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Modalities of National Sovereignty: Territorial Nationalism versus Islamic Fundamentalism in Muslim-Majority Countries
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ABSTRACT

I employ the concept of modality in order to capture the configurations of homogeneous elements that may exist in a heterogeneous context encompassing diverse nationalist movements. Modalities of nationalism are varied outcomes of the efforts of intellectuals to resolve issues concerning the identity of their political community, its boundaries, and the ideal political regime. A modality rests on identity and feelings of national solidarity such that changes in identity and feelings are linked in a predictable way to changes in attitudes toward other issues. I argue that the modalities of territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism are varied ways in which indigenous intellectual leaders resolved sociopolitical issues. I also argue that modalities have varying supports among ordinary individuals. They are clustered on and driven by identity and national pride. An analysis of data from twelve cross-national surveys carried out in ten Muslim-majority countries in 2000-2008 has shown that the change in the basis of identity from religion to territorial nation is connected to a significant increase in favorable attitudes toward gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, Western culture, and, except in two cases, democracy, but not linked consistently to attitudes toward outsiders. National pride, on the other hand, is a driver of fundamentalist values, as it is inversely linked to gender equality (except in three cases), secular orientation, secular politics, and Western culture. National pride has inconsistent linkages with democracy and attitudes toward outsiders. Finally, the link between socioeconomic status and liberal values (except in Saudi Arabia) suggests that the modernist interpretations of nationalism may only apply to the modality of liberal territorial nationalism.
INTRODUCTION

Anthony D. Smith may be accused of making a sweeping historical generalization in describing nationalism at the beginning of his remarkable book, *Nationalism and Modernism*, as “a single red line” that “traverses the history of the modern world from the fall of the Bastille to the fall of the Berlin Wall” (Smith 1998: 1). For sure, insofar as the term applies to a variety of movements that (1) define communities of people as a nation based on certain characteristics shared by a significant sections of their population, (2) bestow on these communities the right to organize a political regime, and (3) advance an exclusive claim to represent them, his generalization is defensible. Nonetheless, Smith’s generalization overlooks the fact that the nationalist movements that emerged on the world stage in different places and times have been too diverse and heterogeneous to be adequately represented by a single line with only one color. Even in a single region of the world and within the confines of a much narrower historical period, like the twentieth-century Middle East, nationalism covers such dissimilar movements as territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism. Although all are instances of nationalism, these movements vastly differ in their sociopolitical and cultural orientations and the type of regimes they created. Lumping them together under the umbrella of nationalism may lead one to gloss over serious differences among these and other varieties of nationalism that may coexist even in the same society, giving rise to different historical outcomes.

Finally, in the absence of a conceptual scaffolding that captures the variety of nationalism and of a mechanism that explains the working of diverse variants of nationalism, it would be hard to understand the persistence of violent reactions in Muslim-majority countries to purportedly anti-Islamic behaviors perpetrated by some in Western countries. How does one explain the glaring contrast between Muslims’ responses to terrorism perpetrated by insiders against their own populations and their overly partisan reactions to anti-Islamic behavior of some Western outsiders? On the one hand, innocent men, women, and children are slaughtered by misguided suicide bombers; powerless captives and political opponents are hideously beheaded in front of the camera, and billions of dollars’ worth of property is destroyed by Muslim terrorists—all in the name of Islam and God’s handsome rewards in the paradise. But there has been hardly commensurable outrage in Islamic countries. If, on the other hand, British author Salmon Rushdie writes the impressionist novel *Satanic Verses*, a U.S. president uses the word
“crusade” in an ill-prepared speech, a Danish cartoonist draws an unflattering portrayal of the faith, or a misguided expatriate Egyptian Christian makes an anti-Islamic film. Islamic communities are mobilized in indignation against the West; Ayatollah Khomeini issues a fatwa calling for the execution of Salmon Rushdie, the American flag and effigies of the U.S. president are burned publicly, the Imams and Western-educated politicians alike in certain Arab countries call for the boycott of Danish products, and American diplomats in Benghazi are murdered.

Are these expressions of Muslim nationalism in general or a particular type of nationalism?

In this paper, I suggest that one way to manage and better comprehend the variety of nationalist movements is to employ the concept of modality. Nationalism encompasses many different types of movements, whose sociopolitical objectives are quite different from, if not diametrically opposed to, one another. Conceptualizing this variety as representing multiple modalities reduces the historical complexity of nationalist movements. Modalities thus capture the configurations of relatively homogeneous elements within the context of historical variation of nationalist movements. I also suggest that modalities are distinguished from one another in terms of (1) the definition of the basis of identity or a cognitive understanding of the basis of the national community, and (2) a feeling of group solidarity or emotional expression of belong to the national community.

The identity of a modality may rest on a territorial nation, ethnicity, or religion. Its conception of pride may be diachronic, historical and self-referential, or synchronic and in relation to the other (i.e., foreigners). These two features of modalities shape other aspects of a nationalist ideology, including the demarcation of the governing principles of national political boundaries separating in-groups from out groups, the distinctive projection of the political map and national territories, and the way in which history is remembered, constructed, or invented. Modalities thus serve as a transmission belt connecting the abstract concept of nationalism to concrete historical cases.

Modalities are constrained by social structures and exigencies of historical development. They, however, cannot be derived from these structures or exigencies. Rather, modalities are produced as intellectual leaders offer resolutions to historically significant issues facing their communities. Variation in modalities is thus a function of the different ways in which these issues are resolved. Modalities are understood in differential relations with one another. They differ in terms of their conception of the basis of identity and the manner in which the feeling of
national solidarity is mobilized in order to promote the cultural and political values among the subject population.

To demonstrate the fruitfulness of these theoretical propositions, I first present territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism as instances of modalities of nationalism and argue that these modalities are the outcomes of the efforts of intellectual leaders to resolve historically significant sociopolitical issues facing their communities. Then, I focus on liberal territorial nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism as two currently competing modalities in Muslim-majority countries, and I argue that they predict two different competing attitudes toward significant sociopolitical and cultural issues. More specifically, I propose that the difference between people who considered religion as the primary basis of their identity and those who consider nation as such is associated with significant differences in their value orientations toward gender equality, secularism and secular politics, democracy, Western culture, and outsiders, while national pride has just the opposite relationships with all these variables. The population may thus be configured into those leaning toward liberal modality and those toward Islamic fundamentalism. To assess these propositions, I use data from twelve surveys that were carried out in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran 2000 and 2005, Iraq 2004 and 2006, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Finally, I discuss the implications of the findings for the study of nationalism.

THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT

The social-scientific literature on the causes and consequences of nationalism is vast and engaging. Nonetheless, there has been little theorizing about how to handle the diversity of nationalism. Many of the existing explanations are formulated in terms that are too general to account for this diversity. They refer to such historical changes as industrialization, the expansion of mass education, print capitalism, and uneven development of capitalism in different theories within the modernist tradition; to substantialist accounts of the rise of nation in various versions of the primordialism perspective; or to cycles of nationalism in varied perennial interpretations. It thus appears that whatever the forms of nationalism—territorial, linguistic-cum-ethnic, or religious—they are all somehow related to the conditions of modernity, the primordial attachments underpinning the formation of nations, or the perennial features of historical cycles. Even then, there is little of a mechanistic explanation that connects these aspects of social conditions to the genesis of nationalism.
Built on the premise that the modern era is *ipso facto* an age of nationalism (Smith 1998: 35-36), proponents of the modernist paradigm link the origins of nationalism to such conditions of modernity as (1) social dislocations caused by economic transformation under ethnically-divided empires where language serves as a medium for turning social conflict into nationalism (Gellner 1964); (2) uneven development that creates center-periphery division in the world economy (Nairn 1977) or internal colonialism in the center (Hechter 1975), prompting the elite in the periphery or of the subordinated groups in the center to engage in nationalist activities; (3) the expansion of networks of discursive literacy by the agencies of the military state and capitalist development, which serve as a medium for the rise of national communities (Mann 1992); (4) the state’s bureaucratic expansion that creates a chasm between the state and society, shaping political conflict and the rise of movements for national self-determination (Breuilly 1982); (5) the pulverization of traditional society and regimentation of the colony caused by imperialism, which lead to the decline of traditional industry, on the one hand, and the rise of mass literacy and the emergence of new marginal men who embrace Western ideals of self-determination, on the other (Kedourie 1971); and (6) the decline of the sacred language and kingship, the rise of the Reformation, the standardization of the vernacular as a tool for administrative centralization, and the advance of print capitalism that generates a unified fields of communication, gives a new fixity to language, and creates languages of power—all contributing to the rise of nation as “an imagined community” (Anderson 1983:4, 44-45).

The primordial and perennial perspectives decouple nationalism and modernity. Their alternative accounts, however, fly even more widely over the historical horizon and thus fail to capture variation in nationalism. Primordialism seeks the roots of nationalism in either people’s genetic relatedness or cultural givens. In the former, kinship, ethnicity, and nation are forms of cooperation that expand genetic relatedness, enhance inclusive fitness, and thus improve an organism’s overall reproductive success (Hamilton 1964). Nation is made possible by the cultural inventions of unilineal descent and lineage exogamy that extended the “primordial model of social organization to much larger societies running into tens of thousands of people” (van de Berghe 1978: 403-4; Smith 1998: 147). Given that altruism is a function of genetic relatedness (Burnstein et al. 1994; Korchmaros and Kenny 2001), with nation being an extension of kin, this theory readily explains self-sacrifice vis-à-vis threats from other nations.¹

¹This is similar to the way that a ground squirrel giving an alarm call to warn the members of its herds of the presence of a predator, even though the call gives away its location and thus putting itself in mortal danger (Mateo 1996, see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inclusive_fitness, retrieved October, 24, 2013).
The cultural version treats nationalism as an outgrowth of a primordial attachment, stemming from the assumed givens “of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times, overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves” (Geertz 1973: 259-60).

Likewise, perennialists do not appear to be concerned with historical variation of nationalism. They differ with primordialists in rejecting the naturalness and immutability of ethnicity and nationalism. They consider ethnicity and nationalism as perennial phenomena, which emerge, transform, and vanish throughout history. Nonetheless, their historical horizon, like that of the primordialists, is too vast to allow for a systematic understanding of variation in nationalism in a much narrower historical context. They do, however, acknowledge that nationalism can take varied and heterogeneous forms: “organic and political; rational and irrational; contractual and inherited; stable and changeable; conflictual, competitive and cooperative” (Fishman and Gertner, 1985: 494; see also Fishman 1972: 497; Armstrong 1982: 4; Smith 1989: 159; Connor 1994: 202).

MODALITIES OF NATIONALISM

A feature on the genesis of nationalism that is shared by all sides of the debate is the social structure-nationalism nexus proposition. While the operational definitions of social structure vary among theorists, all attempt to connect social structure to nationalism. This proposition is problematic, however. For, if the emergence of nationalism is unpredictable, if there is a general admission regarding the difficulty of defining the concept of nation, and if there is considerable historical variation in nationalist movements (Kohn 1967; Fishman 1972: 494; Hobsbawm 1977:3; Seton-Watson 1977: 5; Anderson 1983; Smith 1998: 4; Öznkirimli 2000: 57-60), then it would be hard to connect nationalism to conditions of modernity, ethnicity, or some presumed pre-existing primordial quality of nations. Furthermore, given that the same social structure may support diverse forms of nationalism, that different societies sustain nationalist movements that are similar, and that people shift loyalty from one modality of nationalism to another in a relatively short period, it may be necessary to depart from the premise
that nationalism is caused by social structure in a determinate way. At the same time, however, social structure is indubitably relevant to the study of nationalism. It not only limits the type of modalities of nationalism that are likely to emerge, but also shapes the distribution of resources that make their growth possible.

Given the malleability of culture, as the critics of primordialism have concluded (Brass 1991, Eriksen 1993, Eller and Coughlan 1993), as well as the difficulty of connecting the production of nationalist ideas to the objective conditions of modernity, then one may be justified to search for the emergence of nationalism in processes that signify a category of people as a nation and produce the ideas supporting the right of these people to form a political community. Theorists of nationalism in the modernist tradition have long recognized the fluidity of the phenomenon of nation, realizing that nation is a socially constructed entity; that “nationalism… invents nations where they do not exist” (Gellner 1964: 168), that nation is an “invented tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983: 1), and that nation is “an imagined political community” (Anderson 1983: 6). The invention, imagination, or as Smith (1983: 3) has argued, reconstruction of nations out of the cultural values, norms, and identities that were inherited from pre-modern eras are, however, euphemisms for the process in which the production of nationalist ideas is the point where nationalism begins. The producers of nationalist ideas thus stand at the initiating phase in the genesis of nationalism. And this initiating phase is when new issues about the nature of one’s political community are beginning to crystallize and/or old resolutions of the extant sociopolitical issues appear wanting.

The production of nationalist discourse is a dynamic process. It transpires within the context of discussions, debates, and political conflict among diverse intellectual leaders on issues related to the identity of their community, its boundaries, and how to establish a sovereign political regime. Issues are resolved in oppositional relation to the ideology of the ruling regime. Issues are resolved in oppositional relation to the ideology of the ruling regime.

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2Anderson offers a misguided rationale for his conceptualization of nationalism. A nation, says Anderson (1983: 6), “is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.” This statement implies that any large political or economic organization can be considered an imagined community because not all the members will ever know one another, while in reality such organizations in fact exist. The concept of “imagined,” however, is more in tune with the cognitive turn in the study of nationalism and ethnicity. In fact, the notion that nation is invented or imagined indicates a departure from substantialism as is consistent with a premise that nations are “not things in the world, but perspectives on the world” (Brubaker 2009: 32; Brubaker et al. 2004: 45).
The latter thus constitutes the target of criticism by intellectual leaders, while at the same time, serves as a key factor shaping the nature of the modality of nationalism. Variation in this target decides variation in the production of nationalist discourse. I thus propose that nationalist ideas are produced in response to the ideology of foreign domination. The form and intensity of these responses, however, are moderated by the type of this domination; whether it is directly cultural, political, economic, or the actual occupation of the country; or whether this domination is perceived to be indirect, when a domestic regime is allied with foreign powers. An indigenous regime may also face nationalist oppositions when that regime tries to single out only one among the multitude of cultural differentia that signifies a nation. That is, an overly secularist regime begets religious oppositional response, and a religious authoritarian regime contributes to the rise of liberal territorial nationalism. This oppositional context thus determines whether collective identity is defined in terms of nation, language, ethnicity, or religion. Variation in domination thus produces variation in nationalist discourses, generating different modalities of political sovereignty.

By generating or highlighting categories that illuminate the basis of identity among multitudes of cultural differentia, specify the form of government, and identify in-groups from out-groups, the production of modalities of nationalism is a cognitive process. At the same time, the genesis of nationalism is also an affective process as its shapes the feelings of collective solidarity and pride. This is true because nationalism is an activist ideology. It demands from the faithful an investment in time, money, and even one’s life. Thus, the affective dimension of nationalism—the sense of belonging to a national community; the feeling of pride in its people, territory, history, and achievements; and the love of the country and hate of the outsider—may thus contribute to the core emotional factor that motivates its champions. As the revolutionary icon of twentieth-century Latin America Che Guevara put it, “at the risk of seeming ridiculous, let me say that the true revolutionary is guided by a great feeling of love. It is impossible to think of a genuine revolutionary lacking this quality” (Moaddel, Tessler, and Inglehart 2008: 680).

The affective side of nationalism, however, is not a coherent set of emotions. It varies from modality to modality. To elaborate; en vogue in the literature on nationalism is a distinction between patriotism and national pride. Whereas national pride is proposed to tap into the feeling and perception of the superiority of one’s nation and xenophobia, patriotism is believed to have no such connection and relates only to love of country, its cultural heritage, and
historical achievements (Viroli 1995, de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). I propose that national pride is a synchronic phenomenon; it is produced in simultaneous back-and-and forth interactions with imagined or real belligerent outsiders. Patriotism, on the other hand, may be viewed as a historical or diachronic phenomenon in that people’s patriotic feeling or love of their country is an outcome of being raised and socialized in the country, particularly during their formative years – early childhood and young adulthood age 17-25. In the latter, the feeling of attachment to one’s nation has no relevance to outsiders but rather only to what the nation represents to the individual citizen: its natural beauty, culture, and civilizational accomplishments, particularly in philosophy, science, and technology.

I argue that these two types of nationalist affectivity have varying affinities with different modalities of nationalism. I propose that certain supranational ideologies that are overly concerned with foreign enemies and conspiracies by outsiders tend to produce a more potent nationalist solidarity and are thus associated with stronger feelings of national pride than liberal nationalist ideologies that tend to be self-referential and rest on the critique of civil society, individual inequality, patriarchal values, and patrimonial domination. The liberal component of nationalism often uncovers faults and deficiencies in the existing social order and institutional practices as factors hampering the formation of egalitarian social relationships. Such criticisms tend to lower national pride.

I use these theoretical propositions in order to explain the emergence of such modalities of nationalism as territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism. I propose that these modalities were produced in oppositional relation to different ideological targets: liberal territorial nationalism to the ideology of monarchical absolutism, ulama [Muslim theologians] obstructionism, and foreign occupation; pan-Arab nationalism to the European domination of Arab societies and creation of disparate states, and Islamic fundamentalism to secularist policies of the nationalist authoritarian interventionist state.

I also propose that modalities of nationalism have predictive power in shaping the value orientations of the public. I assess the different ways in which national identity and national pride are linked to people’s sociopolitical and cultural values. Finally, I test the significance of the modernity paradigm of the conceptualization of nationalism in fostering nationalist ideas by assessing the extent to which socioeconomic status is linked to favorable attitudes toward modern values.
A TWO-PRONGED METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY

I have employed a two-pronged methodological strategy to assess the above propositions. The first presents a comparative historical analysis of the modalities of (liberal) territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism. This analysis outlines the differences in the historical contexts that prompted indigenous intellectual leaders to produce these diverse discourses. The second strategy focuses on the modalities of Islamic fundamentalism and territorial nationalism. I assess the linkages of national identity, national pride, and socioeconomic status with attitudes toward gender equality, secularism and secular politics, democracy, Western culture, and outsiders, using data from a dozen national values surveys carried out in Muslim-majority countries between 2000 and 2008.

Territorial Nationalism, Pan-Arab Nationalism, and Islamic Fundamentalism

The twentieth-century Middle East experienced a succession of three different types of political regimes. The first is the territorial nationalist regimes inaugurated most notably in Egypt, Iran, and Turkey almost simultaneously between 1919 and 1925. The second is the pan-Arab nationalist regimes which seized power through military coups in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria between 1952 (Egypt) and 1969 (Libya). The third type consists of the Islamic fundamentalist regimes, exemplified in the formation of the Islamic Republic following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan formed in 1996. The regimes within each category vary from one another. The Egyptian state formed following the nationalist revolution of 1919 was liberal, while the Pahlavi monarchy (founded in Iran in 1925) and Turkish Republic (formed in 1923) were secular authoritarian regimes. The Iranian state, however, took a liberal form only in a short episode between 1941, when the Allies invaded the country and exiled Reza Shah, and 1953, when liberal Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddiq was overthrown by a U.S.-British engineered military coup. The territorial-nationalist and Arab-nationalist regimes were secular, while the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan were religious fundamentalist regimes.

The three types of regimes, however, were different from one another in terms of the basis of identity. In the first group, this basis was the territorial nation (e.g., being Egyptian, Iranian, or Turkish), in second group, it was ethnicity-cum-language (e.g., being Arab), and in the third, it was religion (e.g., being Muslim). These successive regimes represented the institutionalization and embodiment of the three modalities of territorial nationalism, pan-Arab
nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism, respectively. These modalities were produced by indigenous intellectual leaders many years before the inauguration of these regimes. They constituted different ways in which these intellectual leaders resolved issues related to the basis of identity of their political community, form of government, the relationship between religion and politics, the status of women, and the nature of the outside world, the West in particular. Understanding how the modalities of nationalism are produced will provide a better insight into the process of political transformation. At the same time, given that the production of modalities precedes political formation in time, understanding the development of modalities may provide clues concerning the kind of political regime most likely to emerge in the future.

**Territorial Nationalism**

A set of historical factors preceded the rise of territorial nationalism in such diverse places as Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Included among these factors were changes in the structure of domestic production, the development of capitalism, the integration of the domestic economy into the world capitalist market, the decline of the traditional social institutions, including organized religion, the rise of new social classes—including merchants, landowners, and to a limited extent industrialists—the introduction of the press, and the expansion of modern education (Issawi 1966, Heyworth-Dunne, 1968, Ma’oz 1968, Crecelius 1972, Vatikiotis, 1973, Floor 1976, Marsot 1984, Abrahamic 1982, Lapidus 1988, Ruedy 1992, Robinson, 1993). These changes only set the stage for the rise of nationalist discourses. The proximate context that prompted the rise of territorial-nationalist discourse among indigenous intellectual leaders was characterized by a distinctive alignment of political and cultural forces. Broadly speaking, this alignment provided two major ideological targets in opposition to which (liberal) territorial nationalist discourse was produced. One was the political discourses of the ruling regime, and the other the traditionalist religious-cum-political discourse of the conservative ulama. This alignment certainly varied between Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey. Algeria was under the French colonial rule (1848-1962) and Egypt under the British (1882-1922). These colonial powers justified their rule on the grounds that Algerians and Egyptians were not quite ready to self-govern (Milner 1892, Cromer 1908, Marsot 1968, Ruedy 1992). The colonial discourses of the French and British thus constituted the target of nationalist agitations. Although the conservative ulama resisted reforms, including the introduction of modern education and Western liberal-nationalist ideas and life-style, which entailed a shift in the basis
of loyalty from religion to nation, the struggle against the domineering colonial power, which was both foreign and non-Muslim, had pacified the conflict between religion and nationalism and thus made it possible for “the concept of ‘la Patrie,’” in Hourani’s apt remark, to conquer “without struggle” (Hourani 1983: 194).

Iran and Turkey, on the other hand, were under monarchical absolutism, whose power had become too arbitrary in running the affairs of the nation and too weak to defend the country’s interests vis-à-vis European intervention in the nineteenth century (Amanat 1997, Kinross 1977, Davison 1977, Moaddel 2005). Aligned with the ruling monarch were the conservative ulama, who had attempted to block the reformist measures that were initiated within or outside the ruling regime in the second half of the nineteenth century. The opposition to the ulama provoked secular discourse, while opposition to monarchical absolutism created awareness concerning the wickedness of political despotism, on the one hand, and the utility of a constitutional representative system for the country’s technological progress and economic prosperity, on the other. The Allies’ occupation of Turkey and the ensuing Turkish war of independence (1919-1923) were associated with the accentuation of the significance of the nationalist element in the modality of territorial nationalism among Turkish intellectual leaders. Among Iranians, on the other hand, the nationalist element was much weaker because the country was not under colonial domination (Ahmed 1960, Safran 1961, Marsot 1968, 1977, Wendell 1972, Hourani 1983, Christelow 1987, Ruedy 1992, Reid 1996, Afary 1996, Deeb 1997, Zürcher 2004, Moaddel 2005).

In the modality of territorial nationalism, political sovereignty belongs to the people who inhabit a given territory. Connections to this territory, rather than religious affiliations or ethnicity, define membership in the political community. The nation is the source of legitimacy, religious and political functions are differentiated, and individual identity is territorial nationalistic, like being an Algerian, Egyptian, Iranian, or Turkish. An important example of territorial nationalism in action is the manner in which Egyptian Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908), a prominent leader of the nationalist movement, portrayed attachments to the land of Egypt, which underscores the significance of territorial national identity as the defining feature of membership in the political community he was fighting for. For him, it was not language or religion, but the feeling of belonging to the land of Egypt that was the most potent unifying force among Egyptians. He fostered and glorified the sentiment of nationalism, as illustrated in the passage below.
Nationalism is a sentiment before which all nations and all communities bow because it is the feeling of the worth and dignity of man, of the bounty of God and His care, of the meaning of existence itself.

Nationalism is the food which the body and soul of Egypt need before any other food. . . . It is the mainspring of all miracles and the principle of all progress . . . it is the blood in the veins of nations and the life of all living things.

Nationalism is the noblest tie for men and the solid foundation upon which great and mighty kingdoms are built. . . . Life is merely transitory and it has no honor without nationalism and without work for the welfare of the fatherland and its children. . . . Fatherland, O fatherland: To you my love and my heart. To you my life and my existence. To you my blood and my soul. To you my mind and my speech. . . . You, you, O Egypt are life itself, and there is no life but in you (cited in Safran 1961: 87).

**Alternatives to Territorial Nationalism**

Liberal territorial nationalism went down in 1939-1953 before the onslaught of two major ideological movements. One consisted of secular authoritarian ideologies of the left and the right, and the other was Islamic fundamentalism—both were united only by their common hostility to parliamentary politics and democratic elections. In Iran, territorial nationalism was opposed by the monarchy-centered nationalism and Shi’i fundamentalism, and in Arab-majority countries by pan-Arab nationalism and Sunni fundamentalism, spearheaded by the Society of the Muslim Brothers.

Multiple historical factors contributed to the decline of liberal territorial nationalism in the Middle East. While cross-nationally this decline was connected to the failure of the indigenous dominant classes (landowners and merchants) to maintain power or hegemony in the national politics, on the one hand, and the radicalization of the members of the middle classes, on the other, the national context was also important not only in shaping how the members of these social classes operated under varying (internationally induced) economic crisis, but in highlighting the factors that were specific to each country as well. In Algeria, for example, the French failure to make peace with the moderate leaders of the liberation movement contributed to the decline of liberalism and the radicalization of anti-colonial struggle, leading to the Algerian war of independence in 1954–1962 (Ruedy 1992). In Egypt and Syria, the inability of the politicians from landowning-merchant or industrialist families to promote economic development increased the level of mass dissatisfaction with the government. At the same time, the identification of the national government and the parliament with the particularistic interests
of these classes eroded the universalistic appeal of parliamentary politics and undermined its legitimacy in society. Furthermore, the members of the upper classes attaching low esteem to military professions created a structural opportunity for people of humble origins to use the military as a channel of upward mobility, enabling them to control this powerful institution of the state, then seize power through coups, and finally undermine or destroy the traditional upper classes through the nationalization of their property under the guise of Arab socialism (Gershoni and Jankowski 1995; Khoury 1987; Moaddel 2005). Finally, in Iran, the U.S.-British engineered coup in 1953 overthrew the democratically-elected premiership of Mohammad Mosaddiq and abruptly ended the national-liberal episode. The continued and steady support of the dictatorial monarch by Western governments delegitimized pro-Western liberal politics, contributing to the decline of liberalism and the rise of anti-Western cultural movements in the sixties and the seventies (Moaddel 1993).

Pan-Arab nationalism and Sunni fundamentalism emerged somewhat simultaneously in the same social context in places like Egypt and Syria. That is, the two ideological discourses were preceded by major changes in social conditions in the first half of the twentieth century. The population increased rapidly, rural to urban migration accelerated, the traditional social classes continued to decline, a new educated middle class connected to the expanding bureaucratic structure of the state and to an emerging industrial sector grew swiftly, a working class emerged, and landowners and merchants continued to expand their political power and interests in the society. Parallel with this process was also enrichment and bourgeoisification of the leaders of the nationalist movements. The installment of Faisal as the king of Iraq in 1921, following the overthrow of his kingship in Syria a year earlier, was also a major factor in the development of pan-Arab nationalism in Iraq (Issawi 1954, 1966, Quraishi 1967, Dawn 1973, Marsot 1977, Deeb 1979, Khoury 1983, 1987, Ansari 1986, Gershoni and Jankowski 1995, Dawisha 2003).

It would be hard, however, to contrast the structural changes of the nineteenth century with those of the early twentieth century in order to explain why the first set of changes produced territorial nationalism, while the second set pan-Arab nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism. For sure, the bourgeoisification of the nationalist leaders and their exclusivist policies might have undermined the legitimacy of territorial nationalism and parliamentary politics in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, hence contributing to the rise of alternative oppositional ideologies, including pan-Arab nationalism. However, the production of pan-Arab nationalist discourse occurred in the
period between the two world wars, years before the decline of territorial nationalism in the forties through the fifties.

Here, again the ideological target the indigenous intellectual leaders encountered appears to have been the key factors in the production of these discourses. If liberal territorial nationalism was produced in oppositional relation to monarchical absolutism, ulama obstructionism, and foreign occupation—depending on the country—in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pan-Arabic nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism were responses to ideological targets that were quite different. The intellectual leaders who arrived at the pan-Arab nationalist discourse in order to resolve the issue of legitimate political power had encountered omnipresent European colonial domination of the Arab world following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic fundamentalists, on the other hand, first arose in opposition to the secularist policies of the nationalist state and then became radicalized as the state’s exclusivist policies and interventions in economy expanded considerably in the second half of the twentieth century.

Pan-Arab Nationalism

Although the rise of Arab consciousness was rooted in the nineteenth century, pan-Arab nationalism as a full-blown political ideology was an outcome of the reflections of Arab intellectual leaders between the two world wars on the sociopolitical problems facing their societies. It was formulated in reaction to the post-World War I colonial partitioning of the Arab lands into disparate states and the imposition of the French mandate on Lebanon (1920-1943) and Syria (1920–1945) and the British mandate on Iraq (1920–1932) and Transjordan (1922-1946). Arab communities were diverse and even the word Arab was reserved only for the Bedouins in the pre-modern period. Yet, European domination appears to have had a uniformitarian effect on the indigenous intellectual leaders’ perception of Arabs; diverse Arabs were singularized as one people, hence the necessity to establish an all-inclusive Arab state. The Arab identity thus became the key cultural differentia specifica that distinguished a subjugated people from the domineering Europeans (Haim 1962; Cleveland 1971; Zeine 1973; Dawn 1973, 1988; Hourani 1983; Khalidi et al. 1991; Chartouni-Dubarry 1993; Dawisha 2003, Moaddel 2005).

In the pan-Arab-nationalist modality, nation is defined in terms of language-cum-ethnicity. Attachments to the Arabic identity, rather than to a territory or a particular religious affiliation, define the criterion for membership in the political community. As harbingers of pan-Arab nationalism, Sati’ al-Husri (1880–1968) and Darwish al-Miqdadi (1879-1968) best
articulated the notion that the Arab constituted one single eternal nation. For them, only the followers of imperialism and regionalism would deny the existence of the Arab nation. According to al-Husri,

There is left no room to doubt that the division of the Arab provinces into several states took place because of the bargaining and ambitions of the foreign states, and not according to the views and interests of the people of the countries. So, too, were the borders of these states determined by the wishes and agreements of the foreign powers, and not according to the natural demands of the situation or the requirements of indigenous interests. ... Is it possible for us to consider, for example, the people of Syria as forming a true nation, different from the people of Iraq and Lebanon? Never, gentlemen. All that I have explained indicates clearly that the differences we now see between the people of these states are temporary and superficial. ... We must always assert that the Syrians, Iraqis, Lebanese, Jordanians, Hejazis, and Yemenis all belong to one nation, the Arab nation (cited in Cleveland 1971: 130).

To show that Arabs are one singular indivisible people, pan-Arab nationalists claimed the naturalness of the Arab nation, where its different provinces formed parts of an organic whole, having historical permanency. In textbooks designed for use in the schools of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, the Arab homeland is portrayed as a natural geographical unit, consisting of the “Arab Island”—a living body where “the head” was the Fertile Crescent, “the heart” central Arabia, and “the extremities” the Arabian coastlands from the Gulf of Aqaba to “the Gulf of Basra.” This “Island” was “the cradle of the Arabs and their fortress” (Dawn 1988: 69).

Geography, however, is of secondary importance. The people, not territory, are the decisive element, as they are the creator of the homeland. All lands inhabited by Arabs are Arab lands. For Muhammad Izzat Darwaza (1888–1984), "the lands of Syria, Iraq, and Palestine were always Arab because they were filled with Arabs"(Dawn 1988: 70). For Miqdadi also, the Arab homeland is the territory inhabited by Arabs, which expanded as Arabs expanded into Asia, Africa, and Europe. The Arabs inhabiting the homeland was accomplished in remote antiquity. Arabic was the most advanced amongst the ancient Semitic languages. The ancient pre-Islamic Arabs, however, were only a small part of the glorious Arab history (Dawn 1988: 70).

The Europeans, the Greeks, Turks, and Iranians are portrayed as enemies of Arabs. The textbooks reinforced the belief that borrowing from outsiders, particularly Persians and Westerners had been nearly fatal to the ancient Arabs. The Persians are depicted as being filled with hatred of Arabs, and having a fanatical desire for revenge for the loss of their sovereignty and glory (Dawn 1988: 75).
Islamic Fundamentalism

The rise of religious fundamentalism was in part a consequence of the breakdown of the religious-liberal alliance that led the nationalist movements, most notably in Egypt and Iran, in the early twentieth-century. For a group of the ulama and religious activists, who played a leading role in the emergent nationalist movements for the construction of the modern secular state, a constitutional government was far superior to the existing monarchical absolutism or foreign colonial rule. As one of the leaders of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, theologian Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba’ie registered his support for a constitutional political system on the ground that it “will bring security and prosperity to the country” (cited in Adamiyat 1976: 193). Similarly, for Islamic reformer Mufti of Egypt Muhammad Abduh and his followers, although British rule was in principle unacceptable, it had created the only viable opportunity for the gradual education of their fellow Egyptians and would also be easier to get rid of than the khedivial autocracy (Ahmed 1960: 52).

Following the overthrow of traditional monarchical absolutism in Iran and Turkey or foreign colonial rule in Egypt in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the intellectual climate turned overly secularist and anti-religion. The ruling cultural and political elite did not confine their activities to the realm of politics. Subscribing to a Europe-centered secularist project, they narrowed down the cultural and social spheres of religious institutions: they rewrote history to fit their nationalist conception of the past and to overlook the Islamic period, glorified pre-Islamic kingship and ancient history, reformed the educational institutions to undermine the influence of religion, imposed feminism from above, and attacked religion and religious rituals in terms of Western standards (Vatikiotis 1980: 306–307; Moaddel and Karabenick 2013).

The cultural onslaughts on Islam, however, begot a strong reaction from both the ulama and Muslim activists. The discourse of Islamic fundamentalism was thus produced in opposition to the secularist ideas and policies of the nationalist state. The formation of the Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt is 1928, which expanded to other Arab countries in the subsequent decades, represented an organizational embodiment of the anti-secularist movement and exemplified twentieth-century Sunni fundamentalism. Hasan al-Banna, the leader and founder of the Muslim Brothers, often expressed his disapproval of the secular trend in the country and secular policies implemented by the national government, blaming Egypt’s problems squarely on secular nationalist parties like the Wafid and Liberal Constitutionalists as well as the state’s educational and cultural policies (Mitchell 1969).
At the outset, the Muslim Brothers were a moderate group and expressed little interest in revolutionary activities in order to realize their ideal Islamic order. In fact, they enjoyed a cordial relationship with the monarch. Furthermore, they even tried to pursue their religious objectives through participation in parliamentary politics. However, as the government decided to repress the movement by first blocking their participation in the elections, then rigging the elections after they were allowed to participate, dissolving the Society of the Muslim Brothers in 1948, and finally assassinating al-Banna a year later, such undemocratic actions not only undermined the legitimacy of the parliamentary system in their view, but also contributed to the radicalization of a significant section of the Islamic movement. As one prominent member of the Muslim Brothers claimed, the upper class monopolized the government, and the people were compelled to choose the parliament from among their oppressors: the landlord commanded the votes of his tenants; and the lord of finance those of his debtors. All the elections since 1923 were spurious (Mitchell 1969: 219).

The 1952 military coup ended the era of constitutional monarchy in Egypt, but did not produce a friendlier environment for the Muslim Brothers. The totalitarianism of the post-coup pan-Arab nationalist regime, however, was associated with the rise of religious extremism in the country, which was most notably reflected in the political discourse of its most effective spokesperson Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), a secular intellectual-turned Islamic activist. Qutb did not simply criticize the secularism of the state; he questioned the very Islamic nature of the existing order. For him, Egypt was a throwback to the pre-Islamic conditions in Arabia where people lived under the state of ignorance (jahiliyya). By implication, it was thus incumbent on the faithful to rebel against it. An even more extremist and militant version of Islamic fundamentalism was formulated by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj (1954–1982). In his view, the current rulers of Muslim countries were all apostates and should be overthrown in order to establish a truly Islamic state (Akhavi 1992: 94–95). Faraj was the head of the Cairo branch of the Tanzim al-jihad (Jihad Organization) that assassinated President Anwar al-Sadat. Building on Sayyid Qutb’s argument, Faraj proclaimed that “the establishment of an Islamic State is an obligation for the Muslims…. The laws by which the Muslims are ruled today are the laws of Unbelief; they are actually codes of law that were made by infidels who then subjected the Muslims to these (codes)…” (cited in Sageman 2004, 15). These ideas formed the foundations of such radical organizations as Jamaat Islamiyyat, Islamic Jihad, and al-Qaeda, justifying the use of terror for the realization of their ostensibly Islamic objectives.
Similarly, Iranian Shi‘i fundamentalism first emerged as an anti-secular religious extremist group, *Fedaiyan-i Islam* (Devotees of Islam), in 1946. The group believed that Iranian society had strayed from the right path and needed to be purified. It called for a strict enforcement of the shari’a, which included prohibitions of alcohol, tobacco, opium, films, gambling, and foreign clothing, the amputation of hands of thieves, the veiling of women, and an elimination from school curricula the teaching of all non-Islamic subjects (Abrahamian 1982, 259). It also launched a campaign of terror against the politicians and intellectuals the group considered responsible for corrupting the society. One of its most heinous acts was the assassination of Ahmad Kasravi, a prominent historian and noted social critic, in 1946. Despite the suppression of the *Fedaiyan* and the execution of its leader, Navvab Safavi (1924–1955), in 1955, the group survived, and its members became staunch supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini. It was reorganized by Sadiq Khalkhali, the infamous ruthless judge who after the 1979 revolution executed thousands of the supporters of the former regime and political dissidents.

The Islamic fundamentalist modality of nationalism considers Islam as the basis of legitimacy and the source of legislation, negates secular politics and instead advances the idea of the unity of religion and politics in an Islamic government, promotes religious centrist and intolerance of other faiths, endorses male supremacy and restricts women’s involvements in the public sphere, and rejects Western culture as decadent. The view of Egyptian Sayyid Qutb on the Islamic conception of political sovereignty displays a clear contrast with a conception in territorial nationalism and pan-Arab nationalism. Sayyid Qutb questioned pan-Arab nationalism and other forms of nationalism first for being tyrannical, reasoning that “there was no sense in liberating the land from a Byzantine or a Persian tyrant in order to put it in the hands of an Arab tyrant. Any tyrant is a tyrant” (cited in Sivan 1985: 30). In a later text, he flatly rejected pan-Arabism as a concept incompatible with Islam:

The homeland (watan) a Muslim should cherish and defend is not a mere piece of land; the collective identity he is known by is not that of a regime. . . . Neither is the banner he should glory in and die for that of a nation (qawn). . . . His jihad is solely geared to protect the religion of Allah and His Shari’a and to save the Abode of Islam and no other territory. . . . Any land that combats the Faith, hampers Muslims from practicing their religion, or does not apply the Shari’a, becomes ipso facto part of the Abode of War (Dar al-Harb). It should be combated even if one’s own kith and kin, national group, capital and commerce are to be found there. . . . A Muslim’s homeland is any land governed by the laws of Islam. Islam is the only identity worthy of man. . . . Any other group identity . . . is a jahili identity of the type humanity has known during its periods of spiritual decadence (cited in Sivan 1985: 31).
Likewise, harbinger of Shi’i fundamentalism Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini proclaimed that:

Present Islam to the people in its true form, so that our youth do not picture the akhunds as sitting in some corner in Najaf or Qum, studying the questions of menstruation and parturition instead of concerning themselves with politics, and draw the conclusion that religion must be separate from politics. This slogan of the separation of religion and politics and the demand that Islamic scholars not intervene in social and political affairs have been formulated and propagated by the Imperialists; it is only the irreligious who repeats them (Khomeini 1981: 38).

To summarize, the foregoing analysis thus shows that the modalities of territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism, far from being an inevitable reflection of social structure, primordial attachments, or perennial features of historical cycles, were produced by indigenous intellectual leaders to address the historically significant issues they encountered. For sure, there have been crucial differences in the social contexts in which these different discourses were produced. Liberal territorial nationalism was associated with the development of capitalism and the rise of indigenous dominant classes, and both Islamic fundamentalists and pan-Arab nationalists, albeit in different ways, expressed opposition to these classes. The dissolution of political parties, the implementation of land reforms, and nationalization of private concerns in Arab countries or the expansion of the state’ sector in the economy in Iran under secular authoritarians regimes in the second half of the twentieth century channeled oppositional activities through the medium of religion, which favored the rise of Islamic fundamentalism.

Nonetheless, the actual production of these modalities transpired in an oppositional relation to the type of ideological targets the indigenous intellectuals encountered. As these targets changed from one historical episode to the next, so did the type of modality that was produced in opposition to them. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, this target was a combination of monarchical absolutism or foreign occupation and ulama obstructionism that prompted the production of (liberal) territorial nationalism. It was the colonial partitioning of the Arab territories that provoked the idea of pan-Arab unity in the interregnum between the two world wars. Finally, it was in oppositional relation to the expanding interventionist authoritarian secular state that the modality of Islamic fundamentalism was produced in the second half of the twentieth century.
Islamic Fundamentalism versus Liberal Nationalism in Muslim-Majority Countries

The above analysis explains the rise and decline of different modalities of nationalism in the twentieth-century Middle East, focusing on the sociopolitical and cultural outlooks of indigenous intellectual leaders and the centrality of identity in their outlooks. To further demonstrate the fruitfulness of modalities for a better understanding of the heterogeneity of nationalist movements, in the second strategy I assess how modalities predict changes in values among the ordinary public—that is, how the basis of identity and variation in national pride are linked to orientations toward major sociopolitical and cultural issues, including attitudes toward gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics and democracy, western culture, and outsiders. Since these issues, as I discussed earlier, have also been the concerns of indigenous intellectual leaders, assessing the extent to which modalities predict attitudes contributes to the overall validity of the analytical framework on the heterogeneity of nationalism that I have proposed in this paper.

Because of the limitation of the survey data from Muslim-majority countries, only the modalities of Islamic fundamentalism and liberal territorial nationalism may be considered for assessment (not enough data are available to evaluate pan-Arab, pan-Kurdish, or other ethnic modalities of nationalism). Islamic fundamentalism has been one of the most active ideological movements for the construction of a religious government in Muslim-majority countries in recent decades. The rise of religious extremism, suicide terrorism, and violence inspired by religion appears to have generated secular, nationalist, or liberal responses in these countries, a process that is broadly similar to the rise of liberal nationalist discourse in the late nineteenth-century Iran and Syria in response to the domineering power of religious institutions and the conservative ulama (Moaddel 2005). Cultural trends in Iran after the 1979 revolution and in Iraq following the US invasion in 2003 exemplify this process. In Iran, the revolution resulted in the formation of religious absolutism under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. While the Ayatollah’s forced Islamization was a major setback for the followers of liberal values and secular politics, decades of clerical rule did not create a religious order in the country. Scholars of Iran’s intellectual history have shown that the post-revolutionary period exhibits a dramatic decline in support for the religious fundamentalism that once dominated the discourse of the 1977-79 revolution, on the one hand, and the rise of secular and religious reformist oppositional discourses, on the other. In their views, the intellectual field is now directed by the trio of
secularism, religious reformism, and religious conservatism, all vying for the intellectual control of the Iranian society. The dynamic of intellectual change is no longer driven by the sacred spirituality of religion. Rather, it is motivated by a quest for understanding the historical process that produced a despotic religious regime and an inefficient economy as well as a search for an alternative vision of social order that is democratic and egalitarian, conducive to economic prosperity, and removed from the clerical control (Boroujerdi 1996, Vahdat 2002, 2003, Jahanbegloo 2004, Rajaee 2007, Kamrava 2008, Mahdavi 2011). Findings from values surveys have also shown that the Iranian public appeared to be less religious than the publics from many other Muslim-majority countries, and the trend in values among Iranians is toward social individualism, gender equality, democracy, and national identity (Moaddel 2009). Likewise in Iraq, a series of values surveys carried out between 2004 and 2011 has shown an increase in support for national identity and secular politics. The percent Iraqis who defined themselves as “Iraqis above all” (as opposed to Muslims, Arabs, or Kurds) consistently increased from 23% in 2004 to 63% in 2008, and then dropped slightly to 57% in 2011, and those who agreed that Iraq would be a better place if religion and politics were separated increased from 50% in 2004 to about 70% in 2011 (Moaddel, de Jong, and Dagher 2011).

I assess whether variations in value orientations in Iran, Iraq, and other Muslim-majority countries (for which survey data are available) can be explained by the contrast between the two modalities. More specifically, I assess the extent to which identity and pride predict people’s value orientations. Since orientations toward liberal values favor gender equality, secularism, secular politics, Western culture, and tolerance of outsiders, and that the orientations of the fundamentalists tend to be just the opposite, I propose that (1) a shift in the basis of identity from religion to nation entails a significant change toward gender equality, secularism, secular politics, Western culture, and tolerance of out-groups; (2) measures of diachronic pride—pride in one’s country’s historical achievements and contributions to science and technology—are positively linked to these liberal values, and (3) measures of synchronic pride—pride in the superiority of one’s nation over others or national pride—are negatively linked to these values. Again, because of the limitation in the data, proposition #2 cannot be tested. The data does not include questions on people’s feeling of pride in their country’s contributions to science and technology or historical achievements. Furthermore, there is no variable that directly measures synchronic pride—pride in the superiority of one’s nations. However, as was discussed earlier, because religious fundamentalism is orientated toward criticisms of outsiders and rigorously
promoting intra-faith solidarity, and liberalism being self-referential and critical of the social institutions that block the realization of individual equality, a general measure of national pride is consistent with the synchronic conception of pride and is thus used as an affective indicator of religious fundamentalist modality.

**HYPOTHESES**

**National Identity versus National Pride**

I propose that a shift in identity from religion to nation and the feeling of national pride will have varied relationships with people’s orientations toward liberal values. That is:

Hypothesis 1. The shift from religious to national identity entails:

(a) A more favorable attitude toward gender equality,
(b) A more favorable attitude toward Western culture,
(c) A more favorable attitude toward democracy or secular politics,
(d) A stronger secular orientation, and
(e) A weaker hostility toward outsiders.

Hypothesis 2. The feeling of national pride, by contrast, is linked to:

(a) A less favorable attitude toward gender equality,
(b) A less favorable attitude toward Western culture,
(c) A less favorable attitude toward democracy and secular politics,
(d) A weaker secular orientation, and
(e) A stronger hostility toward outsiders.

**Modernity and Liberal Nationalism**

According to the modernization theory discussed earlier, the higher one’s socioeconomic status, the stronger is one’s support for liberal values:

Hypothesis 3. A higher socioeconomic status is linked to:

(a) A more favorable attitude toward gender equality,
(b) A more favorable attitude toward Western culture,
(c) A more favorable attitude toward democracy or secular politics,
(d) A stronger secular orientation, and
(e) A weaker hostility toward outsiders.
MEASUREMENT AND MODELS

Dependent Variables

Several constructs are used as indicators of historically significant issues over which major cultural warfare has transpired between the liberal-nationalist intellectuals and activists, on the one hand, and Islamic fundamentalists, on the other. These are:

**Gender equality:** Three indicators measure this construct. Respondents were asked:

1. “How important is it that a woman wears the veil in public places (1= very important, 6 = not at all important [unfavorable to veil])?”
2. “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that men make better political leaders than women (1=strongly agree, 4=strongly disagree [unfavorable to men better leaders])”?
3. “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that a wife must always obey her husband (1=strongly agree, 4=strongly disagree [unfavorable to wife obedience])?”

Higher values on these measures indicate stronger unfavorable attitudes toward the veil, men as better political leaders, and toward wife obedience—hence a stronger support for gender equality and a weaker advocacy of the values promoted by religious fundamentalism on the proper role for women in the family and society.

**Secular orientation:** Four indicators measure secular orientation of the respondents. All these measures are recoded so that higher values indicate stronger secular orientation (weaker religiosity). One is on the importance of religion in one’s life: (1) “How important is religion in your life (1= very important…, 4= not very important [religion unimportant])?” The other is on mosque attendance: (2) “How often do you participate in mosque services (1=more than once a week…, 7= don’t go to mosques [church for Christian respondents in Lebanon] [mosque/church attendance])?” The third focuses on trust in the religious institutions: (3) “How much trust do you have in mosques ([church for Christian respondents in Lebanon] 1= a great deal [trust in mosque/church]…, 6= none at all). Finally, the fourth measures people’s attitudes toward the shari’a as the guiding principle of a good government: (4) How important is it for a good government to implement only the laws of the Shari’a ([laws inspired by Christian values for Christian respondents in Lebanon] 1= very important…. , 4= not very important [Shari’a])?”
Western culture: Religious fundamentalism holds that the West is culturally decadent and Islamic culture must be protected against invasion by Western culture. One question measures attitudes toward Western culture: “In your view, how important is Western cultural invasion (1=very important…, 6=not important at all)?” Lower values on this measure indicate stronger attitudes against the Western culture.

Hostility toward outsiders: Orientations toward immigrants featured prominently in the study of national pride and in the nationalism-patriotism debate (de Figueiredo and Elkins 2003). To assess the extent to which the followers of the two modalities differ in their attitudes toward immigrant workers, a question that taps into hostility toward immigrants is included in the model: “How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the government should do (1=let anyone comes who wants to…, 4=Prohibit people coming here from other countries [Hostility toward immigrants])?” Higher values indicate a stronger hostility toward immigrant workers.

Form of government: What constitutes as the most desirable form of government has been hotly debated among intellectual leaders and the public at large in Muslim-majority countries in the contemporary period. Here, I consider two constructs; democracy and secular politics. An important caveat should be noted here. Except for extremist groups that categorically reject democracy in favor of religious absolutism, the followers of religious fundamentalism (e.g., Muslim Brothers or anti-reformist and conservative supporters of the supreme leaders in Iran) often express support for “Islamic” democracy. Therefore, given that democracy means different thing to different people, we consider secular politics to be a better distinguishing mark between liberalism and fundamentalism. Where data are available, attitudes toward secular politics is used instead of attitudes toward democracy.

To measure attitudes toward democracy, respondents were asked: “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that democracy may have problems but it is a better system of government.” And to assess people’s orientation toward secular politics, they were asked: “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree that [STUDY SITE COUNTRY] would be a better place if religion and politics were separated?” Both variables are recoded such that a higher value indicates a stronger support for democracy or secular politics.
**Independent Variables**

**National versus religious identity** is considered the key difference between the modalities of liberal nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. Respondents were asked, “which of the following best describes you: (1) above all, I am an Iranian, Egyptian, Iraqi, Saudi…, (2) above all, I am a Muslim (Christians [for Christian respondents]), (3) above all, I am an Azeri-Turk, a Kurd, or other, specify____?”

National identity is measured as a dummy variable (0=Muslim, above all; 1=else, above all). This variable measures whether the respondents’ primary allegiance is to the nation/ethnicity or to religion.

**National pride** is measured in terms of the strength of one’s pride to be a citizen of the country: “How proud are you to be a citizen of [STUDY SITE COUNTRY]: (1) very proud, (2) quite proud, (3) not very proud, or (4) not at all proud?” This variable is recoded so that a higher value is associated with a stronger feeling of national pride.

**Socioeconomic status:** This construct is measured by three variable indicators: education, income, and self-report social-class position. **Education:** Education is measured by asking respondents “What is the highest educational level that you have attained: (1) no formal education, (2) incomplete primary school, (3) complete primary school, (4) incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (5) complete secondary school: technical/vocational type, (6) incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type, (7) complete secondary: university-preparatory type, (8) some university-level education, without degree, and (9) university-level education, with degree.” **Social class:** Self-reported class identification is measured by asking respondents to describe their class background: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the (1) upper class, (2) upper middle class, (3) lower middle class, (4) working class, or (5) lower class?” The self-reported measure of social class is recoded so that higher values indicate higher social classes. **Income:** This variable is measured in terms of the respondents’ placement of their household income on a scale of incomes: “On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the lowest income decile and 10 the highest income decile in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. Please specify the appropriate number, counting all wages, salaries, pensions, and other incomes that come in.”
Gender: A dummy variable on gender is constructed (1=\textbf{male} and 0=female).

Age: The age of the respondents is included in the analysis as a continuous variable.

**Structural Equations Models and the Data**

Data on these variables are not available for all the countries included in the analysis. Data from the 2005 Iran survey is most complete. For other countries, data on only a subset of the variables are available. As a result, three different models are developed and are estimated (Figures 1-3). The model in Figure 1 estimates the linkages of national identity, national pride, and socioeconomic status with gender equality, Western culture, hostility toward immigrants, secular politics, and religious orientation, controlling for gender and age among Iranians, using the data from the 2005 survey. Modified versions of this model are presented in Figures 2 and 3; the first uses the data from the eight countries, and the second from Iraq-2004, Iraq-2006, and Lebanon.

Several differences between the three models should be noted. The models in Figures 1 and 3 consider secular politics as a more appropriate indicator of form of government than democracy. Attitude toward secular politics indicates a more apparent difference between the people who favor liberal nationalism and those supporting religious fundamentalism than democracy, which has different practical meanings for the followers of liberalism and fundamentalism. Therefore, an indicator of attitudes toward secular politics is used instead of attitudes toward democracy in these two models. This question, however, was not asked in the surveys carried out in the countries included in model 2, necessitating the use of democracy in this model. Finally, questions on indicators of attitudes toward Western culture and hostility toward immigrants were not asked in the Iraq and Lebanon surveys.

As shown in the three figures, the models have four exogenous variables and between five (Model 1 in Figure 1) and three (Model 3 in Figure 3) dependent variables. While there may be reciprocal causations between the dependent variables—for example, people who favor gender equality may have stronger secular orientation, more strongly support secular politics, or be more favorable toward Western culture and vice versa—the intention of these models is to assess the linkages between the exogenous and the dependent variables and how well these models fit the data.
Figure 1
Structural relations of the exogenous variables with gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, Western culture, and hostility toward immigrants, based on the 2005 Iran survey data.
Figure 2
Structural relations of the exogenous variables with gender equality, secular orientation, democracy, and hostility toward immigrants in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Figure 3
Structural equations of the relations of the exogenous variables with gender equality, secular orientation, and secular politics for Iraq 2004, Iraq 2006, and Lebanon.
Table 1 provides information on the sample size and dates of each of the surveys carried out in the Muslim-majority countries. All the surveys used multistage probability sampling procedures, broken down into urban and rural areas in proportion to their size, with roughly equal male and female respondents. The interviews, which required approximately one hour on average to complete, were conducted face-to-face in respondents’ residences. For more information on these surveys, see www.mevs.org.

Table 1
The sample size and the date of survey from each of the countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
<th>Survey dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,282</td>
<td>March - May 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>August - September 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1,004</td>
<td>March - September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2,532</td>
<td>January - February 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2,537</td>
<td>June - August 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,325</td>
<td>November - December 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>2,701</td>
<td>March - April 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,223</td>
<td>September 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3,039</td>
<td>April - Sept 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,013</td>
<td>February 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>1,502</td>
<td>April - May 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: www.mevs.org

Table 2 shows the means and standard deviations of the variables of the study. As this table shows, data on all the dependent variables are not available across the twelve surveys. While the 2005 Iran survey includes data on all the variables, data on only a subset of these variables are available for Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran-2000, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA), and Turkey. Data on a slightly different subset are also available for Iraq-2004, Iraq-2006, and Lebanon 2008. Altogether these data are adequate in order to rigorously evaluate the different ways in which national identity and national pride are linked to orientations toward liberal values.
### Table 2 - Mean and standard deviation for the variables used in the analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable in the data set</th>
<th>Iran-5</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Bangladesh</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Iran-0</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>KSA*</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Iraq-4</th>
<th>Iraq-6</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Identity/National Pride</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Identity (1=Else, 0=Muslim)</td>
<td>.50 (.50)</td>
<td>0.33 (.47)</td>
<td>0.76 (.43)</td>
<td>0.58 (.49)</td>
<td>0.38 (.48)</td>
<td>0.29 (.45)</td>
<td>0.37 (.48)</td>
<td>0.25 (.436)</td>
<td>0.36 (.48)</td>
<td>0.37 (.48)</td>
<td>0.36 (.48)</td>
<td>0.83 (.38)</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Pride (4=very proud)</td>
<td>3.55 (.68)</td>
<td>3.68 (.60)</td>
<td>3.69 (.53)</td>
<td>3.41(.64)</td>
<td>3.85 (.55)</td>
<td>3.67 (.45)</td>
<td>3.84 (.44)</td>
<td>3.67 (.605)</td>
<td>3.53 (.78)</td>
<td>3.70 (.62)</td>
<td>3.79 (.52)</td>
<td>3.28 (.77)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Gender Equality</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Woman dresses as she wants (6=very imprt)</td>
<td>3.71 (1.61)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wearing a veil (5=Not at all important)</td>
<td>2.27 (1.29)</td>
<td>1.87 (1.09)</td>
<td>1.89 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.09(1.08)</td>
<td>1.49 (.87)</td>
<td>1.56 (1.04)</td>
<td>1.84 (1.13)</td>
<td>1.24 (.647)</td>
<td>4.22 (1.18)</td>
<td>1.34(83)</td>
<td>1.27 (.75)</td>
<td>2.67 (1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife obedience (5=strongly disagree)</td>
<td>2.76 (1.26)</td>
<td>1.92 (1.03)</td>
<td>1.92 (.90)</td>
<td>2.11(1.02)</td>
<td>2.65 (1.34)</td>
<td>2.10 (1.26)</td>
<td>1.71(.96)</td>
<td>1.73 (.942)</td>
<td>2.44 (1.39)</td>
<td>1.61(1.0)</td>
<td>1.57 (.95)</td>
<td>3.19 (1.41)</td>
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<td>Men better pol leaders (4=strongly disagree)</td>
<td>2.07 (.86)</td>
<td>1.96(1.02)</td>
<td>2.16 (.89)</td>
<td>2.32(.78)</td>
<td>2.14 (.97)</td>
<td>1.46 (.81)</td>
<td>1.98(1.04)</td>
<td>1.79 (.977)</td>
<td>2.31 (.96)</td>
<td>1.42(76)</td>
<td>1.43 (.74)</td>
<td>2.33 (94)</td>
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<td><strong>Secular orientation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion important (4=very important)</td>
<td>3.73 (.59)</td>
<td>3.91 (.323)</td>
<td>3.86 (.40)</td>
<td>3.98(.15)</td>
<td>3.75 (.57)</td>
<td>3.95 (.25)</td>
<td>3.92(.31)</td>
<td>3.88 (.399)</td>
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<td>3.93(30)</td>
<td>3.95 (.25)</td>
<td>3.19 (94)</td>
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<td>Trust in mosque (4=a great deal)</td>
<td>3.40 (.72)</td>
<td>3.48 (.79)</td>
<td>3.88 (.36)</td>
<td>3.71(.54)</td>
<td>3.46 (.80)</td>
<td>3.54 (.68)</td>
<td>3.74(.61)</td>
<td>3.81 (.475)</td>
<td>2.84 (1.04)</td>
<td>3.18(93)</td>
<td>3.27 (.84)</td>
<td>2.70 (103)</td>
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<td>Shari'a law (6=very important)</td>
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<td><strong>Secular Politics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Religion-politics separate (4=strongly agree)</td>
<td>2.44(95)</td>
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<td>Western cultural invasion (5=not serious)</td>
<td>1.61 (.895)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Attitudes toward Immigration</strong></td>
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<td>Anti-immigrant (4=prohibit people)</td>
<td>3.0 (.80)</td>
<td>2.25 (.83)</td>
<td>2.51 (.78)</td>
<td>2.68(.70)</td>
<td>2.81 (.84)</td>
<td>2.84 (.79)</td>
<td>1.95(.94)</td>
<td>2.38 (.818)</td>
<td>2.68 (.95)</td>
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<td><strong>Democracy</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy (4=strongly agree)</td>
<td>3.33 (.78)</td>
<td>3.67 (52)</td>
<td>2.78(.77)</td>
<td>2.89 (1.01)</td>
<td>3.26 (.71)</td>
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<td>2.93 (.964)</td>
<td>3.28 (.73)</td>
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<td><strong>Demographics</strong></td>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>4.73 (1.00)</td>
<td>3.63 (3.31)</td>
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<td>Social class</td>
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<td>2.97 (.84)</td>
<td>2.96 (1.02)</td>
<td>2.83 (.92)</td>
<td>2.33 (1.00)</td>
<td>3.57 (.83)</td>
<td>2.79 (1.01)</td>
<td>2.47 (.93)</td>
<td>2.38 (.85)</td>
<td>2.73 (1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>4.87 (1.94)</td>
<td>3.12 (1.79)</td>
<td>4.68 (1.83)</td>
<td>5.83 (1.74)</td>
<td>5.03 (1.70)</td>
<td>3.48 (1.99)</td>
<td>4.37 (1.65)</td>
<td>6.71 (3.22)</td>
<td>3.19 (1.60)</td>
<td>4.20 (1.88)</td>
<td>4.19 (1.70)</td>
<td>5.09 (2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>32.8 (12.8)</td>
<td>35.6 (13.5)</td>
<td>33.7 (10.9)</td>
<td>44.6 (13.7)</td>
<td>34.2 (15.4)</td>
<td>36.1 (14.7)</td>
<td>33.5 (12.6)</td>
<td>32.0 (10.9)</td>
<td>37.0 (13.6)</td>
<td>37.0 (13.8)</td>
<td>37.1 (13.8)</td>
<td>32.8 (13.0)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.50 (.50)</td>
<td>0.51 (.50)</td>
<td>0.55 (.50)</td>
<td>0.50 (.50)</td>
<td>0.54 (.50)</td>
<td>0.49 (.50)</td>
<td>0.49 (.50)</td>
<td>0.50 (.50)</td>
<td>0.50 (.50)</td>
<td>0.48 (.50)</td>
<td>.48 (.50)</td>
<td>.56 (.50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*For respondents from KSA, valid response codes for education range from 1 thru 6, and for income range from 1 thru 25.*
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Estimates of Structural Equation Models

Table 3 reports the results of the estimates of the three structural equation models described in Figure 1 through Figure 3. Model I (Figure 1) uses data from the 2005 Iran survey; Model II (Figure 2) from eight surveys carried out in Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran 2000, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Turkey; and Model III (Figure 3) from three surveys conducted in Iraq 2004, Iraq 2006, and Lebanon. The table reports only the standardized structural coefficients (βs) and the level of significance. It also reports the measures of goodness-of-fit and the chi-square for the three models. As shown, these three models fit the data (Model I: $\chi^2=721.625$, df=84, $p<.001$, CFI=.928, RMSEA=.05; Model II: $\chi^2=2,430$, df = 408, $p <.000$, CFI=.90, RMSEA=.043; Model III: $\chi^2=1,118$, df =120, $p <.000$ CFI=.914, RMSEA =.032).

National Identity versus National Pride

As Table 3 shows, the estimates of the structural coefficients of the linkages of national identity and national pride with the dependent variables in Model I, which includes information on all the variables of interests, are significant and in the expected direction. That is, national identity is positively linked to attitudes toward gender equality ($\beta = .173$), secular orientation ($\beta = .319$), secular politics ($\beta = .177$), and Western culture ($\beta = .124$). The only exception is that national identity has no significant connection with hostility toward immigrants. National pride, by contrast, is negatively linked to gender equality ($\beta = -.224$), secular orientation ($\beta = -.388$) secular politics ($\beta = -.227$), and Western culture ($\beta = -.329$), but positively to hostility toward immigrants ($\beta = .074$).

Thus data support the presence of two modalities of national sovereignty in the perception of Iranians and these two models have opposite relationships with liberal values.

Model II estimates the structural coefficients of the relationships between the independent variables and a subset of the variables for which data from the eight countries are available, including gender equality, secular orientation, democracy, and hostility toward immigrant workers. In this model, also, all the estimates of the structural coefficients linking national identity to gender equality and secular orientation are significant and in the expected direction. The values of the structural coefficient of national identity on gender equality range between $\beta = 0.099$ for KSA and $\beta = 0.323$ for Indonesia. The link between this variable and secular orientation is also positive across the eight countries, its values range between $\beta = 0.134$.
for Bangladesh and $\beta = 0.405$ for Algeria. Furthermore, the link between national identity and democracy is positive and significant for six of the eight countries; Algeria ($\beta = 0.059$), Bangladesh ($\beta = 0.159$), Indonesia ($\beta = 0.081$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = 0.045$), KSA ($\beta = 0.125$), and Turkey ($\beta = 0.066$). Finally, national identity is significantly negatively linked to hostility towards immigrants in five of the eight cases; Algeria ($\beta = -0.063$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = -0.052$), Jordan ($\beta = -0.051$), Morocco ($\beta = -0.089$), and Turkey ($\beta = -0.061$). In Bangladesh ($\beta = 0.059$), it is positively linked to hostility toward immigrants and in the other two countries this linkage is not significant.

National pride, on the other hand, is significantly negatively linked to gender equality among five of the eight countries: Bangladesh ($\beta = -0.185$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = -0.182$), Morocco ($\beta = -0.077$), KSA ($\beta = -0.347$), and Turkey ($\beta = -0.168$). And, it is negatively linked to secular orientation across the eight countries, with values ranging between $\beta = -0.434$ for Turkey and $\beta = -0.189$ for Indonesia—with all values significant. Moreover, national pride has a significant effect on democracy only in Bangladesh ($\beta = 0.060$) and Indonesia ($\beta = 0.127$). Finally, concerning the linkage between national pride and hostilities toward immigrants, the estimates are inconsistent. Only five of the estimates are significant; two are linked positively—Iran ($\beta = 0.104$) and Turkey ($\beta = 0.088$)—and three are negatively—Bangladesh ($\beta = -0.083$), Morocco ($\beta = -0.074$), and KSA ($\beta = -0.078$).

Finally, Model III uses data from Iraq 2004, Iraq 2006, and Lebanon, which include information on a different subset of the dependent variables: gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, and Western culture. Attitude toward secular politics is used instead of democracy in this model. Data on hostility toward immigrant labor were not available in these surveys and attitudes toward Western culture were available for only the two Iraq surveys. Given this difference between Iraq and Lebanon, two versions of Model III are estimated. The first version excludes the variable Western culture in order to estimate the structural parameters for the three countries simultaneously. The second version includes this variable and estimates the structural parameters for Iraq 2004 and Iraq 2006. The results show that there is no significant difference in the estimates of the structural coefficients between the two versions of Model III (not shown). Therefore, the estimates from the version one of Model III, which includes Iraq 2004, Iraq 2006, and Lebanon, and the estimates of the linkages of the independent variables with Western culture from version two are reported in Table 3.
Table 3 - Standardized structural coefficients showing the effects of national identity, national pride

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model I</th>
<th>Model II</th>
<th>Model III</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National identity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender equality</td>
<td>.173a</td>
<td>.259*</td>
<td>.189*</td>
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<td>.319a</td>
<td>.405*</td>
<td>.134*</td>
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<td>.059*</td>
<td>.159*</td>
<td>.081*</td>
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<td>Secular politics</td>
<td>.177a</td>
<td>.124*</td>
<td>.005*</td>
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<td>Western culture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Anti-immigrant</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>-.063b</td>
<td>.059*</td>
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<td>National pride</td>
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<td>Gender equality</td>
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<td>.006*</td>
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<td>.303c</td>
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Model I: χ²=721.625, df=84, α<.001, CFI=.928, RMSEA=.05; Model II: χ²=2,430, df=408, p <.000, CFI=.90 RMSEA=.043; Model III: χ²=1,118, df=120, p <.000 CFI=.914, RMSEA =.032

a<.001, b<.01, c<.05, d<.10
According to the estimates of Model III, the relationship of national identity with gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, and Western culture (for Iraq surveys only) are positive and significant across Iraq 2004, Iraq 2006, and Lebanon. On the other hand, national pride has consistently opposite relationships with these variables and is negatively linked to gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, and Western culture (again, for Iraq surveys) across the three national values surveys.

Findings from the twelve surveys have thus shown that the people who consider nation as the primary basis of their identity, compared to those who consider religion as such, have more favorable attitudes toward gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics (in the four cases for which data are available), democracy (except for Jordan and Morocco), and Western culture (in the three cases for which data are available), and significantly weaker hostility toward immigrant labor in five of the nine cases for which data are available (in three cases it was not significant, and in one case it was positively linked). National pride, on the other hand, has consistently negative relationships with gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, and Western culture. It is positively linked to democracy in only two cases and has inconsistent relationships with hostility toward immigrants across the eight countries. All in all, the estimates appear to support the view that the difference in the basis of identity between religion and nation is associated with a significant difference in orientation toward liberal values—the liberal modality of political sovereignty—and that national pride is a driver of conservative values—the Islamic fundamentalist modality.

**Socioeconomic Status**

Socioeconomic status is positively linked to gender equality and secular orientation across all the cases, except in Saudi Arabia where socioeconomic status is negatively linked to gender equality and has no relationship with secular orientation. The variable is positively linked to democracy in six of the eight cases—Bangladesh ($\beta = 0.107$), Indonesia ($\beta = 0.139$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = 0.057$), Jordan ($\beta = 0.077$), Morocco ($\beta = 0.158$), and Turkey ($\beta = 0.080$) and with secular politics across the four surveys in Models I & III. The relationship between socioeconomic status and hostility toward immigrants is either negative in five cases—Algeria ($\beta = -0.171$), Bangladesh ($\beta = -0.176$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = -0.052$), Jordan ($\beta = -0.055$), and Turkey ($\beta = -0.063$) or not significant. Finally, socioeconomic status has no relationship with attitudes toward Western culture. Such a generally positive connection between socioeconomic status and liberal values is consistent with the modernist proposition that relates the rise of liberal democracy to economic prosperity.
Gender and Age

Men are less favorable to gender equality than women across all the twelve surveys. In half of the cases—Jordan ($\beta = 0.247$), Morocco ($\beta = 0.114$), KSA ($\beta = 0.127$), Iraq 2004 ($\beta = 0.051$), Iraq 2006 ($\beta = 0.062$), and Lebanon ($\beta = 0.082$) men have a stronger secular orientation than women. On democracy and secular politics, there are no gender differences, except in Jordan ($\beta = 131$) and Iraq 2006 ($\beta = 0.059$), when men are more favorable to these values. On Western culture, only in Iran 2005 are men less favorable to Western culture than women ($\beta = -0.030$), and there is no significant gender difference in other countries. Finally, there is no relationship between gender and attitudes toward immigrant labor, except in Bangladesh ($\beta = 0.047$) and Jordan ($\beta = 0.149$), where men are more hostile than women, and Indonesia ($\beta = -0.068$), where the opposite is the case.

Age does not display have any discernible pattern of relationship with the dependent variables. In Iran 2005 ($\beta = 0.074$) and Algeria ($\beta = 0.091$) older people have more egalitarian attitudes toward women. This relationship is just the opposite in Bangladesh ($\beta = -0.236$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = -0.183$), and Morocco ($\beta = -0.119$), and not significant in other countries. Furthermore, age has a positive effective on secular orientation in Iraq 2004 ($\beta = 0.069$) and a negative effect in Lebanon ($\beta = -0.119$). It is positively linked to democracy only in Indonesia ($\beta = 0.095$), Iran 2000 ($\beta = 0.111$), and Turkey ($\beta = 0.088$). It is also positively linked to secular politics in Iraq 2004 ($\beta = 0.094$) but negatively in Lebanon ($\beta = -0.055$). Finally, age is significantly negatively linked to hostility toward immigrants only in Algeria ($\beta = -0.075$).

Discussion

In this paper, I have employed the concept of modality in order to handle diversities in nationalist movements. Modalities represent different configurations of homogeneous elements clustered on identity and the feeling of national solidarity. They represent competing types of nationalism that may emerge, sometime simultaneously, in a given country, region, or broader cultural tradition. Modalities indicate distinctive resolutions of issues on the nature of political community, the line demarcating in-group and out-group members, and the ideal form of political regime. These issues are resolved by indigenous intellectual leaders in oppositional relation to the type of ideological targets they perceive as obstacles to the realization of their
sociopolitical and cultural objectives. Variation in these targets shapes variation in the way issues are resolved. As a result, different modalities of modalities of national sovereignty are produced.

Using these theoretical propositions, I explained the production of such modalities as liberal territorial nationalism, pan-Arab nationalism, and Islamic fundamentalism in terms of varying ideological targets the intellectual leaders of these movements had encountered in their sociopolitical environment. Liberal territorial nationalism was produced in oppositional relations to the ideology of monarchical absolutism, ulama obstructionism, and foreign domination; pan-Arab nationalism to the post-World War I partitioning of Arab territories and the formation of disparate Arab states by European powers; and Islamic fundamentalism to the secular ideologies and policies of the nationalist interventionist state in the twentieth century.

To further demonstrate the fruitfulness of the concept of modality for a better understanding of the diversity of nationalist movements, I considered the modalities of territorial nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism and assessed the extent to which the two types of modalities are configured among ordinary individuals and clustered on identity and pride, using data from twelve values surveys carried out in ten Muslim-majority countries. Considering that these modalities are distinguished in terms of (a) basis of identity and (b) nationalist affectivity, I reasoned that changes in the basis of identity and nationalist emotion are linked to changes in attitudes toward significant sociopolitical issues, including gender equality, secular politics, Western culture, and outsiders. The data, however, did not include measures of diachronic pride—e.g., citizens’ patriotic pride in their country’s natural beauty and contribution to science and technology, but did include a measure of national pride.

Despite this limitation, the analysis of the data from the twelve surveys showed that the change in people’s basis of identity from religion to nation was linked to changes in favorable attitudes toward gender equality, secular orientation, secular politics, and Western culture across all the countries for which data are available and toward democracy in all the surveys, except in Jordan and Morocco. National pride, on the other hand, was negatively linked to attitudes toward gender equality, secular orientations, secular politics, and Western culture, with the exception of no significant linkage to gender equality in Algeria. National pride had no significant link with attitudes toward democracy, except in Bangladesh and Indonesia, where it was positively linked. In terms of attitudes toward outsiders, findings were inconsistent. People who identified with the nation were less hostile to immigrant labors than people who identified with religion in five of the nine cases for which information on this variable was available, and were more hostile only
in one case, with no significant difference between the remaining three cases. The relationship between this variable and national pride was even more inconsistent across nine surveys, where three cases were shown to be positive, three negative, and the rest have no significant relationship.

Nonetheless, that the two key variables of this study—national identity and national pride—have consistently significant links with almost all the dependent variables in predictable directions across the twelve surveys is remarkable. The analysis thus provides significant support for using the concept of modalities in order to capture different clusters of homogeneous elements that rest on varying cognitive understandings of identity and national affectivity. As shown by findings from the twelve surveys, individuals who identified with the territorial nation and have lower national pride tend to cluster toward liberal values, while those identified with religion tended toward religious fundamentalism.

Finally, the analysis provided support for a version of the modernist perspective on nationalism. It showed that liberal values are significantly tied to higher socioeconomic status across virtually all the surveys. This connection between socioeconomic status and liberalism lends credence to a view that the modernist interpretations of historical cases of nationalism may apply only to the liberal-territorial modality of nationalism.3

The contrasting linkages of national identity and national pride with the two modalities of national sovereignty, where national identity reinforces liberal values while national pride Islamic fundamentalism, are drawn on analyzing cross-sectional survey data. However, if these linkages are interpreted as snapshots of the dynamics of encounters between those who are oriented toward liberal values and those oriented toward Islamic fundamentalism, the forgoing analysis thus provides a framework for speculating why a section of the Islamic publics in Muslim-majority countries has almost always violently responded to (perceived) anti-Islamic

3To be sure, there are a variety of theories that explain variations in historical outcomes. For example, Marxists have long related different forms of nationalism to different classes—e.g., liberal nationalism to the national bourgeoisie, radical nationalism or some form of fascism to petty bourgeoisie, and socialism to the working class or a coalition between workers and peasants. Drawing on Marxist class analysis, Barrington Moor relates variations in social structure—that is, in class coalition, state structure, and historical sequence of change (whether commercialization of agriculture had occurred before or after industrialization) in explaining the emergence of such historical outcomes as fascism, communism, and democracy. Mass society theorists like Hanna Arendt and Kornhauser have related pathological consequences of critical social conditions to the rise of extremist ideological movements. These approaches, however, do not explain how different types of nationalism emerge in the absence of such conditions or how the members of the same class shift their orientation from one form of nationalism to another.
behaviors by some individuals or groups in the West, while it appears that these same people have often remained dormant in responding to violent extremism in their midst or to brutal acts of repressions committed by the ruling regimes in these countries. Insofar as liberal nationalists and Islamic fundamentalists are competing for the intellectual control of their society, uproar against the West under the excuse of the latter’s violence against Islam is functional for Islamic fundamentalism, as it contributes to the mobilization of national pride. And this mobilization in turn functions to strengthen the fundamentalist values and weaken liberalism. As a prime example of this process, the Islamic clerical rulers in Tehran, in order to monopolize power and reproduce this monopoly, have effectively used anti-Western, and more so anti-American, rhetoric and policies as the cornerstone of their rule in the country.

One may argue that the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, the continuation of Iran-Iraq war for six more years after the Iraqis forces were pushed back to the original border, the call for the execution of Salman Rushdie, and the brutal repression of the Green Movement, which were all conducted under the pretext of war against the U.S., were in reality conducted to weaken the liberal national alternative to their rule and strengthen Shi’a fundamentalism. As our analysis has shown, it appears that the same dynamic is at work in other Muslim-majority countries, where the mobilization of national pride tends to reinforce the idea of gender inequality, religious rule, and the rejection of secular politics and the West—all consistent with the Islamic fundamentalist modality of nationalism.

The theoretical propositions suggested in this work may also be applicable to understanding the dynamics of nationalism and national politics in other cases as well. For example, Russian nationalism may not be construed as a unitary and monolithic phenomenon. Rather, conflicting modalities of national sovereignty may be at work in the country today, as the ruling elite uses hostilities to immigrants, gay and lesbian communities, and the West, in particular the United States, as a means to provoke national pride, and hence solidify its rule in the country and undermine the influence of the liberal opposition. In Western Europe, on the other hand, the formation of the European Union and the rise of European identity may moderate the traditional oppositional dichotomy between the modalities of nationalism and patriotism. In these and other cases, to comprehend the range of variation of modalities of nationalism entails understanding the number and nature of the sociopolitical and cultural issues that are currently significant in society, which are also engaging indigenous intellectual leaders. Understanding whether these issues are resolved in a secular or religious framework that shapes the norms of the
sociopolitical community, that such resolutions are centered on the economic or cultural subjects, and that they are formulated in relation to country’s historical achievement or in opposition to outsiders; whether the individual right is subordinated to the idea of maintaining national unity against a (perceived) enemy of the nation (i.e., individual rights and national security are contrasted in an oppositional binary); whether diverse communities within the country define their identity in terms of different of religion, ethnicity, language, or territorial nation; and whether gender-related issues are a significant part of intellectual debates and political conflict in society—all provides clues for understanding the range of variation in the nationalist movements that a country may come to experience.

It would certainly be hard to project the trajectory of the nationalist movements into a country’s future. Nonetheless, understanding the type of issues being contested, considering that issues are often resolved in oppositional relation to the ideology of the ruling political regime or the cultural institutions that are dominant in society, and given that there are only finite ways in which issues may be resolved, using the proposed conceptual schema may enable us to speculate more effectively the type of modalities that are most likely to emerge in the society in the future.
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