traditions, for the revolutionists who took their cues from the French "learned and knew beforehand the course a revolution must take. It was the course of events, not the men of the Revolution, which they imitated.… They knew that a revolution must devour its own children, just as they knew that a revolution would take its course in a sequence of revolutions, or that the open enemy was followed by the hidden enemy under the mask of the 'suspects'…" (p. 51)

Arendt's argument is remarkably consistent with a psychological explanation concerning the connection between moral certainty and political violence. In the same way that Arendt's professional revolutionists are assured of the righteousness of their way, research on moral licensing has shown that people's confidence in their own morality decreases their tendency to be more in other domains. Being certain about their morality thus creates a license to behave immorally (Shaw et al. 2011: 277; see also Sachdeva, Iliev and Medin 2009).

These contradictory interpretations of the relationship between morality and participation notwithstanding, these theories commonly misconceive the role of morality in revolutionary development. Marxist conception of morality is deductive and formalistic, that is, the literal content created by the general theory, which ultimately rests on whether one agrees with its theory of history. Likewise, while pointing to a host of sociological and psychological processes in the rise of violence in the French Revolution, Arendt's explanation of the role of violence in subsequent revolutions is also deductive and formalistic: Professional revolutionists turn to violence for the very reason of believing in a theory of history projected by the French experience. PROP theorists, on the other hand, do not offer a theory of history, but their recourse to moral outrage as galvanizing revolutionary mobilization is often self-referential—based on the actors' explanation of their revolutionary participation.

In either case—whether one presumes commitments to moral values as an essential feature of revolution makers or revolutions as an immoralizing process—the relationship between morality and revolutionary participation needs to be tested empirically. Such an empirical test, however, must be based on independent measures of morality and participation in the revolution. This entails evaluating the extent to which people's ratings of the immorality of such behaviors as violence against other people, stealing other people's property, and telling lies to protect one's interests (not whether or not they are morally outraged at the behavior of the regime) are related to the extent of their revolutionary participation.

Mediums of Communicative Power

It is true that revolutionary action is not just an outcome of the participants' self-reflections on the social conditions shaping their lives and that people generally relay on others in forming opinions on issues (Popkin 1991, Sniderman et al 1991; Kinder 1998) and in validating the authenticity of the available information (Kruglanski 1989, 1990). It is also true that the information that serves a revolutionary end is hard to come by. What is more, useful information is not just a one-time deal that when or if it is present individuals begin to mobilize. In a revolutionary development, there must be a continuing replenishing of information about

situational changes as a result of unfolding events. On the other hand, because information and communication are among the fundamental sources of power and domination (Bell 1973, Salvaggio 1989, Castells 2007), an unrestrained communication system and unfettered distribution of information are potentially subversive of the state power. Naturally, the ruling regimes see it in their interests to control the sources of news information and invalidate the authenticity of the alternative opposition sources.

Reliance on others may thus serve a revolutionary end when it takes place within, or is constituted by, a historically specific transformative medium of communication. Historians and social scientists have theorized about the historical conditions under which such a medium plays a transformative role: where a language, for example, under ethnically divided empires, which have been experiencing economic change and social dislocations, turned the ensued social conflict into ethnic antagonism and nationalist revolutionary movement (Gellner 1965); print capitalism by creating unified fields of communication, by giving a new fixity to language, and by creating languages-of-power contributed to the rise of nations as "imagined communities" in Europe (Anderson 1983:44-45) and having also a similar impact on Muslim-majority countries after print was introduced there in the nineteenth century (Robinson 1993); and a network of "discursive literacy—that is, the ability to read and write non-formulaic text" created cross-class national communities (Mann's1992: 141). In these instances, language, print-capitalism, and discursive literacy constituted new mediums of communicative power under specific historical conditions.

The opposition's innovative use of the new or the pre-existing mediums of communication may thus significantly enhance the process of revolutionary mobilization. The state's loss of communicative control—the decline in its ability to manage and manipulate the flow and content of communication—on the other hand, may undermine its ability to defeat the revolutionary movement. This loss may occur in a variety of ways: when the alternative sources of communicative power are located beyond the national borders, as occurred in Iran, for example, before the Constitutional Revolution (Abrahamian 1982, Bayat 1991), when revolution makers use cultural or religious networks and rituals as a vehicle for communicating with the discontented individuals (Tehranian 1980, Moaddel 1993); or when the ruling dictator is immersed in the silent medium of whispers and gossips about his vulnerability and impending downfall (Chen, Lu, Suen, 2012); when inventions in communication technology facilitate the spread of revolutionary messages in a manner that is either beyond the state's control or the ruling elite are unable to develop an effective strategy to control the new medium. For example,

anecdotal evidence pointed to the significance of Facebook, Google, and Twitter as outlets for outrage expressions in the Egyptian revolutionary movement (Preston 2011; Gross 2011).

This paper assesses the role of the cyberspace and wireless network in shaping a new medium of communicative power and thus predicting participation in revolutionary movements.

Demography, Organization, and Differential Recruitment

PROP and MSR theories relate different demographic features to participation. In PROP theories, *access to social capital*—networks, communities, voluntary associations, frequency of face-to-face interactions—provides the infrastructure for collective action (Minkoff 1997, Portes 1998, Paxton 2002, Davis and Robinson 2010). Likewise, *education* is said to lower cognitive barriers to political enlightenment, as educated people are believed to be more engrossed and concerned politically, have greater skills and sophistication in analyzing and understanding issues and events, and display a stronger determination to see a task completed than those less educated (Kinder 1998; Martinez 2005; Schussman and Soule 2005; Krueger and Malečková 2003, Davis and Robinson 2010). Also consistent with PROP theories' predictions are the influence of *gender*, *urban living*, and *ethnicity* on participation. Where men enjoy more resources and social networks than women, like the contemporary Middle East, they tend to participate in social movements more often than women (Ibrahim 1980, Sageman 2004). Urban living promotes participation because it is conducive to more resources and access to more information and organization than living in the rural areas (Dessouki 1982; Moaddel, 1993; Wiktorowicz 2004). Finally, ethnicity is linked to a higher participation, for it provides a basis for shared understanding and effective communication among its members, particularly where an ethnic group is discriminated against (Hechter 1975; van den Berghe 1978; Fishman 1972; Fishman and Gertner 1985; Armstrong 1982; Connor 1994; Burnstein et al., 1994; Smith 1998; Korchmaros and Kenny 2001; Moaddel, Tessler, and Inglehart 2008a, 2008b).

Consistent with MSR theories, on the other hand, are the influences of such other factors as *income and social class*, where lower income compared to one's relatively higher education or self-assigned class membership tends to enhance the feeling of relative deprivation and unmet expectations (Gurr 1970; Ayubi 1991, Ghadbian 2000; Woltering 2002; Davis and Robinson 2010). So are the effects of being *younger and unmarried*, which indicate the significance of weaker social ties on participation.[2] Both clusters of theories, however, appear to be silent on

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[2]PROP theorists have conceptualized this variable in terms of "biographical availability… as the absence of personal constraints that may increase the costs and risks of movement participation, such as full-time employment, marriage,

the significance of experience during formative years on revolutionary participation. It has been argued that attitudes and behavior are often shaped by the common experience of a cohort (Schuman and Rieger 1992). People's *formative years* under a particular regime are said to shape their orientation toward that regime. South Korean youth, for example, have grown critical of the U.S., but those aged 50 and over, having experienced the Korean War, consider "the U.S. as a savior that stopped communist takeover and recognize the sacrifice of 54,000 American lives in the Korean War" (Lee 2004: 17). Instead of age, this paper uses formative years under President Mubarak as a better predictor of participation.

METHODS: MEASUREMENT AND HYPOTHESES

These theoretical issues are used to specify and measure the variables of this study and develop hypotheses on the predictors of participation.

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is the respondents' self-rating of the extent of their participation in the revolutionary movement against President Hosni Mubarak. They were asked:

> Regarding the revolutionary movement against former President, Hosni Mubarak, on the scale of 1 to 10, with 1 indicating no participation and 10 the utmost participation, where do you put the extent of your participation on this scale?

Correlates of Participation

The correlates of participation fall into three broad categories: (I) attitudes, efficacy, and morality; (II) sources of communicative power; and (III) demographics and organizational membership.

I. Attitudes, Efficacy, and Morality

Five indicators are used to measure attitudes against the government, attitudes toward alternative political order, personal efficacy and dysphoric emotions, and morality. All these indicators are discussed in Appendix I. To assess attitudes against the government, the following indicators are measured. The first two focus on governmental rules and regulations and are intended to measure Durkheim's conceptions of fatalism, **too many rules** (A1), and anomie, **two few rules** (A2). The other three are **diffidence in government** (A3), **dissatisfaction with**

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and family responsibilities" (McAdam 1986: 70; Beyerlein and Hipp 2006). The "absence of personal constraints" practically means in this context "weaker social ties."

government (A4), and the perception that the economy runs for the benefits of a **special few** (A5). Higher values on these variables indicate stronger fatalism, anomie, diffidence in government, dissatisfaction with government, and perception that a special few are benefitting from the economy. Three interaction variables are also included in the analysis: Diffidence × dissatisfaction (A6), special few × dissatisfaction (A7), and special few × diffidence (A8) interactions.

Attitudes toward an alternative political order consist of indicators measuring orientations towards two diverse ideologies: liberalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The liberalism variable is a linear combination of three composite measures of individualism, gender equality, and democracy and secular politics. The composite measure of social individualism consists of people who selected love as the basis for marriage (A9), or selected independence (A10) but did not select obedience (A11) as favorable qualities for children to have. Gender equality variable is also a linear combination of four indicator measures of attitudes toward gender relations, all are in Likert-scale format: A wife must always obey her husband (A12), men make better political leaders (A13), a university education is more important for a boy (A14), and men should have more right to a job than women (A15). Finally, the third component is democratic form of government, which is also a composite measure of attitudes toward secular politics (A16) and democracy (A17). Liberalism is thus a linear combination of social individualism, gender equality, and democratic form of government.

Liberalism = (social individualism + gender equality + liberal government)/3
Higher values on this measure are associated with stronger liberal attitudes, that is, more favorable orientations toward social individualism, gender equality, democracy and secular politics.

The above liberalism measure is normative. A cognitive view of secularism (**secular belief**) is also added to the analysis in order to measure the extent to which secular understanding of development is linked to participation. This is a single measure based on the extent to which respondents associated decline in the belief in God with increase in the level of development in the future (A18). Higher value on this measure, indicate a stronger belief in secularism.

Religious fundamentalism is defined in general terms as a set of beliefs about and attitudes toward whatever religious beliefs one has. For example, believing that one's religion is superior to the religion of others, that one's religion is the only true religion, and that one's

religion is closer to God than other religions does not address religious tenets per se, but rather attitudes toward the significance of one's religion. Fundamentalism also projects an image of the deity that is disciplinarian. That is, God severely punishes those who engaged in a minor violation of His law. It advances a reading of the scriptures that is literal, inerrant, and infallible; and bestows a standing to its religion that is superior to, intolerant of, and more exclusivist (i.e., closer to God) than other religions (Altemayer and Hunsberger 2004; Moaddel and Karabenick 2008). Religious fundamentalism is thus a multi-dimensional concept, consisting of an authoritarian conception of the deity (authoritarian deity factor based on items A19-A23), literalism/inerrancy (literalism factor based on items A24-A26), exclusivity (exclusivism factor based on items A27-A28), and intolerance (intolerance factor based on A29-A30). A single measure of fundamentalism is constructed based on a linear combination of all these factors.

Fundamentalism = (authoritarian deity + literalism + exclusivity + intolerance)/4

A higher value on this measure indicates a stronger fundamentalist orientation. To underscore the significance of fundamentalist attitudes, not religiosity, in shaping people's desire to participate in the revolutionary movement, several measures of religiosity are included in the analysis as control variables. These are**: daily prayer** (A31), self-described as a religious person (A32), the **importance of God** in life (A33), and **Mosque attendance** (A34). Mosque attendance can also be an indicator of both an organizational and a traditional source of communicative power. Mosques have been a setting for communications between religious leaders-cum-activists and followers, the exchange of information among the participants, and networking. Participation in mosques' collective rituals may also contribute to the generation of what Collins (2001) conceptualized as emotional energy.

Both political efficacy and dysphoric emotions feature prominently in sociological theories of collective action and revolution. Political efficacy refers to an individual's belief in his/her ability to affect the scope and content of government policy. While this conceptualization may apply to conditions of political democracy, for many political activists living under an authoritarian state the question is not whether they are capable of affecting state policies. Rather, it is how to get rid of the authoritarian ruler. Thus, the belief that one cannot affect government policy may not be indicative of inefficacy. As an alternative, a broader conception of efficacy is used; one that focuses on **perceived control** (A35) and the belief in **free will** (A36). That is, those who give themselves a higher mark of "having control over their lives" or "deciding their

own destiny" are more efficacious individuals, while those who give themselves a lower rate on these measures tend to feel more powerless and fatalistic. Since the latter is also indicative of a person's fatalistic orientation, an interaction measure of this variable with the Durkheimian measure of fatalism (too many regulations) is also included in the analysis (A37).

In addition, two other variables are considered to assess the predictive power of MSR theories. One measures the perception of insecurity and the other xenophobia. A general measure of insecurity is employed in this study (A38). Since the feeling of insecurity may be reinforced by the fatalistic perception that there are too many rules and regulation, a measure of the interaction between these two variables is included in the analysis (A39). Regarding xenophobia, the practical meaning of the construct and who constitutes the outsiders varies in time and space. Empirical researches in Europe have used attitudes toward immigrants (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003), but immigration is not an issue among Egyptians. Historically, an overriding orientation of both pan-Arab nationalists and religious fundamentalists in the country has been shaped by anti-Western attitudes (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995, Moaddel 2005). Therefore, **xenophobia** is measured as a factor based on the preference not to have Americans (A40), British (A41), or French (A42) as neighbors.

Finally, participants' moral commitments are measured in terms of their rating of indicators of immoral behavior: violence against other people, stealing other people's property, and telling lies to protect one's interests. Since these three variables are correlated they are linearly combined to make a single **moral-flexibility** factor (A43-A45).

$$\text{Morality} = (\text{violence} + \text{stealing} + \text{telling lies})/3$$

Lower values indicate stronger moral commitment, while higher values moral flexibility.

II. Medium of Communicative Power

A medium of communicative power is operationalized in terms of the respondents' reliance on this medium as a source of news information. Included among these sources are radio (A46), domestic TV (A47), satellite TV (48), newspapers (A49), the Internet (A50), and mobile phones (A51). It is proposed that these mediums provide varied communicative power to the revolution makers. Where the Egyptian government had a more effective control over the content and flow of information, like in cases of domestic TV and radio, the news information broadcast through these mediums naturally portrayed the government's performance in a positive light and primed more favorable features of the ruling elite. It is thus proposed that domestic TV and radio

enhanced the communicative power of the government and weakened that of the opposition, and as a result people who relied on these sources tended to participate less often in the movement against it. The government, on the other hand, having far less control over the satellite TV, the Internet, or people's conversation on mobile phones, could not have easily manipulated the flow of information going through these mediums. Being accessible to opposition activists, these mediums tended to increase these activists' communicative power, serving as useful vehicles to spread anti-government messages among the broader public. As a result, people relying on these sources tended to participate more often in anti-regime demonstrations. On the other hand, the linkages between relying on newspapers as sources of information and participation depend on the specific newspaper respondents relied on. It may be proposed that people who relied on the opposition newspapers tended to participate in the revolutionary movement more often than those who relied on pro-regime newspapers or those who did not rely on newspapers as a source of information. A dummy variable is thus created based on whether the respondents mentioned relying on a pro-government or opposition newspapers —**opposition paper** (A52). Finally, it is not possible to consider newspapers, the Internet, and mobile phones as totally separate sources of news information for the individual respondents. People who mentioned a newspaper as a source might have accessed it via the Internet. Or people who have used mobiles as the source of information might have also used the Internet as well or accessed the Internet from their mobiles. As a result, and given that these three measures are significantly correlated, a **paper-internet-mobile** factor is constructed, based on these indicators.

III. Demographics and Organizational Membership

Several measures of demographic attributes of the respondents are included in this analysis: education (A53), self-assigned class membership (A54), and income (A55). These three variables, significantly correlated (the correlation coefficients range between 0.36 and 0.37), are used to create a **socio-economic status** factor. To assess whether the members of the middle class participated more frequently in the revolutionary movements than the members of lower or higher classes, a square of the socio-economic factor (A56) is included in the analysis in order to assess an inverted-U pattern of class and participation.

Other demographic variables are included to measure their effects on participation of living one's **impressionable years under Mubarak** (A57), being **male** (A58), residing in an **urban area** (A59), and being **single** (A60). Finally, an **organizational membership** factor is

constructed based on the respondents' membership in a religious organization (A61), political party (A62), and humanitarian or charitable organization (A63). The relationships among all these variables and participation are considered linear, except for the effect of socioeconomic status, which is proposed to be curvilinear, following an inverted U shape.

Hypotheses and the Limitations of the Study

Based on the above measurements of the theoretically specified variables, the following hypotheses are advanced: Participation rate is higher among Egyptians who:

Hypothesis 1.   Feel that there were too many rules and regulations (fatalistic).
Hypothesis 2.   Feel that there were too few rules and regulations (anomic).
Hypothesis 3.   Have higher diffidence in government.
Hypothesis 4.   Display a higher level of dissatisfaction with the government's performance.
Hypothesis 5.   Believe that the economy is run for big interests rather than for all the people.
Hypothesis 6.   Have stronger liberal attitudes.
Hypothesis 7.   Associate development with a higher decline in faith in Allah.
Hypothesis 8.   Have stronger fundamentalist attitudes.
Hypothesis 9.   Hypothesis 8 remains true, controlling for mosque attendance, daily prayer, self-described as a religious person, the importance of God in life.
Hypothesis 10.   Attend mosque more frequently (as a proxy measure of organization or traditional source of communicative power).
Hypothesis 11.   Have higher perceived control.
Hypothesis 12.   A stronger believer in free will.
Hypothesis 13.   Feel more secure.
Hypothesis 14.   Feel more xenophobic.
Hypothesis 15.   Display a stronger moral commitment.
Hypothesis 16.   Rely less often on radio as a source of information.
Hypothesis 17.   Rely less often on domestic TV as a source of information.
Hypothesis 18.   Rely more often on newspapers, the Internet, and mobile phones as sources of information.
Hypothesis 19.   Relay more often on opposition newspapers as a source of information.
Hypothesis 20.   Are male.
Hypothesis 21.   Are single.
Hypothesis 22.   Lived their impressionable years under President Hosni Mubarak.
Hypothesis 23.   Are Christians.
Hypothesis 24.   Were members of the middle class—there is an inverted U relationship between socioeconomic status and participation.
Hypothesis 25.   Live in urban areas.
Hypothesis 26.   Belong to an organization.

The analysis presented in this paper is based on cross-sectional data collected at one point in time. Although one may still advance causal analysis of the proposed relationship between, for example, socioeconomic status or age and participation in the revolutionary movement, it is acknowledged that with cross-sectional data, the direction of causality cannot be determined empirically for all the hypotheses. It is also acknowledged that it may not be possible to rule out causality in a direction opposite to what is proposed. People who have more frequently participated in the revolutionary movement, for example, were more likely to develop stronger attitudes against the government. Finally, it is possible that causality flows in both directions and that participation and the attitudes against the government, in favor of alternative political order, or morality are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, if the following analysis reveals statistically significant relationships, it can only be concluded that the data are consistent with the proposed hypotheses. Nonetheless, by determining whether the hypothesized relationships exists, the data are very useful in evaluating the explanatory power of PROP and MSR theories, uncovering the limitations of both theories, offering theoretically informed insights about the political dynamics that seem likely to account for variation in participation among different individuals, and suggesting alternative interpretations of the predictors of revolutionary actions that may transcend the status of the existing sociological theories of revolutionary movements.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Data

The data are from a full-scale survey of a nationally representative sample of 3,143 Egyptian adults (18 years of age and over) conducted between June 6, 2011, and August 8, 2011. It used multi-stage random sampling procedures in different provinces, stratified according to urban and rural areas of the country in proportion to their size, with roughly equal proportions of male and female respondents. The interviews took approximately one hour to complete and represented about 90% of the people contacted.

The sample included 3,010 (95.8%) Muslims and 133 (4.2%) Christian Copts. About 1,423 (45.3%) of the sample was from the urban areas, and the rest from the rural areas of the country. The respondents had an average age of 39 years, 1,516 (48.2%) were male, 561 (17.8%) have never been married, 2,253 (71.7%) were married, 39 (1.2%) divorced, 14 (0.4%) separated, and 276 (8.8%) widowed, and 428 (13.6%) had college degrees, and in terms of class, 19 (0.6%)

of the respondents described themselves as members of the upper class, 531 (16.9%) upper middle class, 1,038 (33%) lower middle class, 726 (23.1%) working class, and 820 (26.1%) lower class. Only 1,398 (44.5%) of the respondents indicated that they had jobs.
Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Participation Rate

According to Table 1, 59.4% reported that they did not participate in the movement at all, and the rest indicated varying rates of participation. The mean rate of participation is 2.7,1 and standard deviation is 2.56. If the participation rate is classified into four categories of none, low (2-4), medium (5-7), and high (8-10), then more than 17.7% reported having low, 14.6% medium, and 8.2% high participation.

Table 1. Self-rate participation in the revolutionary movement against President Hosni Mubarak				
	Frequency	Percent		
No participation	1,866	59.5	59.5	None
2	199	6.3		
3	178	5.7	17.7	Low
4	179	5.7		
5	158	5.0		
6	130	4.1	14.6	Medium
7	172	5.5		
8	145	4.6		
9	55	1.8	8.2	High
Utmost participation	56	1.8		
Total	3,138	100.0	100	
Mean (S.D.)	2.71 (2.56)			
DK/NA	5	.2		

Predictors of Participation

Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for predictors of participation rate. The first category consists of attitudes against the government and toward an alternative political order, perception of personal efficacy and dysphoric emotions, and morality. Accordingly, about 20% and 36% of the respondents expressed feelings that were consistent with Durkheim's conception of fatalism ("too many rules") and anomie ("two few rules"), respectively. The majority of respondents, however, expressed "not very much" or "no confidence at all" in their government (mean=2.55)

or showed above average dissatisfaction with its performance (mean=5.47), and less than 47% indicated that the economy ran for big interests. The mean score for liberal attitudes (mean = 1.97) indicates that Egyptians on average were not liberal. The illiberalism of the respondents is mostly due to their unfavorable attitudes toward gender equality. The mean composite measure of gender equality is 1.84 (min-max=1-4) indicating that a majority of the respondents favored gender inequality, while on the measure of social individualism they were divided (mean=1.01, min-max 1-2) and the majority were in favor of democracy (mean=3.05, min-max=1-4, individual composite measures not shown in table). The great majority of Egyptians rejected secular understanding of economic change (mean =1.87). On the contrary, they believed that as Egypt becomes more developed, faith in Allah either increases a lot (51%) or increases a little (23%).

Fundamentalist attitudes, by contrast, were strong among respondents. The combined measure of fundamentalism based on lineal combination of composite measures of deity, literalism, exclusivity, and intolerance has a mean of 3.5 (individual composite measures not shown in table. However, constructing a fundamentalism measure based on factor analysis or a measure of fundamentalism based on lineal combination of composite measures of the four components of fundamentalism does not affect the results of the analysis). The mean score measures of religiosity indicate that Egyptians were high on all measures of religiosity (4.86 for mosque attendance, 5.62 for daily prayer, 7.28 for defining self as a religious person, and 9.75 for the important of God in life).

On the first measure of personal efficacy—perceived control—respondents on average felt they had considerable control over their lives (mean score for perceived control=6.67). On the second measure of the construct, however, on average more Egyptians believed in fate than in free will (mean = 3.59). Likewise, they felt quite insecure (mean=3.04) and xenophobic. That is, about 87% of respondents did not like to have Americans, British, or French as neighbors. On morality, respondents overwhelmingly considered violence against other people, stealing other people's property, and telling lies to protect one's interests highly immoral (mean=1.44).

On average, more respondents use domestic TV as a source of news information than other sources (mean = 2.49), followed by satellite TV (2.32), radio (1.43), and newspapers, internet, or mobiles (1.39). Only 11% reported using anti-government newspapers over pro-government or none as a source of information. 63.7% lived the impressionable years under Mubarak. Finally, between 95% and 97% reported not belonging to a religious organization, political party, or humanitarian organization (individual indicators not shown in table).

Table 2. Descriptive statistics (list-wise N = 1948)					
	N	Min.	Max.	Mean	S.D.
I. Attitudes, Efficacy, and Morality					
Attitude against the government					
Too many rules and regulations	2972	0	1	0.20	0.40
Too few rules and regulations	2972	0	1	0.36	0.48
Diffidence in Government	3044	1	4	2.55	0.99
Dissatisfaction with Gov. performance	2996	1	10	5.47	2.19
Economy run for big interests	2963	0	1	0.47	0.50
Attitude toward alternative political order					
Liberal attitudes	2746	0.89	3.03	1.97	0.31
Development reduces faith in Allah	3078	1	4	1.87	1.05
Fundamentalism	2560	-4.19	1.21	0.00	1.00
Religiosity					
Mosque attendance	3140	1	7	4.87	2.43
Prayer-daily	3127	1	6	5.62	0.99
Self-described religiosity (10 very religious)	3057	1	10	7.28	1.72
Importance of God (10 very important)	3138	1	10	9.75	0.98
Personal efficacy and dysphoric emotions					
Perceived control	2996	1	10	6.67	2.17
Free will (10) vs. faith (1)	3069	1	10	3.59	2.80
Insecurity-life unpredictable	3073	1	4	3.04	0.98
Xenophobia	3037	0	1	0.90	0.29
Morality					
Moral flexibility	3139	1	9.33	1.44	0.76
II. Mediums of communicative power					
Source of information-domestic TV	3139	1	4	2.49	1.16
Source of information-radio	3137	1	4	1.43	0.93
Source of information-satellite TV	3138	1	4	2.32	1.20
Paper-Internet-Mobiles	3083	1	4	1.39	0.63
Anti-government Newspapers	3143	0	1	0.11	0.32
III. Demographics					
Male	3143	0	1	0.48	0.50
Never Married	3143	0	1	0.18	0.38
Impressionable years	3143	0	1	0.64	0.48
Christian	3143	0	1	0.04	0.20
Socioeconomic status	3053	-1.90	3.10	0.0	1.00
Urban	3143	0.00	1.00	0.45	0.50
Organizational membership	3136	-0.24	9.25	0.00	1.00

Table 3 shows correlation matrix between all the variables in the analysis. Accordingly, almost all the attitudinal variables are significantly linked to participation rate, except for the measure of anomie (too few rules), the perception that the economy is run for big interests, daily prayer, and self-described as religious. Among the mediums of communicative power, only reliance on domestic TV is not linked to participation. Reliance on radio is negatively correlated with participation, but satellite TV, newspapers, the Internet, mobile phones, and opposition newspapers are all positively correlated. Finally, among demographics, being Christian or having organizational membership were not linked to participation. Other demographic variables are positively correlated.

The validity of the variable measures is enhanced because the relationships among some of these variables are in directions that either would make intuitive sense or are consistent with the literature. For example, liberal attitudes and fundamentalism are negatively linked (r = -.191). Furthermore, stronger liberal attitudes are linked to a higher perceived control (.087), a stronger belief in free will (.277), a weaker feeling of insecurity (-.105), less xenophobic (-.070), more often reliance on newspapers, the internet, and mobiles or opposition papers as sources of information (.068, .114, respectively), more Christians than Muslims (.115), a higher socioeconomic status (.137), and are supported more often by residents in urban than rural areas.

Those with stronger fundamentalist attitudes, by contrast, display just the opposite relationships with these variables. They have a lower perceived control (-.042, not significant), are more fatalistic (-.083), feel more insecure (.103), more xenophobic (.142), relay less on newspapers, the Internet, and mobile phones or opposition newspapers as sources of information (-.150, -.081, respectively), are fewer Christians than Muslims (-.084), belonged to a lower socioeconomic status (-.098), and are fewer urban than rural residents. These relationships are consistent with previous research on fundamentalism (Moaddel and Karabenick 2008) and profiles of people with extremist orientations as specified in MSR theories.

Table 3. Correlation coefficients between participation rate and predictors (Listwise deletion: N=1945)

Participation rate	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29
Too many rules	.144[c]																												
Too Few rules	.011	-.374[c]																											
Diffidence in Gov.	.130[c]	.141[c]	.133[c]																										
Gov. dissatisfaction	.067[b]	.173[c]	.039	.164[c]																									
Eco for big interests	.032	.182[c]	-.042	.224[c]	.206[c]																								
Liberal attitudes	.146[c]	.022	-.093[c]	.046[a]	-.048[a]	-.005																							
Develop. reduces faith	.232[c]	.097[c]	-.066[b]	.004[b]	.018	.004	.063[b]																						
Fundamentalism	.045[a]	.022	-.022	-.053[a]	-.039	-.213[c]	-.191[c]	.054[a]																					
Mosque attendance	.104[c]	.055[b]	.092[c]	.052[a]	.017	.020	-.115[c]	.005	.008																				
Prayer-daily	-.022	-.076[c]	.056[b]	-.015	-.025	-.104[c]	-.026	-.043	.067[b]	.085[c]																			
Religious person	-.035	-.058[b]	.030	-.025	-.118[b]	-.008	.030	-.098[c]	.007	-.011	.290[c]																		
Importance of God	-.048[a]	.030	.022	.083[c]	.003	.112[c]	-.045[a]	-.011	.080[c]	-.002	-.002	.026																	
Perceived control	.106[c]	-.094[c]	.061[b]	-.046[a]	-.144[c]	-.076[c]	.087[c]	-.029	-.042	.058[b]	.014	.112[c]	.040																
Free will vs. fate	.230[a]	.004[b]	-.014	.018	-.047[a]	-.008	.277[c]	.115[c]	-.083[c]	-.083[c]	-.020	.035	-.086[c]	.147[c]															
Insecurity	.130[c]	.173[c]	.068[b]	.086[c]	.194[c]	.111[c]	-.105[c]	.205[c]	.103[c]	-.021	-.020	-.100[c]	-.002	-.198[c]	.038														
Xenophobia	-.153[c]	-.077[c]	.006	-.129[c]	-.111[c]	-.066[b]	.070[b]	-.025	.142[c]	-.047[a]	.063[b]	.088[c]	.026	.050[a]	-.050[a]	-.084[c]													
Moral flexibility	.255[c]	.041	-.058[b]	.081[c]	.051[a]	.116[c]	.024	.231[c]	.077[c]	.047[a]	-.039	-.108[c]	-.004	-.025	.050[a]	.023	-.065[b]												
Domestic TV	-.020	-.043	.063[b]	-.106[c]	-.012	-.081[c]	-.022	-.025	-.018	-.004	.093[c]	.064[b]	.024	.024	.012	.104[c]	-.021	-.064[b]											
Radio	-079[c]	.051[a]	.090[c]	-.046[a]	.083[c]	-.021	-.106[c]	-.094[c]	.027	.077[c]	.053[a]	-.016	-.032	-.034	-.136[a]	.001	.039	-.058[b]	.072[c]										
Satellite TV	.054[a]	.037	-.011	.046	.095[c]	-.019	.047[a]	.056[b]	-.031	.088[c]	.097[c]	-.041	.006	.016	.020	.002	-.034	-.036	-.018	.018									
Paper-internet-mobiles	.219[c]	.114[c]	.086[c]	.120[c]	.128[c]	.056[b]	.068[b]	-.001	-.150[c]	.170[c]	.032	-.019	.041	.006	.006	.056[b]	-.190[c]	-.037	-.013	.061[b]	.197[c]								
Against Gov. paper	.199[c]	.128[c]	-.007	.116[c]	.066[b]	.045[a]	.114[c]	.034	-.081[c]	.108[c]	.021	-.034	.024	.012	.041	.021	-.151[c]	.002	-.057[b]	.056[b]	.153[c]	.490[c]							
Male	.149[c]	.000	.037	.052[a]	.034	.024	-.026	-.004	-.026	.583[c]	-.041	-.038	-.054[a]	.063[b]	.011	.014	-.015	.008	-.046[a]	.026	.083[c]	.169[c]	.125[c]						
Not Married	.105[c]	.029	.034	.076[c]	.014	.053[a]	.024	-.005	-.044[a]	.072[c]	-.122[c]	-.096[c]	-.019	.020	.032	.004	-.079[c]	-.007	-.055[a]	-.038	.032	.194[c]	.067[b]	.133[c]					
Impressionable years	.094[c]	.020	.022	.097[c]	-.034	-.008	.037	.026	-.010	-.034	-.067[b]	-.081[c]	.042	.053[a]	.027	.013	.008	.026	-.058[b]	-.120[c]	.047[a]	.095[c]	.050[a]	-.106[c]	.314[c]				
Christian	.034	.006	.052[a]	.056[b]	-.052[b]	.020	.115[c]	-.050[a]	-.084[c]	.107[c]	-.334[c]	-.004	.019	.048[a]	.039	-.002	-.054[a]	.001	-.023	-.060[b]	-.022	.018	-.016	.009	.006	-.016			
Socioeconomic status	.236[c]	.083[c]	.061[b]	.131[c]	.038	.063[b]	.137[c]	.117[c]	-.098[c]	.089[c]	.059[b]	-.024	.074[c]	.131[c]	.112[c]	.069[b]	-.138[c]	.008	-.033	-.054[a]	.221[c]	.471[c]	.316[c]	.072[c]	.157[c]	.173[c]	.032		
Urban	.144[c]	.077[c]	-.051[a]	.059[b]	.094[c]	.062[b]	.193[c]	.014	-.102[c]	.036	-.063[b]	-.094[c]	-.058[b]	-.049[a]	.094[c]	.013	-.217[c]	.011	-.047[a]	.004	.060[a]	.176[c]	.176[c]	-.009	.033	-.094[c]	.074[c]	.178[c]	
Organization member	.007	-.014	-.019	.078[c]	-.009	-.013	.034	-.103[c]	.078[c]	.001	.031	-.033	-.029	.008	.113[c]	-.001	.015	-.001	-.111[c]	-.011	-.065[b]	-.007	-.030	.043	-.024	.026	-.001	-.003	-.056[b]

a=p<.05, b=p<.01, c=p<.001

To assess the significance of each of the predictors of participation, four multiple regression models are estimated and the results are reported in Table 4. The first three models assess the linkages of (1) attitudes, efficacy, and morality; (2) mediums of communicative power; and (3) demographic and organizational variables with participation separately. The fourth model includes all these variables.

In the first model the analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows a strong main effect ($F_{22, 1989}$ = 25.49; adjusted-R^2 = 0.21). The regression estimates indicated that the measures of fatalism, anomie, and diffidence in government are positively linked to participation. Among the interaction variables, only the interaction between government dissatisfaction and diffidence in government is positively linked to participation. Diverse, if not opposing attitudes toward alternative sociopolitical order—liberal attitudes, development reduces faith (secular cognition), and religious fundamentalism—are also positively linked to participation. Among religiosity variables, only two have significant effects: mosque attendance having a positive and the importance of God a negative relationship with participation.

Both measures of personal efficacy—perceived control and the belief in free will—are positively related to participation. The interaction between believing in free will and perception of too many rules (fatalism) is also positively linked to participation. Measures of dysphoric emotions, on the other hand, had opposite connections with participation; the feeling of insecurity is positively while xenophobia is negatively linked to participation. Moral flexibility is also significantly linked to participation.

The ANOVA for the second model has also shown the strong main effect of the mediums of communicative power ($F_{5, 3064}$ = 45.51; adjusted-R^2 = 0.07). Among the variables, reliance on radio as a source of information is negatively linked to participation, while reliance on Satellite TV, newspapers, internet, and mobiles, and opposition newspapers are positively connected to participation. Finally, the third model estimates the regression coefficients of demographic and organizational predictors of participation. In order to assess the inverted U relationship between socioeconomic status and participation, a variable measuring the square of socioeconomic status (SES^2) is also included in the model. The ANOVA shows the strong main effects of demographics on participation ($F_{8, 3032}$ = 43.34; adjusted-R^2 = 0.10). Regression estimates have

also shown that people who were male or single, experienced their impressionable years under President Mubarak, belonged to a higher socioeconomic status, and lived in urban areas participated in the revolutionary movement more often than other respondents in the sample.[3] Because the square of the effect of socioeconomic status on participation was insignificant, this model does not support the proposed inverted U-relationship between this variable and participation.

These analyses have shown that attitudinal, personal-efficacy, and morality variables explain the largest proportion of variations in the dependent variable, 21%, followed by demographic, 10%, and then mediums of communicative power, 7%. Finally, combining all the variables into a full model, the ANOVA indicates a strong main effect on participation ($F_{35, 1909}$ = 21.07; adjusted-R^2 = 0.26). The regression estimates also show that all the coefficients but five that were significant in the three separate models have remained significant in the full model as well. These variables are the interaction between dissatisfaction with government and dissident in government, mosque attendance (that was highly correlated with male status), reliance on domestic TV and radio as sources of news information, and being single. On the other hand, the full model estimates show that the square of the socioeconomic-status measure is negatively linked to participation, hence supporting an inverted-U relationship between participation and socioeconomic status.

That the significance of the rest of the variables remains the same in separate and full models is indicative of the robustness of the analytical framework advanced in this paper.

CONCLUSIONS

The empirical analysis of the predictors of participation in the revolutionary movement in Egypt supports the hypotheses drawn from both PROP and MSR theories. At the same time, it offers new insights into the process of revolutionary development, which suggest rethinking about predictors of participation, the conception of the individual participants that has informed these theories, and the unifying element in the revolutionary process.

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[3]Although not shown in this table, youth bulge (measured as a dummy variable differently for ages 18-34=1, 18-28=1, or 18-24=1) had no significant effect on participation, but age had a negative effect (significant at 0.05 level), indicating that being younger is conducive to participation. Thus, there was little support for McAdam's (1986) notion of biographical availability.

Attitudes, Personal Efficacy, and Morality

Consistent with PROP theories, the more efficacious individuals such as those who expressed a higher level of perceived control or more strongly believed in free will tended to participate more often in the revolutionary movement. Alternatively, people who felt more powerless or more strongly believed in fate participated less often. Moreover, xenophobic individuals participated less often than non-xenophobic. While these findings are contrary to MSR theories, there were some supports for these theories as well. People who felt constrained by too many governmental rules and regulations (fatalistic individuals) or those who felt just the opposite and believed that there were not enough rules and regulations (anomic individuals) significantly participated in the revolutionary movement more than those who believed that there were the right amounts of rules and regulations. So did those who have a stronger feeling of insecurity. Supporting both clusters of theories is the interaction between fatalism and the belief in free will. That is, people who felt constrained by governmental rules and regulations (fatalists) and stronger believers in free will tended to participate more often than those who had the same beliefs but were not fatalists.

Regarding the linkages between attitudes and participation, contrary to Tilly's critique of MSR theories, revolutionary action is in part shaped by attitudes against the ruling regime, as diffidence in government, fatalism, and anomie were linked to participation. At the same time, those with stronger liberal or fundamentalist attitudes more often participated in the revolutionary movement, which is consistent with Tilly's proximate conditions of revolutionary situations—the presence of alternative claim to the existing polity. What is more, because such contradictory value orientations as liberalism, secular cognition, and fundamentalism are linked to participation, this finding lends credence to the notion that revolution has different meaning to different participants (Furet 1981; Moaddel 1992). Finally, PROP theories have linked moral outrage to participation in collective action. The present analysis, however, found just an opposite relationship from what these theories predicted; moral-flexibility was positively (or morality is negatively) linked to participation, a finding that is consistent with MSR theories.

Nonetheless, despite this consistent, the reasoning underpinning the linkage of moral flexibility to participation may be related to mundane process of political dynamics than to what Arendt attributes to the effect of ideology on the revolutionary process. Accordingly, moral flexibility may be an outcome of the experience of revolutionary activism. Revolution makers

often face the regime's atrocities: comrades are arrested, beaten, tortured, or even killed by the security forces. Compared to the general public, they may display stronger awareness of the prevalence of corruption among high-ranking officials and have more extensive knowledge of their deceptive activities and spread of misinformation in order to cover up dishonesties. At the same time, repression tends to arouse the feeling of revenge for the fallen comrade, economic corruption the desire to forcibly seize or destroy the ruling elite's property, and deception the need to launch propaganda campaigns against the government. All these in turn may relax or modify the moral standards of the revolution makers. The more extensively the state engages in acts of violence against the opposition, for example, the less the opposition activists remain committed to the immorality of violence. Nepstad and Smith (2001: 173) may be correct to suggest that "moral outrage is a logical reaction to the torture, disappearances, and assassinations of innocent civilians and to the lies disseminated by a government to cover its role as an accomplice to these atrocities." It may also be true that such immoral acts undermine the morality of the revolutionaries. Reflecting on this process, it may be proposed that the more active participants in the revolutionary movement tend to be less strict in their moral standards than the less active participants.

This relationship is consistent with the notion that politics tend to generate wickedness and immorality, providing insights as to why many revolutionary leaders end up practicing the same immoral behaviors against which they fought so persistently. One may surmise that by the time they had seized power, they have resolved in their minds that it would be acceptable, for the "sake of the revolution," to lie, to deceive, to steal, and to kill.

Medium of Communicative Power

Although the stress on organization has been one of the most significant contributions of PROP theories, how an organization contributes to revolutionary mobilization needs to be further clarified. As the analysis of the data has shown the organization factor and mosque (as a proxy measure of organization) were not significantly linked to participation. Moreover, the Society of the Muslim Brothers that had enjoyed nationwide organization failed to play a leading role in the Egyptian revolution. It is not just an organization that may contribute to revolutionary mobilization. Rather, it is what specific function an organization can perform in order to make this mobilization possible. One such function is the capability to serve as a conduit or medium of

communicative power. The power of revolution maker 'A' is enhanced insofar as he/she is enabled to communicate revolution maker 'B', relatively unconstrained by the state power. Not all organizations are able to enhance the revolutionaries' communicative power. Such an organization as that of the Muslim Brother, which has been under the government's surveillance, could not have started the initial revolutionary spark that generate the necessary critical mass.

Furthermore, an important fact about many of the successful revolutions is the introduction of an element of surprise in revolutionary developments, whereby the discontented individuals manage to invent new tactics that cannot be easily combatted by the government's repressive routines or pose problems that cannot be understood in terms of the categories known to the ruling elite. As a result, the security forces fail in devising counterrevolutionary strategies. Organizations, whether preexisting or formed by revolutionary activists, are useful insofar as they facilitate the flow of information among activists, create and reinforce connectivity among the potential revolution makers, mobilize emotional energy against the ruling regime, and make it possible to launch attacks on the regime where it appears most vulnerable. Such an organizing role seems to have been played by modern communication technology, including the Internet and mobile phones. If the introduction of press in the Muslim world in the nineteenth century enhanced the process of culture production, contributing to the rise of modern discourses, it appears that modern communication technology, by liberating the means of communication from the state control, has played a similar role in recent decades in the generation of oppositional ideology.

Demographics

Consistent with PROP theories are the positive linkages between participation and being male and living in the urban area. PROP theories are supported because of the higher participation of the members of the middle class, as shown by the inverted-U relationship between socioeconomic status and participation. Evidently, the members of these classes have higher education and have access to more financial and intellectual resources than the members of the lower class or the unemployed. Yet, their higher participation than the members of the upper class may be indicative of the presence of the feeling of relative deprivation among the middle class members, hence consistent with MSR theories.

Reconciling Contradictory Explanations

The empirical analysis supports contradictory hypotheses on predictors of participation drawn from two opposing clusters of theories of revolution. The fact that the data support contradictory statements about the profile of revolution makers may be indicative of an improper conceptualization of the individual in these theories. This is true because both PROP and MSR theories tend to presume that the revolution makers are monolithic actors,[4] having a coherent, homogeneous, and consistent set of beliefs and value orientations. The difference is that in PROP theories such individuals are cognitively liberated, motivated by the feelings of empowerment and moral outrage, and relieved of any dysphoric emotion, while in MSR theories they are disoriented, fatalist, and insecure individuals who have gained full assurance of their righteousness by commitment to a revolutionary ideology and reliance on totalitarian leaders for the verification of their values and attitudes.

The Egyptian case demonstrates that the revolution makers by contrast display manifold and heterogeneous characters and even contradictory orientations. Some are self-actualized, efficacious, and cognitively liberated, while others feel insecure, anomic, and fatalist. The same individuals may even carry a multitude of contradictory attitudes toward the ruling regime, perceptions of self–empowerment, and assessments of security. Thus, the notion of the monolithic individual cannot be sustained empirically and must be abandoned. The alternative conceptualization, however, by introducing an incoherent image of the revolutionary participants, cannot be easily reconciled with the existing theories of revolution. This is true because both PROP and MSR theories have remained remarkably lucid and comprehensible insofar as their explanations rest on a unified set of interrelated attributes of the monolithic individuals. But the notion of the manifold, heterogeneous, or contradictory individuals begs the question about the source of their unity. How do these individuals gain the appearance of a unified and homogeneous whole in mass demonstrations in Cairo's Tahrir Square?

If the driving ideology is diverse, individual efficacy paired with fatalism, anomie, and insecurity, the role of the existing organization of the opposition secondary in the revolutionary mobilization, and a cohesive culture of resistance wanting, then the centripetal force of the revolutionary movement may be located in the character of the ruling regime. A state becomes vulnerable to revolutionary attack when it turns into a monolithic entity, a homogeneous

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[4] A reference to monolithic individuals may be found in Grimes (2005: p. 87).

pyramidal structure controlled by a single dictator. Such a political system is more likely to become a target of attack from heterogeneous individuals than an authoritarian system having a somewhat heterogeneous and pluralistic structure. One may speculate that this factor explains the resilience of the Arab monarchies in places like Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia and the relative vulnerability of the republican systems in other Arab-majority countries. Although both systems may be equally repressive and non-equalitarian, the monarchies appear to have a more differentiated political structure than the republican systems, which decidedly rested on the whim of a single dictator and have thus become a clear target of attack for diverse revolutionary movements.

The notion of the heterogeneous individuals also provides insights into the process of the formation of post-revolutionary outcomes and why, for example, the characters of the leading participants in the revolution appear to be quite different from those who manage to gain control of the state power after the overthrow of the ruling dictator. Given that opposition to the ruling regime in Egypt consisted of such heterogeneous individuals and groups as Islamic extremists, the Muslim Brothers, and secular groups, it appears that the success of the revolutionary movement to a large extent was contingent on who among these groups played the leading role in calling for the overthrow of the ruling regime. Such groups as the Society of the Muslim Brothers and Muslim extremists have tried unsuccessfully to change or overthrow the government in the past several decades. The Muslim Brothers, in particular, was a most persistent and resilient religious-political organization in the country since it was established in 1928. Yet, it did not play a leading role in the movement. Even if it had tried to play such a role, it would have alerted not only the regime but also its international supporters, including the U.S., about the prospect of the rise of an anti-West Islamic government and would have thus enhanced the regime's justification to repress the revolutionary movement. Only after the movement overthrew President Mubarak were the Muslim Brothers able to draw on the available organizational resources and succeed in the post-Mubarak elections. Therefore, one may not treat the existing organizations as neutral entities that are always useful vehicles for revolutionary mobilization. Rather, their resources and networks, even though extensive, are effective only within the boundaries set by the existing political and discursive structures. The Muslim Brothers were unable to overthrow the regime, but when it was overthrown, they could reap substantial political benefits, thanks to their organizational prowess.

Predictors	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
Table 4. Results of the regression estimates of the predictors of participation rate												
	B	S. E	t	B	S. E	t	B	S. E	t	B	S. E	t
Constant	-1.41	0.83	-1.70	1.59	0.17	9.33^c	1.80	0.11	16.44^c	-1.57	0.88	-1.79
Attitudes, Efficacy, & Morality												
Attitude against the government												
Too many rules	0.60	0.15	3.90^c							0.52	0.15	3.46^c
Too few rules	0.32	0.13	2.53^b							0.25	0.13	1.94^a
Diffidence in Government	0.18	0.06	3.12^b							0.12	0.06	2.10^a
Government dissatisfaction	0.04	0.02	1.57							0.03	0.02	1.14
Diff-Dissat Interaction	0.05	0.02	2.00^a							0.04	0.02	1.68
Economy for special few	-0.19	0.12	-1.58							-0.20	0.12	-1.67
Special Few-Diff Interaction	0.23	0.12	1.90							0.18	0.12	1.54
Special Few-Dissat Interaction	0.31	0.05	0.60							0.04	0.05	0.72
Attitude toward alternative political order												
Liberal attitudes	0.85	0.18	4.75^c							0.50	0.18	2.75^b
Development Reduces Faith	0.34	0.05	6.25^c							0.30	0.05	5.49^c
Fundamentalism	0.17	0.06	2.99^b							0.23	0.06	3.97^c
Religiosity												
Mosque attendance	0.11	0.02	4.55^c							-0.01	0.03	-0.42
Prayer-daily	-0.01	0.06	-0.07							0.03	0.06	0.46
Self-described religious	-0.01	0.03	-0.38							0.02	0.03	0.65
Importance of God	-0.15	0.06	-2.70^b							-0.13	0.05	-2.48^b
Personal efficacy and dysphoric emotions												
Perceived control (fatalism)	0.14	0.03	5.34^c							0.12	0.03	4.44^c
Free will vs. fate	0.15	0.02	7.58^c							0.14	0.02	7.15^c
Fatalism-Free Will Interaction	0.18	0.05	3.40^c							0.16	0.05	3.24^c
Insecurity	0.20	0.06	3.45^c							0.16	0.06	2.90^b
Fatalism-Insecurity Interaction	0.24	0.15	1.66							0.26	0.14	1.84
Xenophobia	-1.06	0.19	-5.50^c							-0.79	0.20	-4.00^c
Morality												
Moral laxity	0.66	0.07	9.37^c							0.69	0.07	9.97^c
Mediums of Communicative Power												
Domestic TV				0.03	0.04	0.87				0.02	0.05	0.45
Radio				-0.16	0.05	-3.38^c				-0.11	0.06	-1.88
Satellite TV				0.07	0.04	1.96^a				-0.04	0.05	-0.91
Paper-internet-mobiles				0.72	0.08	8.79^c				0.46	0.10	4.41^c
Against Gov. papers				0.88	0.16	5.42^c				0.49	0.18	2.71^b
Demographics												
Male							0.64	0.09	7.06^c	0.61	0.14	4.53^c
Never Married							0.37	0.12	2.98^b	0.16	0.15	1.10
Impressionable years							0.35	0.10	3.53^c	0.30	0.12	2.43^a
Christian							0.24	0.22	1.12	0.19	0.30	0.65
Socioeconomic status							0.45	0.05	9.55^c	0.19	0.06	2.98^b
SES squared							-.03	.04	-0.96	-0.12	0.04	-2.96^b
Urban							0.71	0.09	7.84^c	0.41	0.11	3.54^c
Organization member							0.06	0.04	1.33	-0.02	0.05	-0.34
	R	R^2	R^2_{ad}	R	R^2	R^2_{ad}	R	R^2	R^2_{ad}	R	R^2	R^2_{ad}
	0.47	0.22	0.21	.263	0.07	0.07	0.32	0.10	0.10	0.53	0.28	0.26
F values (v_1, v_2)	22,1989 = 25.49			5,3064 = 45.51			8,3032 = 43.34			35, 1909 = 21.07		

Appendix I. Predictive Variables of the study

Attitudes, Efficacy, Morality

Attitudes against government

Fatalism versus anomie - To construct these measures, two dummy variables based on the following question are constructed: Which of the following statements comes closer to your sentiment: (1) There are just about the right amount of governmental laws and regulations; (2) There are not enough governmental laws and regulations to guide me; (3) I feel constrained by the number of governmental laws and regulations.

A1 Fatalism: Too many rules: I feel constrained by the number of governmental laws and regulations (=1, 0=otherwise).

A2 Anomie: Too few rules: There are not enough governmental laws and regulations to guide me (=1, 0=otherwise).

A3 Diffidence in government: Do you have (1) a great deal of confidence, (2) quite a lot of confidence, (3) not very much confidence, or (4) no confidence at all in the government?

A4 Dissatisfaction with the government: People have different views about the ideal way of governing this country. Here is a scale for rating how well the government is doing: 1 means very good, 10 means very bad.

A5 Special few: Generally speaking, would you say that this country's economy is run for the benefit of all the people (=0), or run by a few big influential people and organizations who are looking out for themselves only (=1)?

A6 Diffidence × dissatisfaction interaction = (diffidence – mean)(dissatisfaction – mean)

A7 Special few × dissatisfaction interaction = (special few – mean)(dissatisfaction – mean)

A8 Special few × diffidence interaction = (special few – mean)(diffidence – mean)

Attitudes toward alternative political order: Liberalism and Fundamentalism

Liberalism consists of three composite measures of social individualism, gender equality, and liberal government. Social individualism is a composite measure of three indicators:

A9 Love as the basis for marriage: In your view, which of the following is the more important basis for marriage: (1) parental approval, or (2) love?

Reponses to two of the items regarding child qualities are selected as measures of individualism. Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? (Please choose up to five.)

A10 Independence: (2) selected, (1) not selected.

A11 Obedience: (2) not selected, (1) selected.

Social individualism = (A9+A10+A11)/3

Gender equality is a composite measure of four indicators measuring attitudes toward women, all in Likert-scale format. Do you (1) strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, or (4) strongly disagree that:

A12 A wife must always obey her husband?

A13 On the whole, men make better political leaders than women do?

A14 A university education is more important for a boy than for a girl?

A15 When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women?

Gender equality = (A12+A13+A14+A15)/4

Form of government is a composite measure of two indicators, both in Likert-scale format: Do you agree strongly, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements that

A16 Secular politics: Egypt will be a better place if religion and politics are separated?

A17 Democracy: Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government?

$$\text{Liberal government} = (A16+A17)/2$$

A18 If Egypt became more developed, would faith in Allah (1) increase a lot, (2) increase a little, (3) decrease a little, or (4) decrease a lot?

Islamic fundamentalism is a multi-dimensional concept, including such components as an authoritarian conception of the deity, exclusivity, intolerance, and literalism. These concepts are measured in Likert-scale format. Do you (4) strongly agree, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree that—Authoritarian deity:

A19 Any infraction of religious instruction will bring about Allah's severe punishment?

A20 Only the fear of Allah keeps people on the right path?

A21 Allah requires his slaves to repent (*tobbah*).

A22 Satan is behind any attempt to undermine belief in Allah.

A23 People stay on the right path only because they expect to be rewarded in heaven.

Authoritarian-deity factor is constructed based on these five components (A19-A23) with Eigenvalue 1.928 and Cronbach's alpha .593.

Literalism-inerrancy factor is constructed using the following four measures (A24-A26) with Eigenvalue 1.52 and Cronbach's alpha .492

A24 Whenever there is a conflict between religion and science, religion is always right

A25 In the presence of the Quran, there is no need for man-made laws.

A26 Different interpretations of the Quran are equally valid.

Exclusivity factor is constructed using the following two measures (A27-A28), with Eigenvalue 1.225 and Cronbach's alpha .335.

A27 Only Islam provides comprehensive truth about Allah.

A28 Only Muslims will go to heaven.

Intolerance factor is constructed using the following two measures (A29-A30), with Eigenvalue 1.59 and Cronbach's alpha .683.

A29 Criticism of Islam should not be tolerated.

A30 Criticism of Muslim religious leaders should not be tolerated.

Religiosity indicators

A31 How often do you pray: (1) never, (2) once or twice a month, (3) once a day, (4) once or twice a week, (4) two to four times a day, or (6) five times daily?

A32 To what extent do you consider yourself a religious person, on a scale from 1, not at all religious, to 10, very religious?

A33 How important is the presence of God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate: 10 means very important and 1 means not at all important.

A34 Apart from funerals, about how often do you go to a mosque these days (1) rarely, (2) once a year, (3) only in the religious events, (4) once a month, (5) once a week, or (6) more than once a week?

Personal efficacy and dysphoric emotions

A35 Perceived control: Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 means "a great deal" to

indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your life turns out.

A36 Free will: Some people believe that individuals can decide their own destiny, while others think that it is impossible to escape a predetermined fate. Please tell me which comes closest to your view on this scale on which 1 means "everything in life is determined by fate," and 10 means that "people shape their fate themselves."

A37 Fatalism × free will interaction = (Too many regulations – mean)(Free will – mean)

A38 Insecurity: In Egypt these days, life is unpredictable and dangerous. Do you (4) agree strongly, (3) agree, (2) disagree, or (1) strongly disagree?

A39 Insecurity × fatalism interaction = (insecurity – mean)(too many regulations – mean)

Xenophobia is a factor based on three indicators, all asking respondents if they would like to have Americans, British, or French as neighbors (eigenvalue 2.807, Cronbach's alpha 0.966): On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbors: (2) do not like, (1) like?

A40   Americans,

A41   British,

A42   French.

Morality factor is a linear combination of three interrelated variables. The respondents were asked, "I will read you a list of behaviors. Behaviors that are immoral are rated <u>one</u> and behaviors that are moral are rated ten. You can use both of those numbers for rating behaviors plus all of the numbers in between. Using this scale where 1 is immoral and 10 is moral, where would you put

A43   Stealing other people's property?

A44   Violence against other people?

A45   Telling lies to other people to protect one's own interests?

Mediums of communicative power

A46 How much do you rely on radio as a source of information – (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) not at all?

A47 How much do you rely on domestic television as a source of information – (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) not at all?

A48 How much do you rely on satellite television as a source of information – (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) not at all?

A49 How much do you rely on newspapers as a source of information – (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) not at all?

A50 How much do you rely on the Internet as a source of information – (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) not at all?

A51 How much do you rely on a mobile phone as a source of information – (4) a great deal, (3) some, (2) not very much, or (1) not at all?

A52 Which newspaper is the most reliable source of information for you? (pre-coded open-ended question)

Opposition paper: mentioned an opposition paper is coded as 1, government-controlled paper or none coded as 0.

Paper-Internet-mobile: a single factor constructed based on linear combination of reliance on the Internet, mobile phones and newspapers as sources of information (eigenvalue = 1.66; Cronbach's alpha = .59).

Demographics

A53 Education: What is the highest educational level that you have attained? (1.) no formal education, (2) incomplete primary school, (3) complete primary school, (4) incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (6) incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type, (7) complete secondary: university-preparatory type, (8) some university-level education, without degree, and (9) university-level education, with degree.

A54 Self-assigned class membership: People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, or lower class? (1) Lower class, (2) working class, (3) lower middle class, (4) upper middle class, or (5) upper class.

A55 Income: Annual household income before taxes, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other income, was coded in deciles by the local investigators in each country—with (1) as the lowest decile and (10) as the highest.

Socioeconomic Status: Since social class includes only five categories, for the sake of consistency and construction of a single factor based on education, income, and social class, education and income variables were re-coded in order to reduce number of categories to five. For education, these are 1 (=1), 2(=2+3), 3 (=4+5), 4(=7+8), 5(=8+9); and for income, they are 1 (=1+2)), 2(=3+4), 3 (=5+6), 4(=7+8), 5(=9+10). This factor's Eigenvalue was 1.73 and Cronbach's alpha .61.These recoding, however, does not significantly affect the results of the data analysis.

A56 SES-square = (Socio-Economic Status – Means)^2

A57 Impressionable years under Mubarak: A dummy variable coded as 1 for those between the ages of 18 and 42—those who were 12 in 1981, when Mubarak became the President of Egypt—and 0=otherwise.

A58 Gender (male=1, female=0),

A59 Urban residence (urban=1, rural=0)

A60 Marital status (single=1, 0=otherwise) are also used as dummy variables.

Finally, three questions measure organizational membership: Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations (associations, communities, networks). For each one, could you tell me whether you are (2) an active member, (1) an inactive member, or (0) not a member of that type of organization?

A61   Religious organization
A62   Political party
A63   Humanitarian or charitable organization

Organizational membership is based on A54-A56 (Eigenvalue =2.81, Chronbach's alpha =.966).

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