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Mosidi Nhlapo, Barbara Anderson,  
and Marie Wentzel

Trends in Voting in South Africa  
2003-2014

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Mosidi S. Nhlapo

Statistics South Africa  
mosidin@statssa.gov.za

Barbara A. Anderson

University of Michigan  
barba@umich.edu

Marie Wentzel

Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, South Africa  
mewentzel@hsrc.ac.za

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## **Abstract**

This paper analyzes voting preferences of South Africans based on data from the South African Social Attitudes Surveys (SASAS) 2003-2014. The focus is on differences by race and age. In national election years, respondents were asked whether they voted and what party they voted for. In every year respondents were asked whether they would vote and what party they would vote for if the election were held tomorrow. This paper is based on vote intentions.

Since the end of apartheid in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) has dominated elections, attracting the support of almost all Africans, while non-Africans have increasingly supported the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA). There has been much speculation about when African allegiance to the ANC might weaken. There also has been speculation that the allegiance of better educated Africans to the ANC would weaken before that of Africans with lower educational attainment. Another aspect of possible change in voting preference and behavior relates to age. As more people who spent little of their lives under apartheid reached voting age, it was thought that the allegiance of young Africans to the ANC might be weaker than of older Africans. Also, sometimes young people view issues differently than older people. Africans were more likely to intend to vote than non-Africans, but over time race mattered less in whether a person intended to vote.

It seems that over time non-Africans felt they had more of a stake in the system and thought that voting was worthwhile. Young non-Africans are significantly more likely to support the ANC than older non-Africans, and young Africans are significantly more likely to support the DA than older Africans. Thus young voters are less tied than older voters to the party favored by most members of their racial group. Over the 2003-2014 period young and older Africans and non-Africans increased their support of the DA, and education was positively related to DA support for every group. In 2013, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), a revolutionary socialist party, broke off from the ANC. In the 2014 national election, the EFF won 6% of the vote. In the 2013 SASAS, 9% of young voting-age Africans and 6% of older Africans supported the EFF. Among both young and older Africans, education was positively related to supporting the EFF. However, African support for the ANC remained very high.

The lessening of the importance of race for intention to vote, as is some convergence in voting preferences of young voters, are positive developments. However, this convergence in party choice by race is limited. In 2014, 86% of older Africans and 83% of young Africans who intended to vote supported the ANC, while 81% of both young and older non-Africans who intended to vote supported the DA.

## Introduction

Whether people vote and party choice among voters are of interest in every country. These are especially interesting in South Africa, in which the African National Congress (ANC), a leading opponent of apartheid, has been in power at the national level since the formation of the new South Africa in 1994. Often when there is a major political change, such as a revolution or the end of apartheid, the newly empowered group long feels allegiance to the revolutionary party, despite any shortcomings or problems in the ruling party's performance. On the other hand, people remaining in the country who are members of the group that was formerly in control or relatively advantaged can feel that there is little point in their political participation. When and whether a feeling of political connectedness increases is very important for nation-building. Of special interest are the roles of race, age and education in the determination of whether people vote and the party they choose.

## South African Population Groups

There are four population groups in South Africa. They had different legal rights under apartheid, and the groups continue to be important in contemporary South Africa. Under apartheid, population group membership was a matter of legal designation. Since the end of apartheid, it is a matter of self-identification.

The percentages of the population from the 2011 census and their relative situations under apartheid are as follows:

African: 79%, most restricted under apartheid

Coloured: 9%, somewhat restricted under apartheid, but less than Africans

Asian: 3%, some restrictions under apartheid, but less than the Coloured population

White: 9%, apartheid was designed to serve their interests

In South Africa, Africans are considered to be Bantu-language speaking persons, indigenous to Africa. Coloured persons are mainly the descendants of a mixture of Portuguese, Malays and other groups and members of one ethnic group, the Khokkoi. Coloured persons have been concentrated in the Cape area. Asians are mainly descendants of persons from India. Whites are both English-speaking descendants of persons from Great Britain and Afrikaans-speaking descendants of persons from the Netherlands.


## Characteristics of Population Groups

Even after the end of apartheid, there remained substantial differences among population groups, as indicated in the percent of households with a flush toilet in the dwelling shown in Figure 1 (Statistics South Africa, 2012a: 87), and as shown in average household income by population group in Figure 2 (Statistics South Africa, 2012b).<sup>1</sup> On a wide variety of indicators, besides having been the most oppressed group under apartheid Africans continue to fare worse than the other groups (Statistics South Africa, 2010).


We know that race is socially constructed (Fearon and Laitin, 2000; Waters, 1990). However racial identification continues to be very important in contemporary South Africa, with the largest distinction between Africans and the three non-African groups. Because of these differences between population groups and because of sample size considerations, we group the three non-African groups into one group called non-Africans for most purposes in this study.

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<sup>1</sup> An exchange rate of 7Rand=\$1US is used.



**Figure 1.** Percent of Households with a Flush Toilet in Dwelling by Population Group, 2006



**Figure 2.** Average Household Income by Population Group, 2011

## South African Political History

Apartheid officially ended in 1994. The first post-apartheid election in South Africa also was in 1994. National elections occur every 5 years. South Africa has a parliamentary system, with party list elections, which makes party choice extremely important.

In a party list system, people vote for a party rather than for an individual candidate. Seats are allocated to a party proportionately to that party's share of the vote. Each party has candidates in an ordered list. Which candidates assume office depends on the candidate's place on the list and the proportion of the total vote that the party obtained. Thus, if there are 100 seats available in a legislature, and each party has a list of 100 candidates, if a party receives 20% of the vote, the first twenty candidates on that party's list will gain seats in the legislature.

The major South African political parties are:

**The African National Congress (ANC)** - The ANC played a major role in the anti-apartheid movement. Since the time of apartheid, the ANC has been part of a Tripartite Alliance with the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions, a socialist trade union group. After apartheid, the ANC-controlled government cooperated with the International Monetary Fund and pursued a macro-social structural adjustment agenda, which was criticized by some on the political left and led to tensions within the Tripartite Alliance. The ANC has won every national election.


**The Democratic Alliance (DA)** - The DA grew out of a merger between the Progressive Party, the Democratic Party and the New National Party. The New National Party was a renamed version of the National Party, which was the ruling party during apartheid, but a few members of the National Party joined the ANC. During apartheid, the Progressive Party was the only opposition party in the South African Parliament to the National Party's apartheid policies. After the end of apartheid it was renamed the Democratic Party and merged with others to form the Democratic Alliance. The National Party won the second most votes in 1994. It failed to garner any significant votes in the 1999 elections. The National Party dissolved in 2005. The DA won Cape Town municipal elections in 2001 and won Western Cape provincial elections in 2009 and 2014. DA support has overwhelmingly come from non-Africans. In 2011, only 33% of the population of Western Cape was comprised of Africans, compared to 79% of all South Africans. The DA has been characterized as a "white party," which the DA has tried hard to refute. In May 2015, Mmusi Maimane, who is African, became the leader of the DA. The DA has won the second most votes in every national election since 1999.

Other than the ANC, the DA and the National Party, parties that have done well in some post-apartheid elections in South African include:

**The Inkhata Freedom Party (IFP)** - The IFP is a Zulu-based party centered in KwaZulu-Natal Province. It advocated for a federal system of government in the run-up to the 1994 elections and called for more power to the provinces and less to the national government. It won Kwazulu-Natal provincial elections in 1994 and 1999. It won the third most votes in 1994, 1999 and 2004, and the fourth most in 2009 and 2014. The party's support has declined in recent elections, even in KwaZulu-Natal. One reason for its decline has been the rise of Jacob Zuma, who became Deputy President in 1999 and President in 2009. Jacob Zuma is Zulu.

**The Congress of the People (COPE)** - COPE broke off from the ANC and was formed mostly by supporters of the views of Thabo Mbeki, who was President after Nelson Mandela. In 2008, Mbeki was defeated by Jacob Zuma for leadership of the ANC, and did not win the South African Presidency in 2009. COPE won the third most votes in 2009. COPE still exists, but it has weakened considerably due to internal conflicts.

**The Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF)** – The EFF emerged from a split between the ANC Youth League and the rest of the ANC in 2013. The EFF considers itself a revolutionary socialist party. The EFF won the third most votes in 2014.



**Figure 3.** Percent Distribution of Votes by Party in National Elections According to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) 1994-2014

Figure 3 shows the distribution of votes for the ANC, the DA and all other parties in every post-apartheid South African national election. The ANC share rose until the 2004 election and declined after that, but it has always been more than 60%. The increase in the DA share of votes is impressive. As discussed, the composition of the vote for Other Parties has changed over time, from the National Party to the Inkhata Freedom Party and Cope, to the EFF.

## South African Voting

There is great interest in whether and when a party other than the ANC will gain political control in South Africa. An analogy is often drawn to India, which gained independence in 1947. The Congress Party played a similar role in the struggle for independence in India to the ANC in South Africa. The Congress Party lost power 30 years later in 1977 and has returned to power various times since 1977 (Heller, 2009, 2011; Reddy, 2005). In 1917, it has been 23 years since the end of apartheid.

Researchers and the press have speculated that:


1. Dissatisfaction about service delivery and concern about corruption among all groups, including Africans, would lead to a decline in support for the ANC among Africans (Alexander, 2010; Bassett and Clarke, 2008; Bond and Mottiar, 2013; Etzo, 2010).
2. DA efforts to attract Africans would be increasingly successful (Nuijit, 2013; Southall, 2014).
3. Better-off Africans would stop supporting the ANC and instead would: 1) vote for the DA, 2) vote for a third party or 3) not vote (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009; Nuijit, 2013).
4. Parties other than the ANC are not very attractive to Africans, partially because the ANC has successfully characterized the DA as a “White party” (Langfield, 2014; Southern, 2011).
5. African support for the ANC would decline as Africans who were born after the end of apartheid or who were very young at the end of apartheid reached voting age (Mattes, 2012; Smith, 2014; Southall, 2014).
6. Young people often have different political views and priorities than older people and thus could make different political choices (Harris, Wyn, and Younes, 2010; Henn and Foard, 2012).
7. Many have wondered whether the emergence of the Economic Freedom Fighters, with its strong showing in the 2014 national election, was a protest vote or if it indicates a more fundamental shift in African political support (African Globe, 2015; Engler, 2014; Southall, 2014).

## Young Adults and Social Behaviors

This paper looks at factors related to voting intentions, with a focus on young voters (age 18-35) and older voters (age 36+). Those under age 36 are eligible for membership in the ANC Youth League. The young voters correspond to the Millennials discussed in the United States 2016 election. American Millennials are usually defined as those born since 1980 and were under about age 36 in 2016.


There has been much speculation about whether voting patterns would change as young voters increasingly included those who were born after the end of apartheid (called the Born Frees) or who had been small children when apartheid ended. Those born in 1994 would have reached age 18 (voting age) in 2012, and those born in 1984, and thus age 10 or less in 1994, would have reached age 18 in 2002. The importance of when people were born is related to theories that cohorts differ throughout their lives as a result of situations they experienced at crucial times in the life course (Dietz, Stern and Guagnano, 1998; Harding and Jencks, 2003).

Figure 4 shows the percent of those born in 1984 or later, and thus age 10 or younger when apartheid ended in 1994. This is shown for all of those of voting age and among those age 18-35 for every year 2003-2014. In 2014, 73% of young voters were age 10 or younger at the end of apartheid.



**Figure 4.** Percent of Those Age 18+ and Age 18-35 Born Since 1984 by Year, 2003-2014

There has been general interest in the effects of the age distribution of the population on social phenomena and behaviors. Figure 5 shows the percent of those age 18+ who were age 18-35 for 1950-2015. In the 1970s through the late 1990s, South Africa experienced a youth bulge, which has been thought to contribute to social unrest but also to hold the potential for increased productivity (Assaad and Roudi-Faimi, 2007; Urdal, 2006). The youth bulge period roughly corresponds to the years of intense anti-Apartheid agitation.



**Figure 5.** Percent of those Age 18+ Who Were Age 18-35, South Africa, 1950-2015

**Data Source**

This study uses data from the South African Social Attitudes Surveys (SASAS). The surveys have been conducted annually since 2003 by the Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa. The fieldwork takes place sometime between August and November. South African elections occur in April or May. The focus of the surveys is on attitudes and perceptions, with some questions about behaviors. Other annual scholarly surveys in South Africa do not ask political questions, while other scholarly political surveys are not annual. SASAS are cross-sectional surveys with a large number of identical questions in each year (SASAS, 2015).



The surveys are representative of the South African population age 16+. This study uses data for those age 18+ at the time of the survey since those are the people who would be of voting age at the time of the survey. Response rates in SASAS have been high: 78%-88%.

All the results shown are based on weighted data. In statistical tests the weights are scaled so that the weighted number of cases in the analysis equals the actual number of cases in the given survey year.

In national election years, whether the respondent had voted and if so what party was chosen was asked. In every survey, a question was asked about what party the respondent would vote for (including whether the respondent would vote) if an election were held tomorrow. This paper analyzes voting intentions in order to use data for 12 years rather than for only the three election years.<sup>2</sup>

In each survey, there were about 1,800 African respondents and 1,200 non-African respondents, of which about 500 were Coloured, 400 were White, and 300 were Asian. This paper focuses on a comparison of Africans and non-Africans as a whole. Intention to vote and the party that the respondent would choose are the subjects of analysis.

### Explanatory Variables in the Analysis

Table 1 gives information about the explanatory variables used in the analysis. Education is an indicator of socio-economic status. Whether the respondent thinks life will improve in the next 10 years and the degree of trust in national government are indicators of views of the current and prospective situation in South Africa. If the respondent thinks that whether he or she votes matters is an indicator of feeling of connection with and stake in the system, while listing of corruption as one of the top three problems facing South Africa is an indicator of the degree of concern about corruption. Corruption was a choice from a list of 18 potential problems facing South Africa, including HIV, Racism, Poverty, Crime and Safety, Education and Human Rights.


**Table 1.** Explanatory Variables in the Analysis

Variable	Codes
Education	No schooling=0, Primary=1, Grade 8-11=2, Secondary school grad=3, Tertiary=4
Race	Non-African=0, African=1
Age 36+	Age 18-35=0, Age 36+=1
Age	Age in years
Year	Year of survey, 2003 through 2014
Whether I vote matters (Votematter)	Strongly disagree=1, Disagree=2, Neither=3, Agree=4, Strongly agree=5
Will life improve in next 5 years? (Lifelmpove)	Worse=1, Same=2, Improve=3
Trust in national government (Trustnatgov)	Strongly distrust=1, Distrust=2, Neither=3, Trust=4, Strongly trust=5
Corruption in top 3 problems facing South Africa (CorruptProb)	Not in top 3 problems=0 In top 3 problems=1

<sup>2</sup> Analyzes that were run on reported actual voting in election years show results virtually identical to those for voting intentions in that year, with the exception that the proportion that reported they actually voted is somewhat lower than the proportion who state they would intend to vote if an election were held tomorrow. This is consistent with the observation that many people intend to vote, but sometimes on election day something comes up so they are not able to vote.

### Age, Race and Whether People Vote

After a major political change, those allied with the newly dominant party are likely to be more politically engaged. The anti-apartheid struggle was a struggle among population groups in which Africans had been subjected to the greatest legal discrimination.




**Figure 6.** Proportion Intending to Vote by Race

Figure 6 shows the proportion intending to vote over time by race. In the surveys shortly after elections (2004 and 2009) vote intentions increased for both Africans and non-Africans. Through the period 2003-2014, Africans were more likely than non-Africans to intend to vote. After 2008 and especially after 2011 the racial gap narrowed, with non-Africans more likely to intend to vote than Africans in 2014. The racial gap narrowed both because non-Africans became more likely to intend to vote, and Africans became less likely to intend to vote. From 2003-05 to 2012-14 the proportion of non-Africans who stated they intended to vote increased from 81% to 86%, while the proportion intending to vote among Africans declined from 94% to 87%. Between 2003 and 2014, the proportion of non-Africans among those intending to vote increased from 17% to 21%.


In many countries, older people are more likely to vote than young people (Goerres, 2007; Henn and Foard, 2012; Kirby and Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2009; Wass, 2007). In the 2008 Presidential election in the United States when Barack Obama was elected, voter turnout among those age 18-29 was 51%, which was 11 percentage points higher than it had been in the 2000 Presidential election. However even in the 2008 American election, the voter turnout among those age 18-29 was lower than for older persons (Kirby and Kawashima-Ginsberg, 2009).

Figure 7 shows similar information to that in Figure 6, but also for young and older voting age persons. Older persons were more likely than young persons of the same race to intend to vote.



**Figure 7.** Proportion Intending to Vote by Race and Age Group

In every year except 2007, a question was asked about whether the respondent thought that whether he or she voted mattered. The mean values in whether the respondent thought that his or her vote mattered by race and age group by year are shown in Figure 8. Feeling that whether an individual voted mattered increased in election years (2004, 2009, 2014) except for young and older non-Africans in 2014. Among Africans, feeling that voting mattered decreased over time, while among non-Africans, after about 2006, there was an increase in the feeling that voting mattered.



**Figure 8.** Extent of Agreement that Voting Makes a Difference by Race and Age Group

Table 2 shows the results of logistic regressions of voting intention. First look at Columns 1 through 4, which show results for 2004, 2009, 2013 and 2014. Education usually did not matter, being statistically significant only in 2009. A dummy variable for African is positive and significant in 2004, 2009 and 2014 but is not significant in 2013. Age was always significant, with the older more likely than the younger to intend to vote. In every year feeling that your vote mattered was significantly related to intending to vote.

**Table 2.** Logistic Regression Results for Intention to Vote

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	2004	2009	2013	2014	All	All
Education	-.106	.167*	.026	-.121	.004	.005
Votematter	.980**	.434**	.392**	.462**	.405**	.398**
African	.863**	1.259**	.177	.501**	.758**	195.467**
Age	.043**	.035**	.018**	.032**	.023**	.023**
Year					-.021**	.048**
African*Year						-.097**
Constant	-2.11	-1.50	-.17	-.56	41.28	-97.80
$\chi^2$	237.27**	153.11**	83.58**	157.68**	1261.47**	1312.14**
n	2206	3201	2056	2396	24,708	24,704
Significant positive results are in bold. Significant negative results are bold italic. * p<.05; ** p<.01						

Columns 5 and 6 show results for the pooled data over time.<sup>3</sup> In Column 5 we see that overall being African was related to intention to vote and that intention to vote declined over time. In Column 6, an African\*Year interaction is added. We see that although overall being African is related to greater intention to vote, the significant negative coefficient of the African\*Year interaction shows that vote intention among Africans declined over time. When the African\*Year interaction is included, the coefficient for Year is significant and positive, reflecting the increase in vote intention among non-Africans over time. We also see that in every year and in the pooled data, voting intention is significantly positively related to age.

It seems that over time, Africans were less energized by the prospect of voting and felt that whether they voted was less important, while the opposite was true of non-Africans. It seems that non-Africans increasingly felt they had a stake in the electoral system, and this was reflected in a greater tendency to intend to vote over time.

### **African Dissatisfaction with Water and Sanitation and Electricity Provision**

Demonstrations in African residential areas expressing dissatisfaction with water and sanitation and with electricity provision have been widely expected to lead to less African support of the ANC, under the assumption that Africans generally were increasingly dissatisfied with the provision of these services. Figure 9 shows mean satisfaction among Africans with water and sanitation (asked together in the SASAS surveys) and with the provision of electricity. There was no trend in African satisfaction with either of these, although non-Africans were significantly less satisfied over time. Social movements and demonstrations are important, but such public displays are not a shortcut way to conduct an opinion poll and do not necessarily reflect the views of a group as a whole.

<sup>3</sup> Data for 2007 are not included in the pooled data, since the votematter item was not asked in 2007.




Figure 9. Mean African Satisfaction with Water and Sanitation and with Electricity Provision

### Trends in Party Choice by Race and Age Group

Figures 10-13 show trends in party choice by race and age group. It is clear that party choice is much more similar between young and older persons of the same race than between members of the same age group across racial lines. However, in recent years, the proportion of young Africans who supported the DA was higher than for older Africans, and the proportion of young non-Africans who supported the ANC was higher than for older non-Africans. Similarly, a higher proportion of older Africans than young Africans supported the ANC, and a higher proportion of older non-Africans than young non-Africans supported the DA. These issues will be pursued further later in this paper.




Figure 10. Party Choice by Young Africans




Figure 11. Party Choice by Older Africans




Figure 12. Party Choice by Young non-Africans




Figure 13. Party Choice by Older non-Africans

### Trends in Views of South Africa

Views of the national government and whether people think their lives will improve in the future can influence party choice, especially whether to support the current party in power or to favor a change in the party in power. In many less developed countries, political corruption has been seen as a major problem. In South Africa there have been increasing accusations by the DA and political commentators of corruption among ANC politicians, including Jacob Zuma. Thus views of the extent to which corruption is seen as a major problem in South Africa could influence party choice, especially whether the ruling ANC is supported.





Figure 14. Extent of Trust in National Government by Race and Age Group




**Figure 15.** Extent of Belief that Life Will Improve in Next 5 Years for Persons Like You by Race and Age Group

Figure 14 shows the extent of trust in the national government over time by race and age group, and Figure 15 shows similar information for whether people think that life will improve in the next five years for people like themselves. For both trust in national government and whether life will improve, Africans have a much more positive view than non-Africans. Also, the views of young and older persons of a given race are more similar than the views of a given age group across races. For trust in national government, for a given race there are almost no differences between older and young persons. However, for whether life will improve, young people are substantially more optimistic than older persons. There was decline in trust in national government and in optimism about the future among all groups after about 2004, but the decline in optimism about the future was greater for older than young persons.

Figure 16 shows the proportion who listed corruption among the top three problems facing South Africa by race and age group. Concern about corruption increased among all groups, but non-Africans were always substantially more concerned about corruption than Africans. The increase after about 2009 could be related to the numerous scandals in which the ANC head and national president Jacob Zuma was involved.





**Figure 16.** Proportion Listing Corruption in Top Three Problems in South Africa by Race and Age Group

### Race, Age and Party Support

In the United States, after the Civil War African-Americans tended to support the Republican Party, which was the party of Lincoln. However, at least since the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, African-Americans have overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party. African-American support of the Democratic Party remains strong, despite the agreement of many African-Americans with some conservative positions on social issues held by the Republican Party. Democratic Party identification of a candidate remains a strong influence on African-American candidate choice, even after other factors have been taken into account (Wallace *et al.*, 2009; Kidd *et al.*, 2007; Watson, 1998).

Figure 17 shows the percent of young and older Africans and non-Africans intending to vote for the ANC, among those who intended to vote. In every year, a much higher percent of Africans than non-Africans supported the ANC. Until 2012, there was little decline in African support of the ANC. After 2012, there is noticeably less ANC support among younger than older Africans. We have yet to see whether this decline in 2013 was an anomaly, a temporary reaction to the rise of the EFF, or whether it signals the beginning of a long-term trend. Even in 2014, 86% of older Africans and 83% of young Africans supported the ANC. Younger non-Africans were always more supportive of the ANC than older non-Africans.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> We do not know the reason for the spike in 2012 among non-Africans. The survey question was unchanged. We are still looking into this.




Figure 17. Proportion Supporting ANC by Race and Age Group




Figure 18. Proportion Supporting ANC by Population Group

Figure 18 shows ANC support by population group. Whites were always the least likely to support the ANC. The decline in ANC support among Coloured persons is striking. Although Coloured persons were the second most discriminated group under apartheid, Coloured persons were substantially less likely than Africans to support the ANC in 2003, and Coloured support for the ANC declined sharply over time. The somewhat erratic results for Asian respondents are not surprising, since there were only about 300 Asian respondents in each survey year.




Figure 19. Proportion Supporting DA by Race and Age Group

Figure 19 shows DA support by race and age group. In every year, a much higher percent of non-Africans than Africans supported the DA. For both young and older non-Africans, there was an enormous increase in DA support over time. There was always higher DA support among older than young non-Africans, and higher DA support among young than older Africans. African support of the DA remained very low.




Figure 20. Proportion Supporting DA by Population Group

We saw in Figures 17 and 18 that voting has been very racially divided. At all dates both young and older Africans overwhelmingly voted for the ANC, with at least 78% of voters supporting the ANC in every year. Among non-Africans the proportion supporting the DA is always high and has a steep upward trend over time, although even in 2014, it had not reached the level of African support of the ANC. Thus voting has become increasingly racially bifurcated over time, partially due to increased support of the DA among non-Africans. There has been discussion since the 1994 South African election about the extent to which party choice in South Africa was mainly determined by race and when or whether this relationship between race and party choice might weaken (Davis, 2004). Some have proposed that party choice in South Africa has been a kind of “racial census” (Ferree, 2006; McLaughlin, 2007). There has been extended discussion of when and whether class might become more important than race (Ferree, 2011; Garcia-Rivero, 2006; Southall, 2004; Taylor and Hoene, 1999).

Figure 20 shows the proportion supporting the DA by population group. Although the decrease in ANC support among the Coloured population shown in Figure 18 was striking, the increase in Coloured support of the DA is even more striking. We see a similar increase in Asian support of the DA. Although whites are most likely to support the DA at all dates, we see a strong convergence among all three non-African groups in DA support. A plurality of the population of Western Cape Province is comprised of Coloured persons, and the DA success in the Western Cape provincial elections in 2009 was substantially due to Coloured support of the DA. We see an increase in African support of the DA over time from 1% in 2003-2005 to 5% in 2012-2014.

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of logistic regressions of ANC support and of DA support, among those who intend to vote. These tables are based on the pooled data for all surveys. Table 3 shows the results for all members of a given racial group, while Table 4 looks separately at older and younger Africans and non-Africans.

In Table 3 education is negatively related to ANC support, but positively related to DA support for both Africans and non-Africans. Trust in government and being optimistic about the future are positively related to ANC support. For Africans there is a significant negative trend in ANC support but no significant trend in ANC support for non-Africans. Seeing corruption as a problem is not related to African support of the ANC but is negatively related to ANC support for non-Africans.

The opposite of these are related to DA support. As for ANC support, seeing corruption as a problem is significant for non-African support of the DA but is insignificant for African support of the DA. For both Africans and non-Africans support of the DA has significantly increased over time.

Interestingly, older Africans and younger non-Africans are more likely to support the ANC. Older non-Africans and younger Africans are more likely over time to support the DA. Thus, for both Africans and non-Africans, younger people are more likely than older people to support the party that as not traditionally been supported by their racial group.

In Table 4, we see that the general results seen in Table 3 remain. Education was significantly negatively related to ANC support for every group except for older Africans, while for every group education was significantly positively related to DA support. Seeing corruption as a problem was only positively related to DA support among older non-Africans and was only negatively related to ANC support among Older non-Africans. However seeing corruption as a problem is positively related to ANC support among Young Africans. Apparently Young Africans who saw corruption as a problem did not see the ANC as the source of the problem. Every group was significantly more likely to support the DA over time.

Note that there was a positive trend in both ANC support and DA support for Older Africans. This is because support for third parties declined among Older Africans, There was less support for the Inkhata Freedom Party over time; increased support for the Economic Freedom Fighters was not enough to offset decline in support for other third parties.

**Table 3.** Logistic Regression Results for Intention to Vote for ANC and for the DA by Race

	Support ANC		Support DA	
	African	Non-African	African	Non-African
Education	<i>-.057*</i>	<i>-.643**</i>	<b>.487**</b>	<b>.503**</b>
Trustnatgov	<b>.264**</b>	<b>.512**</b>	<i>-.391**</i>	<i>-.372**</i>
LifelImprove	<b>.184**</b>	<b>.451**</b>	<i>-.141*</i>	<i>-.337**</i>
CorruptProb	<b>.135</b>	<i>-.425**</i>	<b>.170</b>	<b>.324**</b>
Year	<i>-.016*</i>	<i>-.022</i>	<b>.123**</b>	<b>.143**</b>
Age 35+	<b>.118*</b>	<i>-.222**</i>	<i>-.311**</i>	<b>.224**</b>
Constant	<b>32.98</b>	<b>42.07</b>	<b>-250.94</b>	<b>-285.63</b>
X <sup>2</sup>	<b>316.46**</b>	<b>801.89**</b>	<b>360.88**</b>	<b>859.12**</b>
n	<b>14,842</b>	<b>7038</b>	<b>14,842</b>	<b>7038</b>
Significant positive results are in bold. Significant negative results are bold italic. * p<.05; ** p<.01				

**Table 4.** Logistic Regression Results for Intention to Vote for ANC and for the DA by Race and Age Group

	Young African	Older African	Young non-African	Older non-African
	<b>Support ANC</b>			
Education	<i>-.110**</i>	<i>-.029</i>	<i>-.737**</i>	<i>-.611**</i>
Trustnatgov	<b>.275**</b>	<b>.252**</b>	<b>.523**</b>	<b>.504**</b>
LifelImprove	<b>.180**</b>	<b>.196**</b>	<b>.355**</b>	<b>.500**</b>
CorruptProb	<b>.246**</b>	<b>.004</b>	<i>-.246</i>	<i>-.516**</i>
Year	<i>-.049**</i>	<i>.030**</i>	<i>-.006</i>	<i>-.030</i>
Constant	<b>100.10</b>	<b>-60.13</b>	<b>.11.55</b>	<b>58.44</b>
X <sup>2</sup>	<b>234.81**</b>	<b>99.074**</b>	<b>230.66**</b>	<b>559.05**</b>
n	<b>7428</b>	<b>7414</b>	<b>2045</b>	<b>4993</b>
<b>Support DA</b>				
Education	<b>.405**</b>	<b>.576**</b>	<b>.713**</b>	<b>.439**</b>
Trustnatgov	<i>-.374**</i>	<i>-.428**</i>	<i>-.417**</i>	<i>-.348**</i>
LifelImprove	<i>-.068</i>	<i>-.276*</i>	<i>-.243**</i>	<i>-.387**</i>
CorruptProb	<b>.119</b>	<b>.282</b>	<b>.262</b>	<b>.345**</b>
Year	<b>.118**</b>	<b>.136**</b>	<b>.149**</b>	<b>.139**</b>
Constant	<b>-240.26</b>	<b>-276.08</b>	<b>-299.53</b>	<b>-279.03</b>
X <sup>2</sup>	<b>166.94**</b>	<b>155.33**</b>	<b>286.36**</b>	<b>560.70**</b>
n	<b>7428</b>	<b>7414</b>	<b>2045</b>	<b>4993</b>
Significant positive results are in bold. Significant negative results are bold italic. * p<.05; ** p<.01				

### The Nature of EFF Support

Intention to vote for the Economic Freedom Fighters was first asked in the 2013 SASAS. In 2013, 6.2% of those who intended to vote chose the EFF. This is close to the 6.4% of voters who chose the EFF in the 2014 national election, according to the South African Independent Election Commission. In the 2013 SASAS, 99% of those choosing the EFF were African. Among African supporters 64% were young voting age persons. This constituted 9.1% of young Africans who intended to vote and 6.0% of older Africans who intended to vote. For both young and older Africans support of the EFF was significantly positively correlated with education. In the 2013 SASAS, 5.2% of young Africans and 2.9% of older Africans supported the DA. Thus in 2013, substantially more Africans, both young and older, supported the EFF than supported the DA. In 2013, at least, the EFF seems to have taken some African support away from the DA. Thus, the appeal of the EFF among young Africans was clear in October/November 2013 when the 2013 SASAS was in the field, six months before the 2014 national election.

## Concluding Comments

If we look back at the expectations and speculations discussed earlier, we see that there is no trend in African dissatisfaction with water and sanitation and electricity provision. However, the analysis supports many of the other expectations. There has been an increasing trend to DA support among Africans, education is related to this trend, and DA support is greater among young than older Africans.

There are encouraging and less encouraging developments in South African voting. On the one hand intention to vote among non-Africans has increased, and race is less important for vote intention over time. On the other hand, party choice has overall become more bifurcated by race. However, young Africans and young non-Africans have become less tied to the party that their racial group has traditionally supported. Thus, South Africa might be slowly moving toward a situation in which the ANC, the party of the anti-apartheid struggle, will no longer continuously hold power at the national level.

However, this movement away from the usual party of a person's race has been slow. In 2014, 83% of young Africans and 86% of older Africans supported the ANC; 81% of both young and older non-Africans supported the DA. A time when race does not matter for party choice seems very far in the future.

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